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vAbstract
The present thesis is a contribution to a project that is carried out by Michael Rathjen
and Andreas Weiermann to give a general method to study the proof-complexity of Σ01-
sentences. This general method uses the generalised ordinal-analysis that was given by
Buchholz, Ru¨ede and Strahm in [5] and [44] as well as the generalised characterisation
of provable-recursive functions of PA + TI(≺ α) that was given by Weiermann in [60].
The present thesis links these two methods by giving an explicit elementary bound for the
proof-complexity increment that occurs after the transition from the theory ÎD
i
ω + TI(≺
α), which was used by Ru¨ede and Strahm, to the theory PA + TI(≺ α), which was
analysed by Weiermann.
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CONTENTS 1
Introduction
The main purpose of the present thesis is to provide a technical lemma for a research
project of Michael Rathjen and Andreas Weiermann that was outlined in Michael
Rathjen’s talk at the Bertinoro International Center for Informatics in 2011. Rathjen’s
and Weiermann’s work on Kruskal’s theorem in [41] foreshadows a general method to
bound the complexity of deductions of Σ01-sentences as well as a general method to prove
Π02-conservativity for arithmetical theories. Regarding the complexity of deductions of
Σ01-sentences, the idea is rather simple:
If the witnesses of a Σ01-sentence are very big, then the complexity of its
deduction must lie above a certain limit.
The basic methods to make this precise are well known. In the case of a Σ01-sentence σ
that is deducible in a theory T with a deduction of complexity n, in symbols
T `n σ,
one tries to give an ordinal-analysis of T . Under the assumption that this ordinal-analysis
gives the ordinal α one can usually prove that T is Π02-conservative over PA+ TI(≺ α):
T ≡Π02 PA+ TI(≺ α).
Since the theories PA + TI(≺ α) are well-studied, one can use classical subrecursion
theory to bound the witnesses of σ by a Hardy function Hβn(0), where βn is smaller than
α and depends on the complexity of the deduction of σ in T . Hence, if the witnesses of σ
are bigger than Hβn(0), then the complexity of any deduction of σ must be bigger than n.
Generalising this argument faces two issues even in the case when a natural ordinal
notation system is used in the ordinal-analysis. First, one has to find a recipe to prove
that T ≡Π02 PA + TI(≺ α) from an ordinal-analysis that is general enough to draw
general conclusions from it. Here we face the problems that one has to unify the methods
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of formalising an ordinal-analysis and that there are ordinal-analyses in the literature that
include methods that hinder proving conservativity in the standard ways, e.g. the Ω-rule.
Second, one has to find a general approach in subrecursion theory to bound the witnesses
of a deducible Σ01-sentence. Here we face the problem that the assignment of fundamental
sequences to an ordinal notation system must be generalised in order to define a version
of the Hardy hierarchy that is independent enough from the particular ordinal notation
system, which was used in the ordinal-analysis, to give meaningful bounds.
Both of these issues have been already resolved. Buchholz discovered in [5] that an
intuitionistic version of the theory of inductive definitions is Π02-conservative over PA
and can therefore be used to replace PA in PA + TI(≺ α). Since all infinite deduction
systems that are used in ordinal-analysis are inductively defined, this solves the first
problem for a large number of ordinal-analyses that are present in the literature. In [44]
Ru¨ede and Strahm strengthened Buchholz’s result by showing that Π02-conservativity over
PA is preserved, when certain inductive definitions are iterated; hence also the missing
ordinal-analyses, those which include the Ω-rule, are covered as well. The second issue
was solved by Weiermann in [60] by drawing on Buchholz’s, Cichon’s and Weiermann’s
work, which is presented in [7]. Using Cichon’s notion of a norm that can be defined on
all ordinal notation systems which are present in the literature, in [60] Weiermann was
able to generalise the Hardy functions in a way that supports the previously given aims.
However it remained open how these two solutions work together; in order to use
Weiermann’s approach of subrecursion theory in the case of the Π02-conservativity that
was proved for Ru¨ede’s and Strahm’s theories of inductive definitions to study the
complexity of deductions of Σ01-sentences, one has to ensure that the function Hβn , that
is found by Weiermann’s approach when working directly with PA + TI(≺ α), is not
too far away from Hβm , that is found by Weiermann’s approach when working indirectly
via theories of inductive definitions. In other words: one has to ensure that the proof-
theoretical reduction that Ru¨ede and Strahm used to prove their Π02-conservativity result
gives a rather weak speed-up for the theories of inductive definitions over PA+TI(≺ α).
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This is done in the present thesis.
The plan of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 1 has no connection to the rest of the
thesis. It is a philosophical paper that I tried to publish during my PhD. I developed a
method for philosopy inspired by proof theory by following a Carnapian line, in contrast
to American pragmatism. I hoped that it might be a philosophically fruitful alternative
to the contemporary idealists and pragmatists in modern inferentialism. I tried this by
solving a central problem in proof-theoretical semantic by working out the differences
between the requirement for harmony and that for compositionality, and focusing on the
latter without ignoring the former.1 I hoped that a purely syntax-based semantic, that
is also an alternative to the commonly used holistic syntax-based semantic, would show
the community of philosophy of logic that there is a fruitful way of doing philosophy
syntactically without relying on common human behaviour, because common human
behaviour seems to be a bad starting point, when a highly academic field like logic is the
subject of philosophical theorising. For a certain amount of “educational brain-washing”
has to take place before people consider studying logic in a certain manner, which usually
differs from ordinary human behaviour.2
Chapter 2 starts with most of the bookkeeping that has to be done; hence most of the
standard notions that are used in metamathematics are defined. Also the most common
notions of theory reduction are presented and compared. Primarily the notion of proof-
theoretical reduction is introduced and it is emphasised that most of the techniques that
are used in proof-theory, including some other notions of theory reduction, fall under
this notion. Since there was a dispute between Niebergall [35] and Feferman [18] about
such matters, we use this dispute as a narrative for our presentation of proof-theoretical
reduction.
Chapter 3 introduces the technique of ordinal-analysis and emphasises how it can be
1Luckily, therefore my approach is not targeted by Rumfitt’s critique as formulated in [45].
2I was very pleased that Dutilh Novaes realised this point in her book [14] as well, where she argues for
it on a level of scrutiny that I am not yet able to provide.
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used to prove conservativity results of the form
T ≡Π02 PA+ TI(≺ α).
Moreover it introduces fix-point free intuitionistic theories of iterated inductive definitions
and presents Ru¨ede’s and Strahm’s proof-theoretical reduction that proves that these
theories are Π02-conservative over PA. The chapter finishes with the proof that this Π
0
2-
conservativity is preserved when axioms for transfinite induction are present.
Chapter 4 introduces the Ω-rule and sketches how these theories of iterated inductive
definitions can be used to prove Π02-conservativity for theories whose ordinal-analysis
uses the Ω-rule. This is done on a particular case that is also an example for a situation
that is discussed in Chapter 5.
Chapter 5 starts by introducing the notions of deduction complexity and speed-up. It
continues by explaining Weiermann’s general approach from subrecursion theory and
applies this approach to the deduction complexity of Σ01-sentences.
In Chapter 6 the actual work is done. We analyse the relevant proofs from Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3, which define a proof-theoretical reduction, to how the operations that are in
use in these proofs increase the complexity of certain deductions.
In Appendix A I extend my Master Thesis, which I wrote at the University of Vienna.
Here I show that Gentzen’s method to prove the consistency of PA as presented in [57]
is elementary in one use of an ε0-descent recursion.
Appendix B fails to solve a problem in that I was interested for quite a while: to give
an ordinal-analysis of a weak system like EA. The proofs are correct but the results are
not new. The issue here was that I believed that transfinite induction for ∆00-formulas and
elementary-recursive well-foundedness have the same Π02-consequences over EA. For
trivial reasons this is not the case, as Arnold Beckmann told me after I submitted my
Thesis for examination. However, Appendix B presents my thoughts about this topic.
Appendix C is just a list of the deduction systems that are used throughout the thesis.
5Chapter 1
Justifying the use of Multi-Conclusion
Sequents
1.1 Introduction
Proof-theoretic semantics goes back to Dag Prawitz’s efforts to clarify Gerhard Gentzen’s
comments on the calculi that were developed from the latter and got its current form by
Dummett’s book The Logical Basis of Metaphysics published in 1991 (see [47]).1 The
original aim of proof-theoretic semantics was to give a theory of meaning for a logical
vocabulary through introduction and elimination rules that were taken from the calculus
of natural deduction, which was viewed as a model of ordinary language use. The least
metaphysically loaded semantics, in these terms, was aimed at serving as a method of
justification for logical inferences to form a logic which does not presuppose the solutions
of great philosophical problems to which it is applied to (see [13]). Dummett’s own
explanatory example is the dispute about quantum mechanical realism. The distributive
law
[ϕ ∧ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2)]↔ [(ϕ ∧ ψ1) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ2)]
1The name “proof-theoretic semantics” was introduced by Schroeder-Heister much later.
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is banned from quantum logic, but is used in validity proofs using truth tables to justify
inferences of classical logic. If a quantum mechanical realist refuses to accept the
distributive law, a validity proof using truth tables is of no use for convincing her. For
she could object that, the use of two-valued semantics already presupposes a so-and-so-
being of the world which is in contradiction to the quantum world. But according to
Dummett, if one can justify the distributive law in terms of ordinary language use, then
she has to change her opinion in one way or another.
One can find in the literature on proof-theoretic semantics the view that the character of
intuitionistic logic is related to anti-realism while classical logic shows its own connection
to realism. This is not meant as a statistically significant correlation between an anti-
realistic position and the preference for intuitinistic logic in philosophers’ stances, but
as a inherent claim about those logics. In the context of proof-theoretic semantics the
correlation is based on the possibility of giving intuitionistic logic a proof-theoretic
semantics while for classical logic such an account fails.
“According to Dummett, the logical position of intuitionism corresponds to
the philosophical position of anti-realism. [...] Following Dummett, major
parts of proof-theoretic semantics are associated with anti-realism.” [47]
To count a proof-theoretic semantics as anti-realistic is based on its preference for
syntactically given deduction rules, which are inspired by ordinary language use, to truth
assignments and satisfiability by a model.
Unfortunately the literature is very imprecise in this respect. The proof-theoretic
semanticists do not argue that those two diametrically opposed metaphysical theories
correspond to the logics per se. But they do so, if one favours a compositional meaning
theory, as a proof-theoretical semantics is as well. In Dummett’s own account a logic is
viewed as a set of schematically specified inferences without a presupposed semantics,
since he tries to justify certain inferences by ordinary language use (through stipulated
introduction and elimination rules) without relying on the pictures that are based in a
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metaphysics and usually govern a semantics. Subsequently Dummett diverts the possible
meaning theories for these logics into compositional and holistic ones. In the latter a
justification of a particular inference is not possible, since the meaning of the logical
vocabulary is partly given through the possibility of this inference and not vice versa.
Therefore a compositional character of proof-theoretic semantics is demanded. But, as
Dummett explains in [13, p. 225], if we adopt a holistic meaning theory, an anti-realistic
position that essentially includes classical logic is arguable. However one might grant
that, since the context in which proof-theoretic semanticists argue is justification related
and a holistic position lacks the possibility to justify anyway, such things do not have to
be announced explicitly.
In this paper it will be argued that a compositional meaning theory can be given
through a proof-theoretic semantics which is able to justify all inferences of classical
propositional logic and does not diverge more from ordinary language use than that
given by Dummett himself. By extending an account given by Franz von Kutschera in
1968 using sequents with multiple conclusions, a proof-theoretic semantics for classical
logic will be constructed. An analysis of the general use of free variables in proof-
theoretic approaches to first-order logic will expose that the arguments for a refusal of
using multiple conclusions are disproportionate. For it will be shown that the use of
free variables is as problematic for Dummett’s account as that of sequents with multiple
conclusions. This allows us to extend von Kutschera’s account in such a way that
it justifies classical propositional logic, because a general refusal of free variables is
impossible, when the used inference rules have finitely many premisses.
The argument presented above is essentially different from the justification of sequents
with multiple conclusion which is given by Greg Restall in [42]. Restall gave a pragmatic
interpretation of sequents which is a possible (and maybe better) alternative to Dummett’s,
whereas we are not concerned here with the actual way sequents can be embedded into
or interpreted through a framework of pragmatism. On the contrary we shall not make
an issue of interpretations that might be given by pragmatists. If some connections
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are mentioned, then they are intended to help a hypothetical pragmatist, who reads the
present text, to see how the argument would work after an embedding into his wider view.
Also pragmatic views will only enter the argumentation through the so far established
techniques of proof-theoretic semantics. But since those techniques are in the end
just reasonable formal considerations that are heavily used in proof theory anyway or
merely loosely connected with the particular pragmatic stance without referring to its
conceptual specializations, these techniques can just be seen as syntactic considerations
with an unspecific intuition supporting them.2 The arguments presented here are therefore
independent of the pragmatic stance which is adopted, in particular because of their
technical nature. Moreover a syntactical orientated philosopher may not have to adopt
a pragmatic view at all to follow the argumentation which is presented here.
The main consequence of the consideration given here is that any logic can be seen as
metaphysically neutral, or may be considered as free from it, even for those who demand
a compositional semantics.
1.2 A Gentzen-semantics
The sequent calculi developed by Gerhard Gentzen use sequents as the smallest operative
unit. This separates them from all the other calculi commonly in use, since their
operations are defined over formulas. A sequent is a syntactical object of the form
(ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ), where ϕ1, ...ϕn, ψ are formulas of a presupposed language L while
⇒ is not a primitive symbol of L, but a symbol particularly attached to the calculus.
There are many ways of interpreting a sequent. Here we restrict our self to a reading
which interprets (ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ) as an argument with ϕ1, ..., ϕn as premises and the
conclusion ψ. A sequent calculus can therefore be seen as a meta calculus of another
2For instance, the assertion that in general only finitely many terms can be put into a justification of a
general statement is not in need of a fancy analysis of humans’ use of substantives. Also such intuitions
have been guiding proof-theory from the beginning on without being justified by a theory.
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calculus K in the sense that, if K deduces from the formulas ϕ1, ..., ϕn the formula ψ,
notated as ϕ1, ..., ϕn `K ψ, then the associated sequent calculus deduces the sequent
(ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ). Therefore a sequent can be seen as the syntactic counterpart of the
logical entailment relation ϕ1, ..., ϕn |= ψ that was introduced by Tarski via the notion of
satisfiability in models. This makes a proof-theoretic semantics formulated via sequents
a possible alternative to Tarski’s semantics. Since in this part of the paper we only aim to
give a semantics for propositional logic, we restrict our self to a language of propositional
logic. This collapses Tarski’s notion to assignments of truth values to formulas.
Franz von Kutschera described in his paper from 1968 [30] a semantics, which can
be seen as a proof-theoretic semantics (see [47]). This semantics, which was called
Gentzen-semantics by von Kutschera, suits our purposes of giving a proof-theoretic
semantics for classical logic very well. For it is already formulated via sequents, which
avoids the complications that the common formulations via natural deduction offer to
classical logic.3 Before this semantics can be introduced a language L0 has to be defined,
whose primitive symbols include the propositional constants A0, A1, A2, A3, ... and
finitely many connectives Fm00 , ..., F
mn
n , where mi denotes the arity of the connective.
L0 is inductively defined so that any Ai is a formula and, if ϕ1, ..., ϕmi have been
realised as formulas, every Fmii (ϕ1, ..., ϕmi) is a formula. The meaning of a connective
is subsequently stipulated through the introduction rules into the left and right side of
the sequent. To make sense of these stipulations one has to clarify how to treat sequents
independently from the connectives. Therefore the following stipulations have to be
made:
3This problems occur through particularities of the formulations for negation rules in natural deduction.
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Initial Sequents: ϕ⇒ ϕ
Weakening Left:
∆⇒ ϕ
∆, ψ ⇒ ϕ
Weakening Right:
∆⇒
∆⇒ ϕ
Cut:
∆⇒ ψ ∆, ψ ⇒ ϕ
∆⇒ ϕ
Exchange:
Γ, ψ, ϕ,∆⇒ σ
Γ, ϕ, ψ,∆⇒ σ
Contraction:
Γ, ϕ, ϕ,⇒ ψ
Γ, ϕ,⇒ ψ
Here ϕ, ψ, σ are formulas of L0 and ∆,Γ are sequences of such formulas. A
sequent of the form (ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒) is, in accordance with Hilbert’s generalisation of a
contradictory system as a trivial one and the presence of weakening right, interpreted as
the inconsistency of {ϕ1, ..., ϕn}. Using this as a basis, the meaning of a connective can
be stipulated by the introduction rules. But since we are aiming at a compositional theory
of meaning, some restrictions have to be demanded.
First, one has to demand that there is only one occurrence of a single connective and
no other connective occurs in the schema by which the rule is stipulated. Moreover
every explicitly occurring formula in the schema must be a subformula of the formula in
which the connective occurs. These restrictions ensure that the meanings of connectives
are mutually independent of each other and that the semantics is compositional, i.e. the
meaning of a formula is determined by the meaning of its subformulas and the meaning of
the connectives it is formed of. As it is shown in [30], the initial sequents may therefore
only be formed by propositional constants, and the introduction rules for a F n on the right
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side of a sequent must be of the following form:
(∆,∆11 ⇒ Ω11), ..., (∆,∆1St ⇒ Ω1St)
∆⇒ F n(ϕ1, ..., ϕn)
....
(∆,∆t1 ⇒ Ωt1), ..., (∆,∆tSt ⇒ ΩtSt)
∆⇒ F n(ϕ1, ..., ϕn) .
Here the ∆ij and Ωij include only subformulas of ϕ1, ..., ϕn, with the additional restriction
that Ωij does not enumerate more than one formula.
As a second requirement, von Kutschera demands, by presence of the cut-rule, that the
introduction rules on the left side for F n have to have a form which ensures conservativity
of the system over its fragment which does not include any rule for F n, i.e. every provable
sequent which does not include F n must be provable without using an F n introduction
rule. As shown in [30], this requires the following form of the introduction rules on the
left side:
(∆,∆11 ⇒ Ω), ..., (∆,∆1,S1 ⇒ Ω)
∆, F (ϕ1, ..., ϕn)⇒ Ω....
(∆,∆t1 ⇒ Ω), ..., (∆,∆t,St ⇒ Ω)
∆, F (ϕ1, ..., ϕn)⇒ Ω
As before ∆ij and Ω only include subformulas of ϕ1, ..., ϕn and Ω does not enumerate
more than one formula.
Clearly the second requirement is founded in the required compositional character of
the semantics, since it separates the meaning of the connectives from each other. In a
more modern reading however this requirement ensures an additional one. Since the
introduction rules on the left side correlate with the elimination rules in natural deduction
by the presence of the cut-rule, the second requirement guarantees intrinsic and total
harmony in the sense of Dummett (see [13]). According to Dummett’s harmony criterion
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the verificational and pragmatic aspects of a theory of meaning must be in harmony, i.e.
depending on which is favoured the aspects of the other must be justified in terms of it.
Thereby are the verificational aspects of a theory of meaning which determine when a
sentence can be asserted as true while the pragmatic aspects settle what conclusions can
be drawn from a given sentence. In the case of a theory of meaning that is given through
a proof-theoretic semantics which is built via natural deduction, Dummett assigns the
introduction rules to the verificational and the elimination rules to the pragmatic aspects
of this meaning theory. Since here the interpretation of a sequent as a representation of
an argument is chosen, the harmony criterion becomes the harmony between introduction
rule on the right side to introduction rules on the left side. For, in contrast to Dummett,
a sequent calculus is not understood through a natural deduction calculus (see [13, p.
185, p. 248]) here, but as a metacalculus for any other kind of calculus. Therefore the
pragmatic aspect of a connective in a logic becomes the provability of a sequent where
the connective in question appears on the left side. Hence the part an elimination rule
plays in a proof-theoretic semantics that is formulated via natural deduction correlates to
those of an introduction rule on the left side in a formulation via sequents. Consequently
elimination rules for a sequent style formulation of a proof-theoretic semantics do not
carry any additional meaning. Here intrinsic harmony correlates therefore with the
possibility of justifying the introduction rules on the left side by the previously stipulated
introduction rules on the right side by presence of the cut-rule or vice-versa.
The notion of total harmony is satisfied if the calculus formed by the stipulated rules is
conservative over its parts where exactly one connective is removed (see [13, p. 250]).
As von Kutschera proved in [30], every connective which can be formulated by rules
satisfying the two requirements of the Gentzen-semantics are already explicitly definable
by the connectives ¬,∨,∧ and→ of intuitionistic logic.4 This is founded on the fact that
4The proof uses generalised sequents where the symbol⇒ appears finitely nested, e.g. Γ⇒ (∆⇒ Λ),
but since the proof is not of any interest for our considerations here we will not have a closer look into it.
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the usual introduction rules for ¬,∨,∧ and → are generating intuitionistic logic when
they are restricted to sequents with only one formula on their right side (see [57]), and
satisfy the pre-given Gentzen-semantics, as one can easily see.5
Introduction Right Introduction Left
ϕ,∆⇒
∆⇒ ¬ϕ
∆⇒ ϕ
¬ϕ,∆⇒
∆⇒ ϕ ∆⇒ ψ
∆⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ
ϕ,∆⇒ Ω
ϕ ∧ ψ,∆⇒ Ω
ψ,∆⇒ Ω
ϕ ∧ ψ,∆⇒ Ω
∆⇒ ϕ
∆⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ,∆⇒ Ω ψ,∆⇒ Ω
ϕ ∨ ψ,∆⇒ Ω
∆⇒ ψ
∆⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ
ϕ,∆⇒ ψ
∆⇒ ϕ→ ψ
∆⇒ ϕ ψ,∆⇒ Ω
ϕ→ ψ,∆⇒ Ω
Therefore von Kutschera’s result excludes such a semantics for classical logic. Von
Kutschera’s result is however not limited to only giving a division of intuitionistic and
classical logic (this would have been clear according to the conservativity criterion).6
Its importance is exhibited by its characterisation of intuitionistic logic as the maximal
5As explained before, we view intuitionistic logic as the set of all intuitionistically valid formulas.
6If one is choosing the common natural deduction calculus that is equivalent to the previously given one
in sequent style, then extending this calculus by classical negation new ¬-free formulas can be proved. This
is explained in the section about conservativity below.
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logic satisfying the very natural requirements given above. This is of particular interest,
since it characterises intuitionistic logic purely in terms of logic (as a discipline) without
referring to a metaphysical notion of constructivism or to algebraic structures (such as
tree-like ordered models).
If a similar semantics for classical logic, that keeps some compositional character,
is aimed at, then, beside dropping the conservativity claim, the requirements on the
schematic form of the introduction rules have to be changed. The first possibility is to
drop the demand that F n must occur exactly once in the schematic representation of the
rule. This allows us to introduce rules of the form
∆⇒ ¬¬ϕ
∆⇒ ϕ
∆, ϕ⇒ ψ
∆,¬¬ϕ⇒ ψ.
By the Go¨del-Gentzen-translation of intuitionistic into classical logic (see [58]) and the
classically valid formula
ϕ↔ ¬¬ϕ,
extending the intuitionistic sequent calculus by those rules would yield classical logic.
However, as Dummett notes in [13], such a move gives double negation a separate
meaning from ordinary ¬, which would disturb our efforts to give a compositional
semantics for the usual connectives. Another possibility is to drop the restriction to
sequents having only one formula on the right side, i.e. allowing sequents of the form
(ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ1, ..., ψm), which are called multi-conclusion sequents in the following.
In this case one has to add the rule of weakening right
∆⇒ Γ
∆⇒ Γ, ϕ
to the calculus as well. Using multi-conclusion sequents has the advantage that
conservativity is still assured and we will have a closer look into it in the following.
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1.3 Multi-Conclusion Sequents
Arguments against the use of multi-conclusion sequents in the literature of proof-theoretic
semantics are mostly versions or direct citations of Dummett’s argument in [13, p. 187],
which refers to ordinary language use. According to Dummett, the use of sequents
with only one formula on the right side for purposes of semantics is justified, since
one does not have to have an understanding of a logical connective to understand the
sequent.7 As said before, a sequent (ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ) can be viewed as an argument
with the premises ϕ1, ..., ϕn and conclusion ψ. But such an interpretation is not possible
in cases of multi-conclusion sequents like (ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ1, ..., ψn), because there are
no occurrences of arguments drawing more than one conclusion in ordinary language
use. Consequently such sequents must be interpreted through another sequent of the form
(ϕ1, ..., ϕn ⇒ ψ1 ∨ ... ∨ ψn) and therefore presuppose an understanding of ∨. This is
not symmetric to the use of sequents with multiple premises as Dummett explains. In
terms of valid arguments there is indeed no difference in using ϕ1 ∧ ... ∧ ϕn instead of
ϕ1, ..., ϕn, but by contrast with the case of multi-conclusions one does not have to do
this. For assuming many premises is a primitive part of ordinary language use and can
therefore be stipulated without harm.8
However, even when one is mainly interested in a theory of meaning for propositional
connectives, the methods that are used must be somehow extendible to first-order logic,
if the theory of meaning is aimed at being a proper alternative to those given by a model-
theoretic semantics. But after an extension to some kind of quantification, most syntactic
methods have in common that some syntactic entities enter in a close relationship
7Avoiding a circularity here is crucial for Dummett’s aims, since he wants to give a justification for
logical inferences (see [13]).
8Restall avoids being a target of this argument by changing the interpretation of a inference rule. While
Dummett interprets sequents through the warrant to assert the sentence on the right side in [13], Restall
sees a sequent as a state in a dispute where the ϕ1, ..., ϕn are accepted and the ψ1, ..., ψm are rejected by an
opponent.
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(according to their usage) with those quantifiers. Consequently formulas including an
occurrence of such an entity without a related occurrence of one of their associated
quantifiers obstruct, at least partly, an interpretation. For instance if one wants to prove in
a finite calculus K the following
ϕ1, ..., ϕn `K ∀xψ(x),
she has to use a rule of the following form.9
Natural Deduction Sequent Calculus
ϕ(y)
∀xϕ(x)
∆⇒ ϕ(y)
∆⇒ ∀xϕ(x)
Here one has to take some restrictions on the occurrences of y into account. In natural
deduction y must not occur in any open assumption and in the case of a sequent calculus
y must not occur in ∆ ⇒ ∀xϕ(x). By following the approach that introduction and
elimination rules stipulate the meaning of the logical vocabulary and presupposing total
interpretability of every entity in use one faces the problem of not being able to interpret
free variables without presupposing an understanding of the ∀-quantifier. For, since
free variables do not occur in ordinary language use, we are prevented from giving an
obvious interpretation. Also on the basis of the rules which are given so far only the
quantifier rules take free variables into account. Consequently, without a fancy theory
of meaning having been presupposed, one has to interpret (ψ1(x), ..., ψn(x) ⇒ ϕ(x))
through the sequent (∀xψ1(x), ...,∀xψn(x) ⇒ ∀xϕ(x))10 or treat the first sequent as
uninterpreted. In the rest of this section we adopt the so far rather naive view of taking
sequents including free variables as essentially lacking an interpretation. The next section
9A calculus is called finite, when all its rules have finitely many premises.
10Such a treatment is common in formal logic, but presupposes an understanding of the ∀-quantifier.
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will include responses to the obvious objections against such a view.
Dummett does not recognise these difficulties, because he reacts to a consequence of the
problem just described by dividing his justification methods for logical inferences into
three kinds. A proof-theoretic justification of the first kind is to prove a logical principle
from other principles that are seen as more fundamental and therefore treated as axioms. A
proof-theoretic semantics is first used in a justification of the second kind. If the focus lies
on the introduction rules of natural deduction, then the formulas in the logical inference
that are to be justified are analysed according to their assumptions. This is exemplified by
a justification of the inference
(ϕ→ ψ1) ∨ (ϕ→ ψ2)
ϕ→ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2) .
By starting with the premise, the meaning of ∨, which is stipulated by the rules
φ1
φ1 ∨ φ2
φ2
φ1 ∨ φ2,
leads us either to the formula (ϕ → ψ1) or (ϕ → ψ2).11 Since the procedure of the
justification is symmetric for the two cases, we continue with (ϕ → ψ1). According to
the rule
[φ1]....
φ2
φ1 → φ2,
which governs the meaning of→, one gets ϕ.
Next the conclusion comes into focus. Since the main connective is →, again we get
ϕ through the meaning stipulated by the same rule. The conclusion needs the same
assumptions as the premises, therefore the inference is justified by the meaning stipulated
11That one can use the rule for the main connective of a formula here is called the fundamental assumption
in proof-theoretic semantics, i.e. that the rule last used was an introduction rule for the main connective of
the formula (see [13]).
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by the introduction rules. In the case of a formulation via sequents this corresponds with
ending up to a sequent of the form ϕ ⇒ ϕ, because in a formulation with sequents an
inference, which must be justified, it can be expressed as the sequent
(ϕ→ ψ1) ∨ (ϕ→ ψ2)⇒ ϕ→ (ψ1 ∨ ψ2).
As Dummett points out (see [13, p. 259-264]), the justification method cannot work that
way in the case of a ∀-quantifier, since it would justify the inference
∀x[ϕ(x) ∨ ψ(x)]
[∀xϕ(x)] ∨ [∀xψ(x)],
which is generally seen as invalid. The reason for this is connected with the variable
restrictions on the quantification rules. Since the justification goes through a rule from
the conclusion to a premise, the restrictions for free variables, which are top-down
formulated, cannot be taken into account. Dummett is therefore forced to substitute
complex terms for free variables. Consequently if he reaches a ∀xφ(x) he has to proceed
to a φ(t), where t is not a free variable, instead of a ϕ(y) as the rule would say. Dummett
admits this methodological gap by calling quantification-involving proof-theoretic
justifications as of the third kind. Since the methodology has a gap here anyway
according to the justification procedure, the problem of how to interpret formulas or
sequences with free variables is not explicitly addressed.
But the justification method only uses the meaning stipulated by the rules and does not
replace it. Therefore Dummett’s method does not clarify how the possible or actual
occurrence of a sequent including free variables in a rule, that stipulates the meaning of
connectives or quantifiers, can be interpreted. Moreover it does not clarify how this lack
of interpretation is differentiated from the missing primitive interpretation in the case of
multi-conclusion sequents, which he himself described earlier as problematic. Hence he
does not give an answer to the issues identified here.
If we are aiming for a proof-theoretic semantics in terms of rules governing only
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¬,∨,∧,→, ∃ and ∀ for first-order logic, then we cannot avoid the occurrence of syntactic
entities which cannot be interpreted. This undermines the repudiation of multi-conclusion
sequents, since they can be seen as just another artefact lacking an interpretation.
Therefore a rule of the form
∆⇒ ψ1, ψ2
∆⇒ ψ1 ∨ ψ2
is not more problematic than an ∀-quantifier introduction into the right side. This view
correlates with proof-theoretic practice, where sequents are just taken seriously, when
they have only one formula on the right side.12
Also, the extension to multi-conclusion sequents keeps the requirements of a
compositional semantics satisfied in the same sense as von Kutschera formulated them
in [30] and previously explained. For the satisfaction of the first demand can be easily
seen by examination of the rules extended to multi-conclusion sequents. The second
requirement will be explained below in the section about conservativity.
Thus a proof-theoretic semantics for classical logic, which does not differ more from
ordinary language use than Dummett’s, is constructed.
1.4 Comparison with other Positions and Responses to
Objections
The first possible objection we want to scrutinise is that free variables do not need to be
interpreted separately, since they have a primitive interpretation through the possibility
of substituting terms for them. According to the aims of proof-theoretic semantics
this cannot be understood as a closure property for initial sequents or deductions under
substitution, since this would disturb the compositional character of the semantics. For in
this case ∆(x)⇒ Γ(x) can only be understood through the set of all sequents of the form
12If a sequent calculus is used for classical logic, then a provability predicate for a theory T ` ϕ is
defined as the provability of ∆⇒ ϕ, where ∆ ⊂ T , in the sequent calculus used.
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∆(t) ⇒ Γ(t) for any t, which is a significantly big part of the language.13 However, it is
possible to avoid running into holisms by formulating a rule of the form
∆(x)⇒ ϕ(x)
∆(x)[x/t]⇒ ϕ(x)[x/t],
where ϕ(x)[x/t] denotes the formula one gets by substituting t for all occurrences of x
in ϕ. A rule of this form still ensures a compositional character of the semantics, since
ϕ(x)[x/t] is understandable on the basis of ϕ and t. However the rule needs some variable
restrictions to function properly in a setting of logic, which are similar to those governing
∀-quantification. Otherwise one might draw conclusions of the form ∀x[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(f(x))]
from it, which are generally considered as not purely logical.14 Therefore one must
demand in addition that, x does not occur in ∆(x)[x/t]⇒ ϕ(x)[x/t] and no free variable
in t freely occurs in ∆(x)⇒ ϕ(x) either. But similarly as in the case of double negation,
discussed earlier, such a stipulating rule is not just a separate stipulation governing free
variables. The rule
∆(x)⇒ ϕ(x)
∆(x)[x/t]⇒ ϕ(x)[x/t],
together with the variable restrictions discussed above, expresses a meaning of free
variables which is already given through the harmony of the ∀-quantifier rules. For
instance the variable restrictions on the substitution rule allow us to form the following
proof-figure for the special case where x does not occur in ∆, since these restrictions
match those of the ∀-quantifier rule on the right side:
∆⇒ ϕ(x)
∆⇒ ∀yϕ(y)
ϕ(t)⇒ ϕ(t)....
ϕ(t),∆⇒ ϕ(t)
∀yϕ(y),∆⇒ ϕ(t)
∆⇒ ϕ(t)
13Here the term t must be substituted for any occurrence of x. Otherwise one might get from an initial
sequent of the form ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(x) to one of the form ϕ(f(c1))⇒ ϕ(f(c2)). The latter could be translated
as “If Julia’s father wears a hat, then Bob’s father wears a hat.”, which is generally seen as logically invalid.
14Following the previous example that might be translated as “When ever someone wears a hat, this
person’s father wears a hat too”.
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Moreover, this gives a theoretical basis to the previous mentioned naive view that
variables are artefacts lacking an interpretation differentiable from the meaning of the
∀-quantifier, in the approach of proof-theoretic semantics.
Consequently it seems to be suitable to view substitution as a operation which gets its
necessity through the lack of interpretation for free variables instead of interpreting
variables through their possibility to get substituted.15
An objection similar to the one already discussed may be that free variables are some
how primitive through their use as general or arbitrary names for the object to which the
language is applied. But such a move disposes of a proof-theoretic semantics in favour of
a model theoretical one following Tarski or Kripke. For such an objection presupposes a
theory of meaning that surmounts the credo of proof-theoretic semantics, i.e. stipulating
the meaning of the logical vocabulary through introduction and elimination rules.16 If the
use or meaning of free variables in a theory of meaning which is purely given through
introduction and elimination rules does not differ from a primitive usage of names, then
the inferences which are justifiable in terms of rules formulated via names should not
differ from the set justifiable by rules formulated via free variables. For in proof-theoretic
semantics this is the main demarcation criterion for separating two logics. In case of the
∀-quantifier this would be the indistinguishability of the following formulations according
to the justification procedure.
15In this respect a compositional syntactic approach stands diametrically opposite to a holistic syntactic
approach for which Carnap argues (see [11, pp. 142]).
16Given the close connection that variables have with respect to the quantifies, they should be considered
as part of the logical vocabulary.
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Formulation via free Variables Formulations via Names
ϕ(y)
∀xϕ(x)
ϕ(c) for any c in L
∀xϕ(x)
If a formulation via names has been chosen, the following differences can be found: In
the case when L includes only one name the ∃-quantifier coincides with the ∀-quantifier,
since the inference
∃xϕ(x)
∀xϕ(x)
is justifiable. If L includes more than one but finitely many names c1, ..., cn, then
inferences of the form
∀x1...∀xi...∀xj...∀xn+1ϕ(x1, ..., xn+1)
∀x1...∀xj...∀xi...∀xn+1ϕ(x1, ..., xn+1),
where x1, ..., xn+1 are pairwise disjoint, are not justifiable any more. One might say that
such inferences are in fact justifiable in the formulation with names, if a justification
proceeds from a formula ∀xϕ(x) to a formula ϕ(t), where t is any term, instead to a
ϕ(ci). But according to the fundamental assumption as is explained in [13, pp. 274],
doing so would be covertly using the formulation via free variables. Dummett faces
serious complications, when it comes to a proof-theoretic justification of inferences
including ∀-quantifiers, because he has to talk about an adequate representative sample
t1, ..., tn, from which the t is taken, to make the step from ∀xϕ(x) to a ϕ(t) plausible.
But the notion of an adequate representative sample is very vague and sensitive to
the particularities of an individual case. However in the case of a formulation of
∀-quantification via finitely many names the adequate representative sample is naturally
given through the formulation of the rule itself. This becomes especially crucial in
cases of a very small set of names, say c1, ..., c5, since in such a case the example of
a ∀-quantifier permutation given above is particularly inconvenient while the adequate
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representative sample of c1, ..., c5 is highly natural.
In the case of infinitely (but countably) many names the two formulations coincide.
Since the samples are in both cases potentially unbounded, the justification can be
chosen to proceed identically under both formulations. However, beside the fact that it
barely happens that ordinary language use operates with infinitely many names, it seems
counter-intuitive that logical principles change according to the number of objects one
wants to talk about.
The final objection which is discussed here criticises the actual way a justification must
proceed in the previous given semantics for classical logic. In the case of
¬[∃x¬ϕ(x)]
∀xϕ(x)
a justification would look as follows:
The sequent ¬[∃x¬ϕ(x)] ⇒ ∀xϕ(x) gives ⇒ ∀xϕ(x),∃x¬ϕ(x) through the meaning
of ¬, which is stipulated by the ¬-introduction rule on the right side. The rule of ∃-
introduction gives at least one t such that ⇒ ∀xϕ(x),¬ϕ(t). As Dummett explains in
[13], the fundamental assumption according to ∀-introduction gives ⇒ ϕ(t),¬ϕ(t). By
using the meaning of ¬ again one gets ϕ(t)⇒ ϕ(t), which ends the justification.
The justification just performed necessarily uses multi-conclusion sequents while free
variables do not occur, since one can choose t such that no free variable occurs. But as
explained before, the cases under issue, which proceed from ∆⇒ ∀xϕ(x) to ∆⇒ ϕ(x),
were not excluded for lacking an interpretation, but for justifying an inference which
is generally seen as invalid. Moreover the element stipulating the meaning, the rule, is
necessarily formulated via free variables, which lack an interpretation if one does not
want to interpret them by the ∀-quantifier. This raises the question: Why is the use of
harmless sequents which lack an interpretation forbidden, while harmful ones, which
have the same property, are used in the elements stipulating the meaning of a semantics?
Moreover, since quantification rules appear nested in the rules for connectives during a
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justification, it is not possible to separate principles of first-order from propositional logic
in first-order logic. Therefore an attempt, which tries to separate the use of sequents
with free variables from those using multi-conclusions, to argue against the use of the
latter but keeps the former, must be fruitless. However, in the same manner as for the
fundamental assumption, one might try to establish an assumption, which separates the
justification for first-order principles beforehand in a quantificational and a propositional
part by the midsequent theorem. The midsequent theorem states that, in a calculus for
which cut-elimination17 has been established, the proof of a sequent which includes only
formulas in prenex-normal-form can be transformed into a proof where the propositional
part is done before any quantification takes place (see [57, p. 29]). However finding a
midsequent (or a Herbrand disjunction) is, depending on the formal system that is in use,
a hard task and it is not always clear how crucial the assumption that all formulas are in
prenex-normal-form is. In any case the issue seems to be that in finding such a midsequent
(or Herbrand disjunction) many inferences that one might want to justify are already in
use. Hence one cannot separate first-order logic from proposition logic at the beginning
of building a proof-theoretic semantics for first-order logic.
Following the arguments given earlier, using a sequent calculus in proof-theoretic
semantics seems to be privileged. For an approach which operates on deductive relations,
which are formulated as sequents here, might be distanced enough from ordinary language
use to accept syntactic entities which lack an interpretation, but still close enough to
ordinary language use by the way that introduction rules are formulated. In contrast,
in a natural deduction formulation it might seem unnatural that entities which lack an
interpretation through the occurrence of free variables appear in places where the well
known concept of assuming a sentence is usually taking place.
17A property calculi, which are logical in nature, usually have.
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1.5 Conservativity
As explained before, von Kutschera demands in his Genzen-semantics (given in [30])
conservativity for each individual connective over the others, which forces, together with
the cut-rule, a particular form of the introduction rules on the left side. To explain what
this means, the connection between the introduction rules for ¬ is given in the following.
∆′, ϕ⇒
∆′ ⇒ ¬ϕ....
∆⇒ ¬ϕ
∆′′ ⇒ ϕ
¬ϕ,∆′′ ⇒....¬ϕ,∆⇒
∆⇒
It is easy to see that ∆ ⇒ can be obtained without using any rule for ¬, by using an
application of the cut-rule at an earlier stage. So one can easily translate the given proof
to the following one.
∆′′ ⇒ ϕ....
∆⇒ ϕ
∆′, ϕ⇒....
ϕ,∆⇒
∆⇒ .
Such translations can be found for every connective in a sequent calculus and are
summarised in the so called cut-elimination algorithm.18 Using this algorithm it is
possible to show that, for each connective the calculus formed by the previous given rules
for ¬,∨,∧, and → is conservative over its fragments that are obtained by deleting the
rules for exactly one of the connectives. Since side formulas do not essentially disturb
this process, this property is preserved after extending the calculus by multi-conclusion
sequents. Consequently all criteria for a compositional semantics are satisfied by the
previous given proof-theoretical semantics for classical logic, because a formula can
be fully understood on the basis of its subformulas together with the connective used
18This is a rather unfortunately chosen name, since it covers the syntactic nature of cut-elimination by
constructive aspects. For as mentioned in [58], there are many cut-elimination algorithms in systems where
the cut-rule is dispensable which are not syntactic in nature.
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and the meaning of each connective is strictly separated from those of the others by
the semantics. Moreover local and total harmony, in the sense given above, are fully
established.
However, it was mentioned before that, in some sense, classical negation is not
conservative over the other logical connectives, while intuitionistic negation is. This
will be clarified in the following. The natural deduction calculus formed by the
usual introduction and elimination rules for ∨,∧ and → proves the ¬-free fragment of
intuitionistic logic. If one extends this calculus by ¬-rules giving intuitionistic negation,
then no new ¬-free formulas can be proved in the calculus given by these rules while the
¬-rule that is usually taken as classical can. In this sense classical negation is not in total
harmony with the rest of the connectives according to the proof-theoretic semantics given
through the natural deduction rules. Moreover one might say that, the semantics given
by the natural deduction rules for classical logic is not compositional in nature, by the
lack of conservativity over the other connectives.19 However, the reason for this is the
way functional ¬-rules must be formulated in natural deduction. For in natural deduction
¬-rules, capturing intuitionistic negation is extremely different in their schematic form
from those capturing classical negation. By contrast, in common sequent formulation the
rules are very similar and only differ in allowing side formulas on the right side.
19Dummett explains in [13] that, according to his proof-theoretic semantics, which is given by natural
deduction rules, classical negation refers to the consistency of the logic justifiable by his semantics. One
might say this makes it holistic in nature.
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Intuitionistic Negation Classical Negation
ϕ,∆⇒
∆⇒ ¬ϕ
ϕ,∆⇒ Γ
∆⇒ Γ,¬ϕ
¬ϕ,∆⇒
∆⇒ ϕ
¬ϕ,∆⇒ Γ
∆⇒ Γ, ϕ
However it must be stressed here that conservativity is used differently in these two
cases. Since natural deduction operates on formulas, the conservativity notion is defined
via provability of formulas, while in a sequent formulation it is the conservativity over
deducible sequents, which are interpreted as arguments here.
As Schro¨der-Heister correctly asserts in [47], the calculus of natural deduction seems to
have a strong connection with intuitionistic logic. This might not be very surprising in
view of the fact that it is operating on formulas. For, this gives a semantics that is highly
focussed on particular sentences rather than on inferential-relations. This circumstance
coincides with the idea of intuitionism as a very rigorous justification system for particular
sentences explained by the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-interpretation, or its even more
rigorous formal counterpart, realisability.
1.6 Conclusion
The present paper argues for the possibility of a proof-theoretic semantics for classical
logic that uses multi-conclusion sequents, which is no further from ordinary language
use than the one given by Dummett. Consequently, the correlation of logics with
metaphysical stances is undermined. However, this was made possible by a paradigm
shift; instead of primarily focusing on formulas and their use as such, sentences are
understood through their function in an argument while avoiding a holistic meaning
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theory. For instead of using formulas as smallest operative unit we use sequents.
The appearance of new syntactic objects which lack an interpretation in this process
should not be worrying, because their appearance comes with baggage when a syntactic
approach is systematised.
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Chapter 2
Theory Reduction
To reduce a theory to another one has been a central concept of modern logic which is
included in many approaches since the very beginning. For Hilbert already gave one
in his Grundlagen der Geometrie from 1903 [27].1 Recently Michael Rathjen used a
reductive approach to formulate a notion of ordinal analysis in [40]. Since the aim of
this thesis is to show that Rathjen’s notion can be made even more convenient without
any metamathematical or foundational costs by using particular theories of inductive
definitions, we take a closer look at the commonly used notions of reduction in this
chapter. Such a survey was already done by Karl-Georg Niebergall in [35], which
therefore seems to be a good starting point. However Niebergall’s aims differ from
ours. For he wants to evaluate the different notions to find “the best”. Also since he
sees his work as a first step towards ontological reduction, his argumentation is flavoured
by a branch of analytic metaphysics.2 Consequently Niebergall’s analysis is based on the
philosophical intuitions of this tradition and phrased in a terminology which is influenced
1It is common in the logic community to view Hilbert’s methods as an early model-theoretic
construction. However Patricia Blanchette convincingly argued for a syntactic reading at the Logic
Colloquium 2014.
2One should indicate here that the field of analytical metaphysics is the target of many objections. See
[20] and T. Mohrmann’s introduction in [12] for an extensive critique.
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by a model-theoretic perspective on logic, as is common for more recent discussions in
analytic philosophy. We therefore give a rather different presentation. We will argue for
our preference of proof-theoretical reduction to interpretability in accordance with the
aims of this thesis.3 We will also have a closer look at realisability. For it is the reduction
method which is heavily used and scrutinised in Chapter 3 and Chapter 6.
2.1 Preliminaries
Before we can talk about theory reductions we have to give some central definitions and
state some important proof theoretical results. Unfortunately the concept of elementary
recursive functions is not as well known as that of primitive recursive functions, therefore
we will give a definition here.
Definition 2.1.1 The class of elementary (recursive) functions ERF is defined as:
1. ERF contains: The constant 0 function, successor S, projection, addition +,
multiplication ·, modified subtraction −˙ and exponentiation 2x.
2. ERF is closed under composition.
3. ERF is closed under limited recursion: Assume that h, g, k ∈ ERF and for all
~x, y
f(~x, 0) = g(~x),
f(~x, y + 1) = h(~x, y, f(~x, y)),
and f(~x, y) ≤ k(~x, y),
then f ∈ ERF .
3Niebergall favours interpretability and is challenged by Feferman in [18].
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The class of primitive recursive functions PR is defined similarly, but without the
bounding condition in the third clause.
By closing off the primitive recursive functions under the µ-operation we get the (partial)
recursive functionsR. That is, if g ∈ R is a k-ary function and
f(x0, ..., xk−1) = µy[g(x0, ...xk−1, y) = 0] (the smallest such y),
then f ∈ R.4
It is possible to code the formation of a recursive k-ary function f into a natural
number ef , by inductively going through Definition 2.1.1, and to give an elementary
predicate5 T k as well as an elementary function U such that f(~n) = m is equivalent to
U(µy[T k(ef , ~n, y)]) = m. The latter is often abbreviated by {ef}k(~n) = m, which is
called the Kleene brackets. For more details see [50].
To fix notation we briefly talk about some standard definitions in logic (for more
details see [16]). If τ is a set of symbols for predicates, functions and constants, then
L(τ) denotes the set of well formed formulas that are generated by τ . We call L(τ)
a language. We generally assume that τ is finite. The terms, formulas and sentences
are defined inductively in the standard way for an nth-order language.6 If we want to
specify the order of a language we denote it by a superscript, e.g. by Ln(τ). If the
superscript is suppressed the order is arbitrary. To denote symbols and expressions we
use the following conventions: We use x, y, z for variables, s, t, t0, t1, ..., tn for terms and
ϕ, ψ, φ, ϕ1, ..., ϕn for formulas. Also we write 〈t0, t1, t2〉 for 〈〈t0, t1〉, t2〉. By a theory
T we mean an elementarily definable set, if not specified otherwise, of formulas (called
4The functions inR are in general not total, since such a y, which is required by the µ-operation, might
not exist.
5We identify predicates with their characteristic functions.
6We use the usual notational conventions concerning to logical connectives, brackets and identity, e.g.
x 6= y means ¬(x = y).
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the axioms) together with a logic. If it is not stated otherwise, the logic is the classical
logic suitable to the order of the language. Other logics are specified by superscripts,
e.g. in the case of intuitionistic logic by an i as in T i.7 The language of a theory T is
denoted by LT and is the L(τ) whose τ contains only those symbols occurring in the
axioms of T . In proofs we usually view the logic as given by a Hilbert or Gentzen system
(see [58] for an introduction and Appendix C for the systems frequently used here). We
denote provability in all contexts by `. In proofs we will frequently switch back and
forth between Hilbert and Gentzen systems. This practice is justified by the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.1.2 Let ϕ ∈ L(τ).
There is an elementary recursive function which assigns to every deduction dH ` ϕ in a
Hilbert system a deduction dG ` ϕ in a Gentzen system.
There is an elementary recursive function which maps every deduction dG ` ϕ in a
Gentzen system to a deduction dH ` ϕ in a Hilbert system.
The deductive closure of a theory T (the set of all formulas provable from T ) is denoted
by T `.
In the following we define important theories and notions that are used throughout in
the text. All the following definitions use the first order language L1Q := L1({=
,≤, S,+, ·, 0¯}), where S,+ and · are read as successor, addition and multiplication
respectively. We use n¯ to denote the term S(...S(0¯)...) with successor-depth n. A bounded
quantifier is a quantifier in the following context
(∃x ≤ t)ϕ(x, y) :≡ (∃x)(x ≤ y ∧ ϕ(x))
(∀x ≤ t)ϕ(x, y) :≡ (∀x)(x ≤ t→ ϕ(x, y)),
7Since we are only interested in syntactical transformations of deduction systems in which the
deductions of classical logic are a superset of those of other logics in use here, this is the most appropriate
thing to do.
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where x does not occur in t.
Definition 2.1.3 1. The set of Σ00 = Π00 formulas contains all atomic formulas of a
language L and is the least set that is closed under all logical connectives and
bounded quantification.
2. Σ0n+1 contains Π
0
n and is closed under ∧,∨, bounded quantification and unbounded
∃-quantification.
3. Π0n+1 contains Σ
0
n and is closed under ∧,∨, bounded quantification and unbounded
∀-quantification.
4. Π0∞ :=
⋃
n∈N Π
0
n
5. We say a formula is ∆0n in a theory T :⇔ It is equivalent to a Σ0n as well as to a
Π0n-formula in T .
6. A set is called Σ0n, when there is a Σ
0
n-formula defining it in the standard model.
8
We use an analogous notation for Π0n sets. A set is ∆
0
n, if the equivalences of its
definition to a Σ0n and a Π
0
n-formula are both true in the standard model.
Note that being a Π0n- or Σ
0
n-formula is relative to the language in use.
Definition 2.1.4 1. The theory Q contains, besides the usual axioms of identity, the
following axioms:
S(x) 6= 0¯
S(x) = S(y)→ x = y
x 6= 0¯→ (∃y)(x = S(y))
x+ 0¯ = x
8The standard model of L1Q is 〈N,≤N, SN,+N, ·N, 0¯N〉.
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x+ S(y) = S(x+ y)
x · 0¯ = 0¯
x · S(y) = (x · y) + x
x ≤ y ≡ (∃z)(z + x = y)
2. The theory IΣn is defined as Q together with the restricted induction schema:
ϕ(0) ∧ (∀x)[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))]→ (∀x)ϕ(x),
where ϕ ∈ Σ0n.
3. The theory IΠn is defined analogously.
4. Peano Arithmetic is defined as PA :=
⋃
n∈N IΣn.
5. Elementary Arithmetic (EA) is defined as Q together with induction for all Σ00
formulas and the following additional axioms (by extending the language by the
function symbol 2)
20¯ = 1
2S(x) = 2x · 2¯.
6. Primitive Recursive Arithmetic (PRA) is defined as Q together with axioms
defining all primitive recursive functions and the schema of induction for atomic
formulas of L1PRA.
7. Heyting Arithmetic (HA) is defined as PRAi together with induction for all
formulas of L1PRA.
Remark 2.1.5 In case the reader wonders how all primitive recursive functions can be
introduced, she can consult Definition 6.2.1 and Definition 6.2.2. To improve readability
we avoid those technicalities here. Moreover the exact way in which function symbols are
introduced is only needed in the Lemmata following Definition 6.2.2. Therefore Chapter 6
seems to be the appropriate place.
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Consequently L1EA and L1PRA are richer languages than L1Q. It is a well known fact (see
[26] or [50]) that the graph of any recursive function can be represented in Q by a Σ1
formula, e.g. by coding the Kleene brackets. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 2.1.6 Let T be a theory such that LQ ⊂ LT . We say a function f : Nk → N is
provably recursive in T :⇔ There is a Σ01-formula ϕf (~x, y) such that
1. f(~n) = m⇔ ϕf (~¯n, m¯) is true (in the standard model);
2. T ` (∀~x)(∃y)ϕf (~x, y);
3. T ` ϕf (~x, y) ∧ ϕf (~x, y′)→ y = y′.
Remark 2.1.7 It is standard to say that ϕf represents an f , if it satisfies 1. While ϕf is
said to define a function f , if it also satisfies 2 and 3.
The following theorem combines Parsons’ and Parikh’s Theorem, which are proved in
[36] and [9, p. 87] respectively.
Theorem 2.1.8 IΣ1 and PRA prove the same Π02 sentences. Therefore the provably
recursive functions of IΣ1 are the primitive recursive functions.
The provably recursive functions of IΣ0 all have polynomial growth rate.
It is obvious that elementary functions have super-polynomial growth rate. Hence to give
a theory that has exactly the elementary recursive functions as provably recursive ones,
it is not sufficient to weaken the induction schema. We also have to add a function of
function of suitable growth rate. In fact it is enough to add the exponentiation function to
IΣ0. Let exp(x, y) be a Σ1 formula defining the graph of exponentiation to the base 2, i.e.
x 7→ 2x. We denote the totality statement for exponentiation by
Exp :≡ (∀x)(∃y)exp(x, y).
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Theorem 2.1.9 The provably recursive functions of IΣ0+Exp andEA are the elementary
recursive functions.
Proof
There is a very nice proof of this result in [50, p. 122].2
It is well known that syntax can be coded by elementary functions (see [50]); we denote
the code of a syntactic object by framing it with two corners, e.g. pϕq in case of a
formula ϕ. Therefore one can give for a theory T in IΣ0 + Exp a standard provability
predicate9 ProvT (x, y) saying that x is a code of a deduction for the formula with the code
y. The formula ProvT (x, y) is Σ00, which makes provability PrT (y), which is defined as
(∃x) ProvT (x, y), a Σ1-formula. Consequently unprovability and therefore consistency
is Π01. One can just take an appropriate inconsistency
10 (⊥) in T and define Con(T ) :≡
(∀x)¬ProvT (x, p⊥q).11 The following lemma states Σ01-completeness and formalised
Σ01-completeness respectively and has many nice applications.
Lemma 2.1.10 Assume that T is a theory such that L1Q ⊂ LT . Then
1. Q ` ϕ for any true Σ01-sentence ϕ.
2. IΣ1 ` ϕ→ PrT (pϕq) for any Σ01-sentence ϕ.
Proof
9By Theorem 2.1.2 we do not care about which deduction system is used and will switch between Hilbert
and sequent style systems.
10If Q ⊂ T we usually take ⊥ to be 0 = 1.
11As Fefermann elaborated in [17], one can get into trouble by not specifying a representation of a
theory when coding syntax. However we always assume that we use a natural representation when defining
ProvT (x, y); in the case of a finite theory just a finite disjunction. But we will never give a statement in a
generality where such problems occur.
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1. By convincing oneself that Q calculates correctly.
2. The only actual proof which I know of can be found in [24, pp. 69-72].
2
It is also possible to partially define truth in IΣ0 + Exp via syntax coding as the next
theorem states. Here we use Feferman’s dot-notation x˙ to denote the function that maps
x to the xth numeral.12
Theorem 2.1.11 For every n ≥ 1 there is a Σ0n formula TΣn(x) (where x is the only free
variable) such that, if ϕ(y1, ..., ym) is a Σ0n-formula, then
IΣ1 ` ϕ(y1, ..., ym)↔ TΣ0n(pϕ(y˙1, ..., y˙m)q).
In the case of a Σ00-formula ϕ(y1, ..., ym), there is a Σ
0
1-formula TΣ00(x) such that
IΣ0 + Exp ` ϕ(y1, ..., ym)↔ TΣ00(pϕ(y˙1, ..., y˙m)q).13
Analogous statements hold for Π0n-sentences.
12The dot-notation is closely related to the bar-notation, which is defined in the text above Definition 2.1.3
as
1¯ := S(0¯)
n+ 1 := S(n¯);
note that 0¯ is a primitive symbol of LQ. While the bar-notation is an abbreviation of terms at the meta-level,
the dot-notation is an abbreviation of a formalisation of a function that outputs the codes of these terms, i.e.
x˙ := px¯q.
13Note that this truth-predicate cannot be used in EA, because the additional function symbol 2x
spoils the computational bound, that is required by the truth-predicate, on terms. In fact it is a deeper
metamathematical insight that one either has a truth-predicate with a low syntactical-complexity for a Π2-
axiomatisation (I∆0 + Exp) or has a Π1-axiomatisation (EA) without such a truth-predicate.
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Proof
1. See [26, p.59].
2. See [26, Corollary 5.5, p.365].
2
It is a well known fact that the usual Gentzen system for first order logic satisfies
cut-elimination (see [58]) as well as that theories formulated within a Gentzen system
have partial cut elimination14 (see [9]). As it is shown in [26] (and can also be seen
by the methods developed in Chapter A) the elimination of a single cut can be coded
and carried out by an elementary function and is therefore available in IΣ0 + Exp.
However full cut-elimination cannot be done in IΣ0 + Exp and EA, since EA can
be formulated by Σ00-formulas (in LEA) and therefore would be able to prove its own
consistency by using partial cut-elimination together with Theorem 2.1.11. Since the
super-exponential function is primitive recursive and dominates the cut-elimination
procedure, cut-elimination and partial cut-elimination can be fully carried out in IΣ1 and
PRA.
Another important proof-theoretical tool is reflection principles. We will only define the
simplest form here and prove a very simple but handy fact about it. For more information
one may consult [3].
Definition 2.1.12 Assume that ϕ ∈ L1Q is a sentence. The local reflection schema for a
14Roughly speaking, cut-elimination up to cuts whose cut-formula has not more alternating quantifiers
than the axioms of the theories.
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theory T (in symbols Rfn(T )) such that L1Q ⊂ L1T is the schema
PrT (pϕq)→ ϕ.
If the schema is restricted to a set of sentences Γ, then we denote it by RfnΓ(T ).
The following lemma is used when dealing with proof-theoretical reduction.
Lemma 2.1.13 IΣ0 + Exp ` Con(T )↔ RfnΠ01(T )
Proof
“⇒:” Assume that ϕ ∈ Π01. Hence ¬ϕ ∈ Σ01 and therefore
IΣ0 + Exp ` ¬ϕ→ PrT (p¬ϕq)
by Lemma 2.1.10.15 Consequently the assumption ¬ϕ in IΣ0 + Exp gives PrT (p¬ϕq).
Since we can also assume that Con(T ) holds, we get ¬PrT (pϕq); which leads to
IΣ0 + Exp + Con(T ) ` ¬ϕ→ ¬PrT (pϕq).
And we get the ϕ-instance of RfnΠ01(T ) by contraposition.
“⇐:” Assuming RfnΠ01(T ) and instantiating it by p0 = 1q in IΣ0 + Exp gives by
contraposition and the definition of Con(T )
IΣ0 + Exp + RfnΠ01(T ) ` 0 6= 1→ Con(T ).
Since IΣ0 + Exp ` 0 6= 1, the theorem is proven.2
The notion of theory reduction is closely related to the notion of conservativity. To fix a
notation we will define this well known concept in the following.
15The function defined in [24] is in fact elementary and, hence, the proof of Lemma 2.1.10 proves an
analogous statement about IΣ0 + Exp.
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Definition 2.1.14 Assume that S ⊂ T , LS ⊂ LT and Γ ⊂ LS .
The theory T is Γ-conservative over S (in symbols T ⊆Γ S) :⇔ Any ϕ ∈ Γ that satisfies
T ` ϕ also satisfies S ` ϕ.
Some of the previous results can be reformulated via this notion. The final result of this
section is a very useful conservativity result as well.
Lemma 2.1.15 Assume that T is a theory such that LQ ⊂ LT and I∆0 + Exp ⊂ T `.
Then T ⊆Π01 I∆0 + Exp + Con(T ).
Proof
Assume that T ` ϕ for ϕ ∈ Π01. Therefore I∆0 + Exp ` PrT (pϕq) by Lemma 2.1.10. By
Lemma 2.1.13 we get
I∆0 + Exp + Con(T ) ` RfnΠ01(T ).
Combining these two results gives I∆0 + Exp + Con(T ) ` ϕ.2
2.2 Some Syntactic Notions of Theory Reduction
As already mentioned above, our interest in theory reduction emerges from our wish to
motivate the general notion of ordinal analysis that is given in [40]. Since some steps in an
ordinal-analysis can be viewed as a syntactic reduction16, we are mainly concerned with
syntax here. However we will sketch some model-theoretical reductions as well, when
they are related to a syntactic one that is under consideration.17
16This will be explained in chapter 3.
17There is no such thing as a semantic reduction that is in opposition to a syntactic reduction. The
correct opposite to a syntactic reduction is a referential or model-theoretical reduction. This is because a
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2.2.1 Interpretability
The notion of interpretability is arguably one of the most common forms of theory
reduction in the logic-related literature. Roughly speaking, it can be viewed as a logic-
preserving translation of the non-logical lexicon of one theory into another. In more
model theoretical terms one can view interpretability as defining a model of one theory in
a second theory. More precisely:
Definition 2.2.1 1. Let L11 be a language and T a theory in the language L12.18 An
interpretability translation ∗ of L11 into T is given by:
(a) A χ(x) ∈ L12 such that T ` (∃x)χ(x).
(b) For each constant c of L11, a formula ψc(x), with all free variables exhibited,
such that
T ` (∃!x)(χ(x) ∧ ψc(x)).
(c) For each n-ary predicate P of L11, a formula ψP (x1, ..., xn) ∈ L12 with all free
variables exhibited.
(d) For each n-ary function symbol f of L11 a formula ψf (x1, ..., xn, y) ∈ L12, with
all free variables exhibited, such that
T `
n∧
i=1
χ(xi)→ (∃!y)(χ(y) ∧ ψf (x1, ..., xn, y)).
The interpretation ϕ∗ is then defined inductively over the definition of terms and
formulas. At the atomic level we use (in the obvious way) the formulas given above
“good syntactic reduction” is good, when semantically explanatory, and syntactic, when lacking referential
concepts. Or, as Quine would put it, the reason why we talk about syntax and reference is because we are
not able to directly grasp “semantic” by a reasonable methodology.
18Note that we assumed at the beginning of this chapter that the non-logical alphabet is finite.
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for predicate, constant and function symbols respectively. During the induction step
∗ distributes over the logical particles as expected:
(¬ϕ)∗ ≡ ¬ϕ∗
(ϕ ◦ ψ)∗ ≡ ϕ∗ ◦ ψ∗ for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}
[(∃x)(ϕ(x))]∗ ≡ (∃x)(χ(x) ∧ ϕ(x)∗)
[(∀x)(ϕ(x))]∗ ≡ (∀x)(χ(x)→ ϕ(x)∗)
2. Assume that S and T are two first-order theories in the languages L1S and L1T
respectively.
Then S is interpretable in a theory T (in symbols S  T ) :⇔ There is a relativized
translation ∗ of L1S in T such that for every axiom ϕ(x1, ..., xn) of S,
T `
n∧
i=1
χ(xi)→ ϕ∗(x1, ..., xn).
3. Let S and T be as before. S is locally interpretable in T (in symbols S loc T ) :⇔
For each axiom ϕ of S, {ϕ}  T .
This gives the following corollary.
Corollary 2.2.2 If S  T via ∗, then for each ϕ(x1, ..., xn) ∈ L1S , such that S `
ϕ(x1, ..., xn), T `
∧
χ(xi) → ϕ∗(x1, ..., xn); in particular, for each sentence ϕ ∈ L1S ,
S ` ϕ implies T ` ϕ∗.
In the case of L1T ⊂ L1S and when interpretability can be shown via the trivial translation,
i.e. χ(x) is taken to be x = x and the translation is the identity, one can obtain a
conservativity result. For in such a case ϕ∗ ≡ ϕ.
There are two notions of reduction that are known to be equivalent to interpretability and
are model-theoretical in nature.
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Definition 2.2.3 Let S and T be two first-order theories in the languages L1S and L1T
respectively.
S C1 T :⇔ There is an f : L1S → L1T which distributes over ¬,∧,∀,∃ (as in
Definition 2.2.1) and for any model A of T there exists a model B of S such that for
any formula ϕ ∈ L1S it holds that B |= ϕ iff A |= f(ϕ).
The equivalence to interpretability was established by Montague [34] . The other notion
was proved equivalent to interpretability by Benthem and Pearce [4] and is defined as
follows.
Definition 2.2.4 Let S and T be as before. S C2 T :⇔ There is a function F :
Mod(T ) → Mod(S) which respects L1T -isomorphisms, L1T -ultraproducts and satisfies
|F (A)| ⊂ |A| for each A ∈ Mod(T ).19
In the following we will give some examples of properties or meta-theorems about
interpretability.
Theorem 2.2.5 For all theories S,T and all formulas ϕ, ψ:
If S  T + ϕ and S  T + ψ, then S  T + (ϕ ∨ ψ).
Proof
See [32, p. 82]2
Another important property is the following. Here S  k includes those elements of S
with a code that is numerically smaller than k.
Theorem 2.2.6 Assume that PA ⊂ T is a theory with a ∆01 definition and is formulated
in L1Q. If S is another theory with a ∆01 definition, then the following are equivalent
19By |A| we denote the domain of the model A and Mod(T ) denotes the set of all models of a theory T .
Chapter 2. Theory Reduction 44
1. S  T
2. S loc T
3. For each k, T ` Con(S  k)
Proof
See [26, pp. 169-171]. 2
2.2.2 Proof-Theoretical Reduction
The notion of Proof-Theoretical Reduction was introduced by Fefermann 1988 in [19] to
extend Hilbert’s Program by an approach of relativised consistency. While the consistency
of a system enlarging arithmetic cannot be established from a purely finitistic perspective,
relativised consistency proofs can often be done finitistically. This can be generalised to
a group of questions of the form: can one justify the use of certain principles in terms of
a less questionable set of principles by assuming that the set of those latter principles is
already justified?
An example for such a task would be the justification of impredicative principles by
predicative notions. Here justification of principles means showing that they are at
least consistent with each other. But proof-theoretical reduction is much more than just
consistency. It can be viewed as a strong version of formalised conservativity.
To improve readability of the following definition, we use abbreviations for formulas as
follows. f(x) = z denotes a Σ01-formula ϕf (x, z) that represents the graph of a function
f in a natural way (see Remark 2.1.7).20 To express totality we use
f ↓:⇔ (∀x)(∃y)ϕf (x, y).
20If the recursive functions are coded via Definition 2.1.1 and not as Turing-machines, then one can use
Kleene brackets here:
ϕf (x, z) :≡ (∃y)[T (ef , x, y) ∧ U(y) = z].
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Definition 2.2.7 Let f be a recursive function. Assume that S and T are two theories in
the languages LS and LT respectively such that Q ⊂ T and that there is an elementary
recursive set of formulas Γ ⊂ LS ∩LT .
We say S is proof-theoretically reducible to T according to Γ by f (in symbols f : S ≤Γ
T ) :⇔ There is a representation of f in LT such that
T ` f ↓
T ` (∀x)(∀y)(∃z)[Γ(y) ∧ ProvS(x, y)→ f(x) = z ∧ ProvT (z, y)].
We express the existence of such a function f , such that f : S ≤Γ T , by S ≤Γ T .
If S ≤Γ T and T ≤Γ S holds, then we write S ≡Γ T .
Note both requirements are Π02-statements. But together the latter is also ∆
0
1 in T , since
U is a function, which makes its output unique.
Corollary 2.2.8 If S and T are as in Definition 2.2.7 and S ≤Γ T where ⊥ ∈ Γ (e.g. S
and T are arithmetical theories and ⊥ is 0 = 1), then
T ` Con(T )→ Con(S).
Proof
Instantiate the second requirement in Definition 2.2.7 with p⊥q for y and take the
contrapositive of this instantiation.2
It goes back to an observation by Kreisel that one can obtain a finitistic21 relative
consistency proof from most proof-theoretical reductions that have been given so far. This
The term “natural” means that we know the function f quite well from an informal-proof and that we have
chosen a representation ϕf (or code ef ) that supports our formalisation of this proof.
21Finitistic means here, following Tait [56], that the proof can be carried out in PRA. But since
Proposition 2.1.8 holds, one can also chose IΣ1.
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is the case when the function from the reduction is primitive recursive (and IΣ1 ⊂ T ).
The following argument is partly taken from [40]:
Assuming that f : S ≤Γ T ,⊥ ∈ Γ and that f is primitive recursive. Hence we can choose
a representation of f such that
IΣ1 ` f ↓
(∗)T ` (∀x)[ProvS(x, p⊥q)→ (∃y)(f(x) = y ∧ ProvT (y, p⊥q))].
Since f(x) = z is a Σ01-formula defining a function in T ⊃ IΣ1, the succedent of the
implication above is equivalent to the Π01-formula
(∀y)[f(x) = y → ProvT (y, p⊥q)].
Since this makes (∗) equivalent to a Π01-sentence, we get (by Lemma 2.1.15)
IΣ1 + Con(T ) ` (∗). Which leads to
IΣ1 + Con(T ) ` Con(T )→ Con(S),
by the provable totality of f in IΣ1 (see Theorem 2.1.8). Hence
IΣ1 ` Con(T )→ Con(S).
Therefore, inspired by Hilbert’s Programme, sometimes logicians use the term proof-
theoretical reduction also in the weaker sense of relative consistency.
Definition 2.2.9 Let S and T be theories. Then:
S CRC T :⇔ IΣ1 ` Con(T )→ Con(S).
The order CRC is therefore transitive. However, to come closer to the idea of the broader
Definition 2.2.7, one may have a closer look at the following.
Definition 2.2.10 Let S and T be theories. Then:
S JRC T :⇔ T ` Con(T )→ Con(S).
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Niebergall gives in [35] a counterexample to the claim that JRC is transitive.
Theorem 2.2.11 There are arithmetical sound recursively enumerable theories S, T, U
such that S JRC T and T JRC U , but not S JRC U .
Proof
Take
S := IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA))
T := PA
U := IΣ1 + Con(PA)
so we have to prove the following to establish the claim of the theorem.
1. PA ` Con(PA)→ Con(IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)))
2. IΣ1 + Con(PA) ` Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA))→ Con(PA)
3. IΣ1 + Con(PA) 6` Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA))→ Con(IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA))
1. We are working in PA+ Con(PA): Since IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) ⊂ Π04, we
have partial cut-elimination down to Π04 formulae.
We proceed with a proof by contradiction: Assuming that ¬Con(IΣ1 +Con(IΣ1 +
Con(PA))), then there is a proof p ` p0 = 1q in IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)).
Because of partial cut-freeness there is a proof p′ which includes only Π04 formulae.
By Theorem 2.1.11 we have a truth predicate such that
(∗)TΠ04(pϕq)⇔ ϕ.
By (∗) we can establish TΠ04(pϕq) for any ϕ that is an axiom of IΣ1 and occurs
in p′. This leaves us to establish the truth of Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)). Since IΣ1 +
Con(PA) ⊂ Π04, we get from the assumption ¬Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) a partial
cut-free proof of p0 = 1q. By using the assumption Con(PA) together with the
Chapter 2. Theory Reduction 48
truth of all axioms of IΣ1 we get 0 = 1 by (∗) and the truth-preservation of the
proof system. This leads to Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) and to its truth by (∗).
Since we know that all axioms of IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) are true and there
are only Π04 formulas in p
′, we get by the truth preservation of the deduction system
TΠ04(p0 = 1q). Hence (∗) gives 0 = 1, which is the contradiction that we aimed at.
2. IΣ1 + Con(PA) ` Con(PA) implies
IΣ1 + Con(PA) ` ϕ→ Con(PA) for every ϕ.
3. We proceed by a proof by contradiction. Assume that
IΣ1 + Con(PA) `
Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA))→ Con(IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)).
Obviously IΣ1 + Con(PA) ` Con(PA). Hence by Lemma 2.1.15 we get
IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) ` Con(PA).
Which gives
IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) `
Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA))→ Con(IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)).
But this leads to
IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)) ` Con(IΣ1 + Con(IΣ1 + Con(PA)).
Hence we contradict the second incompleteness theorem.
2
The next theorem (taken from [35] as well) transports the intransitivity from JRC to
proof-theoretical reduction. In the following Eq is the set of all closed equations.
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Theorem 2.2.12 Let S and T be first order theories with Σ00 definitions, I∆0 + Exp ⊂ T
and Q ⊂ S. Then
I∆0 + Exp ` Con(T )→ Con(S) implies S ≤Eq T.
Proof
22We work in T .
By I∆0 + Exp ⊂ T we get Con(T ) → Con(S) by the assumption. We distinguish two
cases. In both cases we will construct a T -deduction for a closed equation t1 = t2 from a
given S-deduction.
1. ¬Con(S): In this case also ¬Con(T ). Hence we can construct a T -deduction for
pt1 = t2q uniformly from the contradiction p0 = 1 ∧ 0 6= 1q.
2. Con(S): We assume that there is a S-deduction for pt1 = t2q. Since the
representation of S is Σ00, we can prove Q ⊂ S by ∆0-induction. Moreover
Con(S) and the fact that Q proves all true closed equations (see Theorem 2.1.10)
ensures that TEq(pt1 = t2q) holds. Note that the proof of Σ1-completeness (see
Theorem 2.1.10) proceeds by an elementary recursive function in [24, pp. 69-
72].23 Hence this proof-method is available, i.e. provably total, in I∆0 + Exp
by Theorem 2.1.9. Therefore we can construct a T -deduction of pt1 = t2q.
2
By Theorem 2.2.12 we can lift the intransitivity of JRC to proof-theoretical reduction.
22Note this proof also establishes that Con(T ) → Con(S) and formalised Eq-conservativity are
equivalent in I∆0 + Exp.
23The proof inductively proceeds on the length of a formula by a finite case distinction where all cases,
except the atomic case, are schematic in the formulas used, hence can be bounded by a constant. Moreover
the atomic case is about LQ and, hence, its terms can be formally evaluated elementarily.
Chapter 2. Theory Reduction 50
Theorem 2.2.13 There are arithmetical sound recursively enumerable theories S, T, U
such that S ≤Eq T and T ≤Eq U , but not S ≤Eq U .
Proof
Take
S := IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1))
T := IΣ1
U := IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1)
The following statements can be proved like those which are given in the proof of
Theorem 2.2.11.
1. IΣ1 ` Con(IΣ1)→ Con(IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1)))
2. IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1) ` Con(IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1))→ Con(IΣ1)
3. IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1) 6` Con(IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1)) → Con(IΣ0 + Exp +
Con(IΣ0 + Exp + Con(IΣ1))
Consequently S ≤Eq T and T ≤Eq U can be obtained by 1 and 2 by Theorem 2.2.12.
However, as we have assumed S ≤Eq U , we can contradict 3.2
Therefore, one might change Definition 2.2.7 in order to make it transitive, by restricting
the conditions
T ` f ↓
and
T ` (∀x)(∀y)(∃z)[Γ(y) ∧ ProvS(x, y)→ f(x) = z ∧ ProvT (z, y)]
to
IΣ1 ` f ↓ 24
24That is sufficient to make f primitive recurisve, by Theorem 2.1.8.
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and
IΣ1 ` (∀x)(∀y)(∃z)[Γ(y) ∧ ProvS(x, y)→ f(x) = z ∧ ProvT (z, y)].25
Let’s denote this version by S ≤finΓ T . However this does not change much as the
discussion that was given above Definition 2.2.9 shows.
Theorem 2.2.14 Let S and T be theories that have a Σ00 definitions, IΣ1 ⊂ T andQ ⊂ S.
Then the following holds:
f : S ≤Eq T and f is primitive recusive. ⇔ S ≤finEq T.
Proof
“⇒:” Assume that S ≤Eq T . By the argument given above Definition 2.2.9 we get
IΣ1 ` Con(T )→ Con(S).
Which gives S ≤finEq T by Theorem 2.2.12.
“⇐:” This direction follows from the definition, since IΣ1 ⊂ T .2
Consequently transitivity is ensured in cases where the theories include IΣ1 and the
reduction is given in a primitive recursive way. But there is another reason why this lack
of transitivity does not matter much to us. The centre of attention in proof-theoretical
reduction (especially in relation to proof-theoretical ordinals) is the relation S ≤Π02 T .
But note that
Con(T )→ Con(S)
as well as
(∀x)(∀y)[ProvS(x, y)→ (∃z)({ef}(x) = z ∧ ProvT (z, y))]
are both equivalent to Π02-sentences. Therefore one gets the following theorem, which
ensures transitivity in those cases.
25Here we follow [56] again.
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Theorem 2.2.15 Assume that S, T and U are theories such that Q ⊂ T and Q ⊂ U .
1. S JRC T , T JRC U and T ⊆Π02 U
implies S JRC U .
2. S ≤Γ T , T ≤Π02 U and Γ ⊂ Π02 has a ∆01 definition (in T ) implies S ≤Γ U .
2.2.3 Translation
According to Feferman [18] there is no useful general theory of translations which is
different enough from proof-theoretical reduction to be explored.26 But he gives three
minimal assumptions a translation between two theories S and T should satisfy:27
1. f : LS → LT is recursive and total,
2. S ` ϕ⇒ T ` f(ϕ) and
3. f(¬ϕ) = ¬f(ϕ).
It is not possible to assume that f distributes on the other connectives or the quantifiers
as well. For this would exclude translations between theories that are based on different
logics, e.g. the Go¨del-Gentzen translations does not satisfy such a notion (see [58]).
Also Go¨del’s Dialectica interpretation does not distribute on quantifiers. But there is a
stronger objection against a general approach of translations that supposes distribution on
all logical connectives, as it was shown in [39].
26Most likely, Feferman either means that all cases that appear in the literature can be adequately handled
by proof-theoretical reduction or that one would like to extend a translation to the deduction system and
therefore gets something very close to proof-theoretical reduction.
27In addition several requirements have to be satisfied by the theories that are under consideration.
However we have made them already in previous definitions: the language must be recursive, negation
must be defined for every formula and provability must be given by axioms and rules.
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Theorem 2.2.16 For any consistent and recursively enumerable S that is based on
classical logic, there is a primitive recursive translation f , which distributes with all
logical connectives, into Q.28
Moreover it is sometimes even suitable to drop distributivity with negation as well and
substitute it by
3′. f(⊥S) = ⊥T ,
where ⊥S and ⊥T are suitable atomic inconsistencies in S and T respectively. One may
give the following definition.
Definition 2.2.17 f : S ≤trans T :⇔ f satisfies condition 1, 2 and 3′. We write S ≤trans
T iff there is such an f .
It is easy to see that S ≤trans T insures relative consistency; for suitable f also in the sense
of S JRC T or S CRC T . However one can get closer to proof-theoretical reduction by
making the reasonable assumption that f can be extended to deductions, say to f ∗. So
one may strengthen property 2 by using
2′. d `S ϕ ⇒ f ∗(d) `T f(ϕ).
However in cases where the language intersects, e.g. in the case of arithmetical theories,
one might be able to define a natural fragment of both languages so that the properties of a
proof-theoretical reduction are satisfied. An example for such a translation is again Go¨del-
Gentzen as well as Friedman’s negative translation (see [21]). Both translate PA into
HA in a way which shows that their negative fragment and their provable Π02-sentences
coincide. Therefore one gets a proof-theoretical reduction according to these two sets of
formulas.
28The reader should not be confused by this apparently strong statement, because the assumption that S
is consistent allows to use unnatural representations of S in Q that encode various cheap tricks.
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2.2.4 Realisability
Realisability is a method which is heavily used in the analysis of intuitionistic theories.
Its most common form was defined via partial recursive functions by Kleene 1945 as
a syntactic translation based on the intuition that is given by the Brouwer-Heyting-
Kolmogorov-Interpretation (BHK). The idea was to view the BHK of implication and
generalisation as grasped by the notion of partial recursive functions. Before we give a
definition of such a realisability translation we contrast BHK with the idea of realisability.
We are following here A. Troelstra’s book [59] and omit most of the proofs because they
are highly technical and long.
BHK Realisation
A proof of φ∧ ψ is a proof of
φ and ψ.
φ ∧ ψ is realised by a pair of
realisers for φ and ψ, 〈nφ, nψ〉
A proof of φ ∨ ψ is either a
proof of φ or ψ.
φ ∨ ψ is realised by a pair
〈m,n〉 where m entails if the
realizer n realises φ or ψ.
A proof of φ → ψ is
a procedure that transforms
every proof of φ into a proof
of ψ.
φ → ψ is realised by a code
of a partial recursive function
that gives for any realizer of φ
a realizer of ψ.
A proof of (∃y)ψ(y) is a pair
of a witness m and a proof of
ψ(m¯).
(∃y)ψ(y) is realised by a pair
〈m,nφ(m¯)〉 of a witnessm and
a realiser of φ(m¯).
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A proof of (∀y)ψ(y) is a
procedure which gives for
any n an evaluation of ψ(n¯).
(∀y)ψ(y) is realised by the
code of a partial recursive
function which gives for any
n a realiser of ψ(n¯).
By using Kleene brackets one can formulate the implication and the generalisation cases
of realisability in L1HA. See [59] for details how to formalise T and U in HA. In the
following we consider the easiest case where L1HA is interpreted in L1HA. Also we use
p1, p2 to denote the function symbols expressing the projection functions in L1HA.
Definition 2.2.18 Assume that x is a variable of L1HA. The realisability translation xr :
L1HA → L1HA is defined on the complexity of a ϕ ∈ L1HA, where ϕ does not contain x free.
1. If ϕ is atomic, then xrϕ :≡ ϕ
2. If ϕ ≡ φ ∧ ψ, then xrϕ :≡ p1(x)rφ ∧ p2(x)rψ
3. If ϕ ≡ φ ∨ ψ, then
xrϕ :≡ [p1(x) = 0→ p2(x)rφ] ∧ [p1(x) 6= 0→ p2(x)rψ]
4. If ϕ ≡ φ→ ψ, then
xrϕ :≡ (∀u)[urφ→ (∃v)[T (x, u, v) ∧ U(v)rψ]]
5. If ϕ ≡ (∃y)ψ(y), then xrϕ :≡ p2(x)rψ(p1(x))
6. If ϕ ≡ (∀y)ψ(y), then xrϕ :≡ (∀y)(∃z)[T (x, y, z) ∧ U(z)rψ(y)]
The next theorem is called the soundness theorem for realisability and is central for the
following investigations. We give the proof of the soundness theorem in full detail, since
we will give an analysis of it in Chapter 6.
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Theorem 2.2.19 Assume that ϕ ∈ L1HA is a sentence and that T := HA+ Γ, where Γ is
a set of sentences of L1HA, then:
1. If HA ` ϕ, then there is an n ∈ N such that HA ` n¯rϕ.
2. If for any ψ ∈ Γ, T ` (∃x)(xrψ), then
T ` ϕ⇒ T ` (∃x)(xrϕ).
3. Assume that T ≡Σ01 HA and that for any ψ ∈ Γ there is an n ∈ N such that
T ` n¯rψ. Then
T ` ϕ implies that there is an n ∈ N such that T ` n¯rϕ.
Proof
The following proof is taken from [59, pp. 190-192].
1. The proof proceeds by an induction over the length of a HA-deduction of ϕ. To do
so we have to fix a deduction system. Since the realisability translation translates
formulas, a Hilbert-system is favoured. We use a system going back to Go¨del,
which is defined in Appendix C. The proof uses p-terms29 in an inessential way to
denote functions whose codes serve as a realiser. Also, to improve readability, we
write trϕ, where t is a p-term, instead of ptqrϕ.
Since the theorem is stated about sentences we have to deal with the occurrence
of free variables in the induction step before the induction hypothesis can be
applied. Therefore we have to treat the free-variable case and the sentence case
in parallel. But since every proof which ends in a formula with a free variable can
be transformed into one ending in a sentence by ∀-introduction, that is a minor
29The set of p-terms is constructed by closing-off the set of terms of LHA by λ-abstraction and Kleene-
brackets. See [59] for details.
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problem. However the constructed deduction for n¯rϕ becomes therefore longer;
which will be an issue in Chapter 6. The following case-distinction follows the
enumeration which is given in Appendix C.
(a) If the instance is a sentence, we take 0r[⊥ → ϕ], otherwise we take the
universal closure and realise it by a constant 0 function with appropriate arity
λ~x.0r(∀~x)[⊥ → ϕ(~x)].
In the following four cases we suppress the case where free variables
occur, since in those the realiser is as well just the dummy-variable version of
the one used in the sentence case.
(b) λx.p2(x)r[ϕ ∨ ϕ→ ϕ]
λx.〈x, x〉r[ϕ→ ϕ ∧ ϕ]
(c) λx.〈0, x〉r[ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ]
λx.p1(x)r[ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ]
(d) λx.〈1−˙p1(x), p2(x)〉r[ϕ ∨ ψ → ψ ∨ ϕ]
λx.〈p2(x), p1(x)〉r[ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ ϕ]
(e) λy.{y}(t)r[(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t)]
(f) λy.〈t, y〉r[ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x)]
(g) Assume that there is an application of Modus Ponens with premisses ϕ(~x) and
ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x). Hence by ∀-introduction we also have proofs of (∀~x)ϕ(~x) and
(∀~x)[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]. The induction hypothesis gives then an n and an m such
that HA proves
n¯r(∀~x)ϕ(~x)
and
m¯r(∀~x)[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)].
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Therefore Definition 2.2.18 gives
{n}(x)rϕ(x)
and
{m¯}(x)r[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)].
By Modus Ponens and Definition 2.2.18 we therefore obtain
{{m¯}(~x)}({n}(~x))rψ(~x).
Thus λ~x.{{m¯}(~x)}({n¯}(~x))r(∀~x)ψ(~x).
For simplicity we only consider the cases without free variables for the
other rules.
(h) We can assume that there are proofs for n¯r[ϕ → χ] and m¯r[χ → ψ]. With
xrϕ having been assumed, one gets {n¯}(x)rχ and hence {m¯}({n¯}(x))rψ.
By the deduction theorem and Definition 2.2.18 this gives
λx.{m¯}({n¯}(x))r[ϕ→ ψ].
(i) Assume that there is a proof of n¯r[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ]. Also assume that xrϕ and
yrψ, which gives 〈x, y〉r[ϕ ∧ ψ]. Together this gives {n¯}(〈x, y〉)rχ. Hence
we get λxλy.{n¯}(〈x, y〉)r[ϕ→ (ψ → χ)].
(j) Assume that there is a proof of n¯r[ϕ → (ψ → χ)]. To apply the
deduction theorem, assume that xr[ϕ ∧ ψ]. By Definition 2.2.18 and two
applications of Modus Ponens we get {{n¯}(p1(x))}(p2(x))rχ. Therefore
λx.{{n¯}(p1(x))}(p2(x))r[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ] by Definition 2.2.18.
(k) Assume that n¯r[ϕ→ ψ]. To apply the deduction theorem, assume that xr[χ∨
ϕ]. By Definition 2.2.18 we get p1(x) = 0 → (p2(x)rχ) and p1(x) 6= 0 →
(p2(x)rϕ). If p1(x) = 0 is true, then
xr[χ ∨ ψ];
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otherwise we have a proof of {n¯}(p2(x))rψ and therefore get
〈p1(x), {n¯}(p2(x))〉r[χ ∨ ψ].
This gives
λx.[(1−˙p1(x))x+ sgn(p1(x)) · 〈p1(x), {n¯}(p2(x))〉]r[χ ∨ ψ].
(l) Assuming that there is a proof for ψ(~y) → ϕ(x, ~y), then we get a proof for
n¯r(∀~yx)[ψ(~y) → ϕ(x, ~y)] by induction hypothesis. To use the deduction
theorem, assume that zrψ(~y), which leads to {n¯}(~y, x, z)rϕ(x, ~y). Hence we
get
λx.{n¯}(~y, x, z)r(∀x)ϕ(x, y).
Therefore we get by Definition 2.2.18
λ~yλzλx.{n¯}(~y, x, z)r(∀~y)[ψ(~y)→ (∀x)ϕ(x, ~y)].
(m) From a proof of ϕ(x) → ψ we get a proof of n¯r(∀x)[ϕ(x) → ψ]. To use the
deduction theorem we assume that ur(∃x)ϕ(x), which gives p2(u)rϕ(p1(u)).
Therefore we get {n¯}(p1(u), p2(u))rψ, hence we can obtain
λu.{n¯}(p1(u), p2(u))r[(∃x)ϕ(x)→ ψ].
We have completed all logical cases and will consider the axioms of HA in the
following.
(a) We give explicit p-terms for the axioms of identity:
λx.0r(∀x)[x = x]
λxλyλzλu.0r(∀xyz)[x = y ∧ y = z → x = z]
λx1...λxnλu.0r(∀x1, ..., xn)[xi = y → [ϕ(xi)↔ ϕ(y)]]
λxλu.0r(∀x)[S(x) 6= 0]
λxλyλu.0r(∀xy)[S(x) = S(y)→ x = y]
Chapter 2. Theory Reduction 60
(b) All axioms for primitive recursive functions are realised by a constant 0
function with same arity.
(c) Assume that ur[ϕ(0)∧ (∀x)[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))]]. By the recursion theorem we
can find a code for a partial recursive function
f(u, 0) ' p1(u)
f(u, S(x)) ' {p2(u)}(x, f(u, x)).
An easy induction shows that f is total. Hence we can obtain
λuλx.f(u, x)r[ϕ(0) ∧ (∀x)[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))]→ (∀x)ϕ(x)].
2. Assume that T ` ϕ, where ϕ is a sentence. The deduction theorem gives us
HA ` ψ → ϕ, where ψ is a finite conjunction of sentences of Γ. Hence, by
the assumptions of the theorem and the Modus Ponens step from above, we get the
result.
3. As before the assumption that T ` ϕ, where ϕ is a sentence, gives a ψ such that
HA ` ψ → ϕ. This leads to T ` {n¯}(m¯) ↓ ∧{n¯}(m¯)rϕ. Since {n¯}(m¯) ↓ is a
Σ01-sentence, we have HA ` {n¯}(m¯) ↓. By the fact that HA is Σ01-correct, there is
a suitable m0 = {n¯}(m¯) such that HA ` m0rϕ.
2
The proof of Theorem 2.2.19 proceeds by constructing in every case a realiser from given
ones. Moreover the proof divides into a finite number of cases. Therefore the proof above
gives a primitive recursive method to find such a realiser. Consequently one can formalise
via primitive recursive functions f1, f2 a version of Theorem 2.2.19 as
HA ` ProvHA(x, pϕq)→ ProvHA(f1(x), pptf2(x)qrϕq).
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However there is no primitive recursive universal realiser. As an diagonalisation (see [59]
p. 192) shows, there are no provable total recursive functions f ′1 and f
′
2, in HA, such that
HA ` ProvHA(x, pϕq)→ ProvHA(f1(x), ppλx.t(x)qrϕq),
such that the p-term t defines the function f2.
Realisability does not effect formulas of a particular form (called almost negative
formulas), which makes these formulas particularly interesting for conservativity results.
Definition 2.2.20 An almost negative formula is an element of L1HA which does not
contain ∨ and a ∃-quantifier can only occur in front of an equation (like (∃x)(t(x) =
s(x))).
Theorem 2.2.21 For any ϕ ∈ L1HA its realised version xrϕ is logically equivalent to an
almost negative formula.
Proof
See [59, p. 193].2
The proof of the next proposition is given in full detail, because it will be analysed in
Chapter 6.
Theorem 2.2.22 If ϕ is almost negative, then
HA ` (∃x)(xrϕ)↔ ϕ.
Proof
The proof goes by induction on the construction of ϕ.
1. In the case of an atomic ϕ the Lemma trivialises to ϕ↔ ϕ by Definition 2.2.18.
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2. ϕ ≡ (∃y)[t(y) = s(y)] :
“⇒”: We assume that (∃x)(xrϕ), which is
p2(x)r[t(p1(x)) = s(p1(x))].
But this is just t(p1(x)) = s(p1(x)), hence we get (∃y)[t(y) = s(y)].
“⇐”: We assume that (∃y)[t(y) = s(y)]. This is equivalent to
(∃y)[〈y, 0〉r(∃y)[t(y) = s(y)]],
by Definition 2.2.18 and HA ` p1(〈y, 0〉) = y. Hence we get (∃x)[xr(∃y)[t(y) =
s(y)]] and are done.
3. ϕ ≡ ψ1 → ψ2 :
“⇒”: We assume that (∃x)(xrϕ). This is
(∃x)(∀u)[urψ1 → (∃v)[T (x, u, v) ∧ U(v)rψ2]].
The induction hypothesis
(∃w)[wrψ2]→ ψ2
gives us
(∀u)[urψ1 → ψ2].
By induction hypothesis
ψ1 → (∃u)[urψ1],
which gives ψ1 → ψ2.
“⇐”: We assume that ψ1 → ψ2. By assuming urψ1, we get ψ1 by induction
hypothesis, and hence ψ2. The induction hypothesis gives us therefore (∃v)[vrψ2].
Together this gives
urψ1 → (∃v)[vrψ2].
Let ev be the function that gives v for every input u. Hence evr[ψ1 → ψ2] and are
done.
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4. ϕ ≡ (∀y)ψ(y):
“⇒”: We assume that (∃x)(xrϕ). This is
(∃x)(∀u)(∃v)[T (x, u, v) ∧ U(v)rψ(u)]].
By induction hypothesis this gives (∀u)ψ(u). Hence, by renaming of variables, we
are done.
“⇐”: We assume that (∀y)ψ(y). By induction hypothesis we get (∀y)(∃z)[zrψ(y)].
Hence, by choosing a code for the function “y 7→ z” as the realiser, we are done.
5. ϕ ≡ ψ1 ∧ ψ2:
ψ1 ∧ ψ2 ⇔ p1(x)rψ1 ∧ p2(x)rψ2 ⇔ 〈p1(x), p2(x)〉r[ψ1 ∧ ψ2]⇔ xr[ψ1 ∧ ψ2]
2
The last two propositions easily give idempotence.
Theorem 2.2.23
HA ` (∃x)(xr(∃y)(yrϕ))↔ (∃y)(yrϕ)
A classical application of realisability is the analysis of Church’s Thesis. Therefore we
will give two formulations of this thesis in the following.
Definition 2.2.24 Let ϕ be almost negative and not contain y freely. The following
schema is denoted by ECT0 and is called extended Church’s Thesis.
(∀x)[ϕ→ (∃y)ψ(y)]→ (∃u)(∀x)[ϕ→ (∀v)(T (u, x, v) ∧ ϕ(U(v)))]
Here ψ is just any formula of L1HA.
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By taking ϕ as 0 = 0 one gets a formula equivalent to Church’s Thesis (CT0) itself, which
is
(∀x)(∃y)ψ(y)→ (∃u)(∀x)[(∃v)T (u, x, v) ∧ ψ(U(v))]30.
In order to use Theorem 2.2.19 one has to establish the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2.25 For any universal closure ϕ of an instance ofECT0 there exists an n ∈ N
such that
HA ` n¯rϕ.
Proof
See [59, p. 195]. 2
In terms of ECT0 one can characterise realisability as follows.
Theorem 2.2.26 Assume that T := HA + Γ, where Γ are some sentences of L1HA, such
that for any ψ ∈ Γ
T ` (∃x)(xrψ).
Then
• T + ECT0 ` ϕ↔ (∃x)(xrϕ)
• T + ECT0 ` ϕ if and only if T ` (∃x)(xrϕ).
Proof
The first statement is shown by induction on the complexity of ϕ. For instance let’s
30This can be read as “If a procedure is total, then there is already a total recursive function which
executes it” or as “Every function is already a total recursive one”.
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assume that ϕ :≡ φ→ ψ;
(φ→ ψ) ↔ (by induction
hypothesis)
((∃x)[xrφ]→ (∃y)[yrψ]) ↔ (by prenexiation)
(∀x)([xrφ]→ (∃y)[yrψ]) ↔ (by ECT0)
(∃z)(∀x)([xrφ]→ (∃v)[T (z, x, v) ∧ U(v)rψ]) ↔ (by the definition
of xr according to
implication)
(∃z)(zr[φ→ ψ])
For the second claim we firstly note that the implication from right to left is given by the
first claim. To prove the implication from left to right we assume that T + ECT0 ` ϕ.
Hence T ` φ → ϕ, for a conjunction φ of universal closures of ECT0-instances. Since
Theorem 2.2.19 shows that T ` ψ implies T ` (∃x)(xrψ), we get T ` (∃x)[xr(φ→ ϕ)].
Also we get T ` (∃x)(xrφ) by Lemma 2.2.25 and HA ⊂ T . By the implication case in
Definition 2.2.18 and Modus Ponens, we conclude T ` (∃x)(xrϕ). 2
Since the proof of Theorem 2.2.26 is done by a uniform proof construction, this gives a
proof-theoretical reduction T + ECT0 ≤alm.neg T for the almost negative fragment of
L1HA (Theorem 2.2.22).
For the purposes of ordinal analysis it is important to know that transfinite induction does
not disturb Theorem 2.2.26. Therefore we first define this schema.
Definition 2.2.27 Let 〈A,≺〉 be such that A is a primitive recursive set and≺ a primitive
recursive order on A. The schema TI(≺) is then
(∀x)[[A(x) ∧ (∀y ≺ x)ϕ(y)]→ ϕ(x)]→ (∀x)[A(x)→ ϕ(x)]
for ϕ ∈ L1HA. Here A(x) and x ≺ y are abbreviations for fA(x) = 1 and f≺(x, y) = 1
respectively, where fA, f≺ ∈ L1HA are the function symbols denoting the characteristic
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functions of the respective sets.
If we want to restrict the schema to a certain set of formulas Γ we denote this by TIΓ(≺).
According to the side conditions on Γ, that are demanded by Theorem 2.2.26, we only
need the following lemma to show that TI(≺) does not change the possibility of giving a
proof-theoretical reduction.
Lemma 2.2.28 For any closed instance ϕ of an TI(≺) it holds that there is an n ∈ N
such that HA+ TI(≺) ` n¯rϕ.
Proof
See [59, p. 199].2
One easily gets the following corollary by putting Lemma 2.2.28 and Theorem 2.2.26
together.
Corollary 2.2.29 For any primitive recursive ≺
HA+ TI(≺) + ECT0 ` ϕ if and only if HA+ TI(≺) ` (∃x)(xrϕ).
Even though the idea behind realisability is to interpret formulas by their computational
content, it seems fair to say that it should be viewed as an ordinary translation and hence
as a proof-theoretical reduction (as explained section 2.2.3).31
31As I said earlier, embracing semantics does not make a methodology less syntactic. On the contrary it
characterises a good syntactic methodology to reveal the semantics without collapsing into a referentialistic
point of view.
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2.3 An axiomatization of Theory Reduction
In [35] Niebergall identifies certain features a good notion of theory reduction should have
and are arguably accepted by most in the community32. He then presents a formalisation
of these features in an unspecified base theory33, that should be as weak as possible. The
following axioms axiomatise the notation SρT (read as “S is reducible to T ”), where
S, T, U,E, F range over theories as formalised objects in the unspecified base theory.
1. ∀S, T (S ⊂ T ⇒ SρT )
2. ∀S, T, U(SρT ∧ TρU ⇒ SρU)
3. ∀S, T (SρT ⇒ (T is consistent ⇒ S is consistent ))
4. ∀S, T (SρT ⇒ ∀ψ ∈ S∃ϕ ∈ T{ψ}`ρ{ϕ}`)
5. ∀E,F finitely axiomatisable
EρF ⇒ IΣ1 ` Con(F )→ Con(E).
The most distinguishing characteristic of the axiomatic approach is, that it does not rest on
the idea that a reduction has to be given by a function.34 This accords with some people’s
view that reduction should not be a term-term, predicate-predicate or formula-formula
relation, as stated in [35].
We do not wish to argue here for the axioms 1-4, in fact we doubt whether 1-3 would
be subject to any objections anyway. Axiom 5 is chosen that way, because provable
32He calls them linguistic intuitions.
33In [35] on page 52 Niebergall explains that, since his reducibility logic (a modal logic like provability
logic) is too weak to distinguish interpretability from proof-theoretical reduction, a “pure” axiomatization
does not seem fruitful.
34Niebergall links the lack of a function to the question whether a reduction should be structure preserving
or not. But, as we said before, we are not interested in this direction of his argumentation.
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consistency-reduction is a wish of the community and the restriction to finite theories
rules out non-standard representations of theories in arithmetic.35 The subtheory relation,
interpretability and local interpretability obviously satisfy the axioms above. Moreover a
very surprising property of this axiom system is that it even almost defines interpretability.
Theorem 2.3.1 If SρT is governed by axiom 1-5, IΣ1 ⊂ T and T is reflexive36, then
• If SρT , then S loc T .
• If Q ⊂ S, then: SρT ⇒ S ⊆Π01 T .
• If S is axiomatisable, then: if SρT , then S  T .
Proof
See [35, p. 41].2
Since S loc T satisfies axiom 1-5 we get the following corollary.
Corollary 2.3.2 If Q ⊂ S, S is axiomatisable, IΣ1 ⊂ T and T is reflexive, then:
• S loc T ⇒ S ⊆Π01 T and S  T .
• If E is finitely axiomatisable, then: SρT and S ` Con(E) implies T ` Con(E).
Moreover the close relationship with interpretability is preserved when axiom 5 is
weakened to
6. SρT ∧ S ` Con(E)⇒ T ` Con(E),
where E is a finitely axiomatizable theory.
35For in the case ofE = {e0, ..., ek} one can chose the canonical representation x = pe0q∨...∨x = pekq
36A theory T is called reflexive, if it proves the consistency of all its finite fragments.
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Theorem 2.3.3 If SρT is governed by axiom 1-4 and 6, IΣ1 ⊂ T and S is a reflexive
extension of Q, then
• SρT ⇒ S ⊆Π01 T
• If SρT and S is axiomatisable, then S  T .
Proof
See [35, p. 42].2
However there are some differences with interpretability. For instance the property of
interpretability given by Theorem 2.2.5 does not hold in general for a relation governed
by axioms 1-5 as shown in [35, p. 44].
More impotently the above axiom system is not satisfied by proof-theoretical reduction,
because proof-theoretical reduction fails to satisfy axiom 4. For instance it is a standard
result of proof-theory that ACA0 ≤ PA. But if ρ is governed by axioms 1-5, then
ACA0 is not ρ-reduceable to PA, which is an easy result from the theorem following the
definition of ACA0.
Definition 2.3.4 ACA0 is formulated in L2({0,=, S,+, ·}) with all axioms ofQ together
with the single second order induction axiom
X(0) ∧ (∀x)[X(x)→ X(S(x))]→ (∀x)(X(x)),
the axiom of extensionality
X = Y ↔ (∀x)(X(x)↔ Y (x))
and arithmetical comprehension
(∃X)(∀x)(X(x)↔ ϕ(x)),
where X and second-order quantification do not occur in ϕ.
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Theorem 2.3.5 1. ACA0 ≤ PA
2. ACA0 6 PA
Proof
ACA0 ≤ PA can be easily seen by working in IΣ1. If ACA0 ` ϕ for a sentence
ϕ ∈ L1Q, then there is a deduction in a Gentzen system for some sequent Γ ⇒ ϕ, where
Γ ⊂ ACA0. As explained in Section 2.1, cut-elimination can be done in IΣ1, therefore
we have a cut-free deduction of Γ ⇒ ϕ. By the subformula property all second order
variables occurring in the deduction already occur in Γ ⇒ ϕ. Next we substitute for
every second-order variable which occurs in an instance of a comprehension axiom of Γ,
its comprehension formula. The comprehension axioms therefore becomes logical valid
formulas, which can be cut out. For any remaining X(y) we substitute y = 0. Note that
there cannot be any second-order variables left after this procedure. Hence, since PA
embraces induction for any formula of L1Q, we get a sequent ∆ ⇒ ϕ with ∆ ⊂ PA,
which leads to PA ` ϕ.
It remains to show that ACA0 6 PA. We only defined  for first order theories but
it should be clear how one can extend it to second order. However in the second-order
case Theorem 2.2.6 proceeds in the same way. Towards a contradiction let’s assume
that ACA0  PA. Then by a version of Theorem 2.2.6 for any finite subtheory of
ACA0, let’s call it E, PA ` Con(E). But as we know from [26, p. 154], ACA0 is
finitely axiomatizable. Therefore PA ` Con(ACA0). But since ACA0 ≤ PA, this gives
PA ` Con(PA).2
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2.4 Discussion
The disagreement of two notions of theory reduction in the case of natural theories, like
PA andACA0, forces us to make a choice, when the “right”,“best” or most “appropriate”
notion is aimed at. However even though we have to choose as well, our choice is much
easier, because we merely ask for a notion which serves our well defined purposes. We
want a notion that summarises all methods used in ordinal-analysis that have been used so
far in the literature, for example translation, realisation and cut-elimination. Furthermore
one of the most interesting outcomes of an ordinal-analysis is the characterisation of the
provable-total functions of a theory. Therefore Π02-conservativity is of particular interest.
As a third point, we want to compare theories based on different logics. The fourth
consideration is in fact a restriction: ordinal-analysts are mainly interested in strong
theories far above PA.37
Hence we prefer proof-theoretical reduction. From a positive perspective, because it
subsumes interlogical translations and therefore allows the comparision of intuitionistic
and classical theories (something interpretabilitiy is lacking). Also from a negative
perspective its lack of transitivity is not much of an issue for us, because Theorem 2.2.14
assures us that transitivity is satisfied, when the methods in use can be done primitively
recursively and the theories are above IΣ1. This is a condition which is easily met
for ordinal-analysis that is done by transfinite cut-elimination (see [33]). Moreover, as
Theorem 2.2.15 shows, even for those cases where the methods are not primitive recursive
our aim for Π02-conservativity ensures transitivity.
However I want to say something about the Niebergall-Feferman-dispute. The example
that Niebergall gives in the proof of Theorem 2.2.13 is particularly misleading in view of
the fact that those theories are rather weak. In the case of weak theories, where existence
claims do not play much of a role because of their rather narrow ontological basis, the
37That is not only grounded in the personal interest of ordinal analysts. For weak systems an ordinal
analysis is quite painful and not worth the effort since in most cases other methods work far better.
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question of strength boils down to what a theory can do. Also, since fancy proof-methods
are also missing in weak theories, the intuition behind can do boils down to whether a
theory can perform a certain operation or not. Hence the issue here is the provability of
Π2-sentences. However, since by Theorem 2.2.15 Niebergall’s example does not satisfy
Π02-conservativity, one might ask the question how this example is supposed to challenge
our intuition on theory reduction. For it seems reasonable to assume that any reduction-
relation should enjoy Π02-conservativity when going up one of its chains in the realm of
weak arithmetical theories.
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Chapter 3
A better Base Theory for
Ordinal-Analysis
The current chapter mainly serves as an introduction to the theories ÎD
i
n and the results
that are given by Buchholz, Ru¨ede and Strahm in [5] and [44]. Our interest in these
theories is based on an account which is given by Buchholz in [5] and concerns the
interaction of intuitionistic logic with inductive definitions. According to Buchholz’s
results, these theories are not stronger than PA but offer an easy and nice definition for
infinite systems that are used in ordinal-analysis. Hence one can substitute ÎD
i
n for PA
as a metatheory for formalised ordinal analysis. This prevents the analyst from drawing
on formalised recursion theory in order to deal with infinite trees and operations upon
them, which makes the actually presented proofs more readable and avoids hand waving.
Since formalised ordinal-analysis is central for some results that one wants to obtain
from an ordinal-analysis, this is a major success in methodology. Moreover there are
ordinal-analyses that never have been formalised, since they use strong metamathematical
principles like the Ω-rule. These can be straightforwardly formalised in ÎD
i
n. Hence these
methodological advantages outline a recipe for an ordinal analysis that is general enough
to draw certain general conclusions from it.
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We will explain the role of formalised ordinal analysis in the first section of this chapter
before we move on to study ÎD
i
n in detail. Moreover the following discussion has a strong
relation to Rathjen’s generalised ordinal-analysis given in [40].
3.1 Ordinal-Analysis and Provable Conservativity
Ordinal-analysis is a proof-theoretical technique which goes back to Gentzen’s work
on the consistency of arithmetic in 1938 (see [23]).1 By giving a reduction method
that transforms a deduction of an inconsistency in PA into a deduction of a very
weak subsystem S of PA, Gentzen’s approach, as presented in [23], is very close to
Definition 2.2.10. Moreover his proof can be extended to prove
PA ⊆Σ1 S
in the metatheory EA+ TIΣ00(≺ε0)2, where ≺ε0 is an elementary recursive well-ordering
of order-type ε0. Here ε0 is defined as
ε0 := sup{ω, ωω, ωωω , ωωω
ω
, ...}
and the ordering 〈ε0,≺ε0〉 is naturally given by a normal-form theorem of ordinal-
arithmetic (for details see [57]). Besides the fact that the ordering is very natural, the
proof has the advantage that it obviously can be done in PRA3 at any step but one. For
the system S is weak enough such that
PRA ` Con(S)
1The following considerations on ordinal analysis are ment to give a unifying framework. For a very
recent recapitulation on ordinal analysis that gives most of the different aspects see [31].
2It should be clear how to adapt Definition 2.2.27 to the systems that are used in this chapter by
substituting the defining formulas of the ordering for the function symbols that are used in Definitin 2.2.27.
3According to Chapter A even in EA, which is less obvious.
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and every step in Gentzen’s transformation can be done primitive recursively. Only to
prove the transformation’s totality one needs TI∆00(≺ε0). Consequently Gentzen’s proof
can be seen in the light of Chapter 2 as showing that
PRA+ TIΣ00(≺ε0) ` Con(S)→ Con(PA),
which leads, together with the provable consistency of S, to
PRA+ TIΣ00(≺ε0) ` Con(PA).
Moreover Gentzen proved that for any proper initial segment of 〈ε0,≺ε0〉 this cannot be
done. Consequently there is no shorter ordering that can prove the consistency in the range
of all orderings provably comparable to 〈ε0,≺ε0〉. This motivates calling ε0 the ordinal
of PA and identifying ε0 with the proof-theoretical strength of PA. The successors of
Gentzen developed longer and more elaborate elementary recursive orderings, which we
will call ordinal notation systems and denote by OT (β), where β is the order type.4 This
motivates the following definition. Here ≺β |α, for α ∈ OT (β), denotes the restriction of
the ordering on OT (β) to those elements of OT (β) that are ≺OT (β)-smaller than α.5
Definition 3.1.1 Let T be a theory as defined in chapter 2 and fix anOT (β). Assume that
there is an α ∈ OT (β) such that
PRA+ TIΣ00(≺β |α) ` Con(T ),
then we call the ≺β-least of this α the proof theoretical ordinal of T and denote it by
‖T‖Con.
4An ordinal notation system in this sense is just an arbitrary elementary recursive set containing strings
of symbols which are well-ordered. We denote these strings by small Greek letters to emphasise their close
connection to ordinal numbers. In most cases we do not distinguish a string from its code, hence in many
cases the elements of an OT (β) are numbers.
5Note that TI(≺β |α) states transfinite induction on α and not just for any ordinal smaller than α.
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Definition 3.1.1 gets its foundational significance in metamathematics by trusting the
well-foundness of a natural ordinal notation systems, like Gentzen’s 〈ε0,≺ε0〉, more
than the consistency of the theory in question. However note that this definition cannot
be generalised by abstracting the preassumed ordinal notation system away, because
there is no known definition of a natural ordinal notation system; and trying to give
Definition 3.1.1 in terms of order types of arbitrary orderings collapses the notion to ω for
every theory, as Kreisel emphasised.6
Another drawback of Definition 3.1.1 is that it obscures the actual benefits of a modern
ordinal-analysis by narrowing it down to a consistency proof. But since the Schu¨tte school
developed their methods in the sixties much more can be achieved. Schu¨tte gave a proof-
theoretical analysis of several systems by using the ω-rule
ϕ(n¯) : n ∈ N
∀xϕ(x)
as a substitute for ∀-introduction and induction axioms. For instance PAω is defined as
the system that embraces all true atomic and negated atomic sentences of L1PRA as axioms
and is closed-off by the inference rules for ∧,∨,∃, cut and the ω-rule; while negation is
defined on the meta-level. If one views the deductions of PAω as infinite rooted trees and
labels them by elements of an appropriate OT (α) in a suitable way, then cut-elimination
for a subset of PAω’s deductions, which depends on α, can be shown by a transfinite
induction on α. This ensures the subformula property for this fragment of PAω, i.e. every
formula occurring in the deduction is a subformula of the formula which is proved by the
deduction. Moreover the subformula property has many successful applications.
It is an easy fact that restricting the application of the ω-rule in PAω to premisses that are
elementarily recursively enumerable (we denote this system by PAelω ) does not change
the extension of provability, i.e. PAω ≡Π0∞ PAelω .7 Therefore one can give a provability
predicate of PAω in EA by using codes for the functions enumerating the premisses of
6There is a cheap trick to code the consistency of a theory in an elementary ordering of order type ω.
For details see [29].
7Note that every step in the construction of a reduction tree (see [49, pp. 197-201] for a Definition) for
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the ω-rule (see [51]). By enlarging the deduction system by repetition rules, e.g. rules of
the following form
ϕ
ϕ,
it is possible to do the cut-elimination procedure up to cut-freeness by an elementary
recursive function as Minc shows in [33]. Note this from being not in conflict with
Go¨del’s Theorems, because the presence of the repetition rule prohibits that EA is able to
tell whether a particular cut-free object is a deduction or not, since the infinite repetition
of a singular formula opens up the possibility of a correctly formed “proof”-tree that is
not well-founded. However labelling the deductions by ordinals coming from the ordinal
notation systems such that premisses have smaller ordinals than their conclusions ensures
the property of being a deduction. Taking the ordinals into account means using some
instance of a TI(α). The observation that every deduction of PA can be translated into
PAω and that the latter system enjoys cut-freeness ensures consistency. Hence we are
coming back to the view that is given by Definition 3.1.1.
The example of analysing PA via PAω is exemplary for ordinal-analysis in general.
In many cases in the literature, where an ordinal-analysis of a theory T is given, it
is customary to chose an infinite system in which the infinite rules are restricted to
elementary enumerable premisses and some sort of cut-elimination can be done. In the
following we denote such an infinite system for a theory T by T∞. In addition we assume
that the set of the axioms of T∞ are a decidable, consistent and complete subset of the
atomic sentences in the language LT∞ .8
But what do we achieve by this method that is obscured by Definition 3.1.1? The answer
is that we have just given a very uniform way to achieve conservativity results for T with
a formula in LPAω can be performed elementarily in an evaluation function for terms, which is of course
not elementary, when LPAω has a symbol for any elementary function. Hence, since PAω enjoys cut-
elimination, every deducible formula has a deduction that is enumerable by function that is elementary in
an evalution function for terms.
8Consistent means that P (~t) and ¬P (~t) are not both axioms, when a negation operator is present. The
requirements on the axioms of T∞ ensure that we can use a “truth predicate” for any theory T .
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Q ⊂ T . For classical theories it proceeds as follows.
First we fix an 〈OT (γ),≺γ〉 and assume that ‖T‖Con = α ∈ OT (γ). We also assume
that the transformation f∞ of T -deductions into T∞ is primitive recursive, since in the
literature this is always the case. Therefore we get
IΣ1 ` {ef∞} ↓
IΣ1 ` ProvT (x, y)→ ProvT∞({ef∞}(x), y).
In the next step we eliminate any rule that might spoil cut-elimination. We assume that
this can be done primitive recursively by a function fr and ignore this step for now.9 Since
Minc’s cut-elimination procedure fc is elementary recursive we also have
IΣ1 ` {efc} ↓
IΣ1 ` ProvT∞(x, y)→ ProvT∞({efc}(x), y).
Informal cut-elimination gives us ‖T‖Con = α, which is the supremum of the ordinal
heights of those T∞ deductions that are relevant for T , i.e. the deductions that were
obtained by cut-elimination on those that had been translated into T∞ from T . Also,
since cut-free deductions have the subformula property, a correctness proof by transfinite
induction on a single deduction with ordinal hight β (for β ≺γ α) can be done by using an
instance of TIΠ0n(≺γ |β) for a suitable n.10 This gives for any n ∈ N and any β ∈ OT (γ)
IΣ1 + TIΠ0n(≺γ |β) ` pi0n(y) ∧ cutfree(x, β) ∧ ProvT∞(x, y)→ TΠ0n(y),
where pi0n(y) and cutfree(x, β) are Σ
0
0-formulas formalising the property of being Π
0
n and
cut-freeness with ordinal-hight β respectively.
9However this preliminary step to cut-elimination is the point where the hard work of ordinal-analysis
is done. Consequently the assumption that this can be done primitive recursively most certainly excludes
many interesting cases. But to keep our presentation simple we make this assumption.
10Not that in general the truth predicate has the same logical complexity as its grammatical subjects.
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Next we can prove conservativity. To do so assume that T ` ϕ and ϕ ∈ Π0m for some
m ∈ N. By Lemma 2.1.10 we get
IΣ1 ` pi0m(pϕq) ∧ PrT (pϕq),
which leads to
IΣ1 + TIΠ0m(≺γ |β) ` TΠ0m(pϕq)
for some β ≺γ α by the results above. Consequently we get
IΣ1 + TIΠ0m(≺γ |β) ` ϕ
by Theorem 2.1.11.
Since the proof is uniform and m can be chosen primitive recursively, we get a proof-
theoretical reduction
T ≤ IΣ1 + TI(≺ α),
where TI(≺ α) is the set of all TI(≺γ |β) with β ≺γ α.
Conversely, since T ` TI(≺γ |β) for any β ≺γ α by ordinal analysis, it is obvious that T
proves all consequences of
IΣ1 + TI(≺ α).
Also since the deductions of TI(≺γ |β), that are given by the informal ordinal-analysis,
are usually given uniformly, a proof-theoretical reduction is achieved as well.
By combining these two directions, we get
T ≡ IΣ1 + TI(≺ α).
However, if ω ≺ α, then TI(α) proves all instances of induction. Hence PA + TI(≺
α) ≡ IΣ1 + TI(≺ α) and therefore we do not lose anything by going up to
T ≡ PA+ TI(≺ α).
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An analogous argument gives
T i ≡ HA+ TI(≺ α)
for intuitionistic theories.
For a fixed ordinal notation system OT (β) and an α ∈ OT (β) we denote the theory
T + TI(≺ α) by [T ]α in the following. The hierarchy of all [T ]α is denoted by [T ]OT (β).
Some times we will also write [T ]≺.
The insights that are given above motivate the following definition (see [40]).
Definition 3.1.2 Let T be a classical theory as defined in Chapter 2 and OT (β) an
ordinal notation system. Assume that there is an α ∈ OT (β) such that
T ≡ [PA]α,
then we call α the reductive proof theoretical ordinal of T and denote it by ‖T‖R. If T is
intuitionistic, then we take
T ≡ [HA]α
to be the defining property.
However as Friedman proves in [21] [HA]≺ ≡Π02 [PA]≺ for any primitive recursive
ordering ≺. Therefore we can make Definition 3.1.2 smoother.
Definition 3.1.3 Let T be a theory as defined in Chapter 2 andOT (β) an ordinal notation
system. Assume that there is an α ∈ OT (β) such that
T ≡Π02 [PA]α,
then we call α the Π02-proof-theoretical-ordinal of T and denote it by ‖T‖Π02 .
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The advantages over Definition 3.1.1 are obvious. First, both Definitions give us provable
conservativity by proof-theoretical reduction, which is relative to a hierarchy of theories
that is uniformly given. [PA]OT (β) can therefore function as a scale. Hence an ordinal-
analysis proves or refutes conservativity results for a large set of theories.11 Moreover,
since Definition 3.1.3 takes Π02-conservativity into account and the [PA]OT (β) are well-
studied theories, one gets a characterisation of the provable-total recursive functions of
a theory almost free in therms of subrecursive-hierarchy theory (see Section 5.2.1 and
Section 5.2.2). Second, the link between a proof-theoretical ordinal and proof-theoretical
strength is explicitly given by mentioning the deducability relation in the definition.12
Also we still grant the leading foundational-idea behind ordinal analysis, since [PA]OT (β)
is a very natural hierarchy of theories as far as the ordering ≺β can be considered as
natural. However to invoke Definition 3.1.3 one has to code T∞ into PA or HA, which
might be quite painful and long. Moreover the definitions of operations on these codes of
infinite deductions require formalised versions of the recursion theorem, becouse infinite
rules appear nested in these deductions and the function that enumerates their premisses
must be explictly given by one of its codes when formalising the deduction in arithmetic.13
Consequently, these proofs become very technical and to make them readable, ordinal-
analysts use a lot of hand waving even in very technical and relatively complete texts like
[51] and [38]. Also for some ordinal-analyses such proofs have never been given, e.g. the
11In Chapter 5 we connect an ordinal analysis to a function hierarchy. Therefore, when two theories are
ordinal analiesed, one can extract totality statement (Π02-sentences) which are provable in one but not in the
other theory.
12By proof-theoretical strength we mean the strength of the deducibility relation and not necessarily the
consistency strength, which might be different.
13E.g. one might chose to formalise an ω-rule application
ϕ(n¯) : n ∈ N
(∀x)ϕ(x) ,
where the premisses are enumerable by the elementary recursive function f , as 〈ef , p(∀x)ϕ(x)q〉 with
{ef}(n) := pϕ(n¯)q.
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Ω-rule using analysis given in [41]. But, since the T∞ are, as any systems used in proof-
theory, given by an inductive definition, moving on to theories that include this concept
as a primitive notion seems a natural thing to do. We will discuss this possibility in the
next section.
3.2 Theories of Inductive Definitions and Fixed points
In [1] Peter Aczel promoted his idea viewing an inductive definition of a set of natural
numbers X as a set of pairs, called clauses, of the form 〈A, b〉, where the set A ⊂ N and
b ∈ N. Such a clause is read as:
If every a ∈ A is an element of X , then b ∈ X .
Sometimes clauses are written more intuitively as A ⇒ b. We say that a set X satisfies
a set of clauses C, from A ⇒ b ∈ C with A ⊂ X it follows that b ∈ X . Moreover we
say that a set is inductively definable, if it is the least set (under set inclusion) satisfying
such a C. Theories of inductive definitions try to mimic the idea of the clauses by using
certain formulas that are attached to names for a particular inductively definable set. It
will be clear later that these formulas might be used to define a monotonic operator on the
power set of N (denoted by P(N)) whose smallest fixed point (again under set inclusion)
is also the inductively definable set. Therefore the formulas below are called operator
forms. However to define these formulas we have to define the language in use in more
detail than we did in Chapter 2.
Definition 3.2.1 The languageLID is defined as usual as a one sorted and negation free14
first order language including the constant 0¯ (zero), the binary predicate< and a function
symbol for every primitive recursive function in particular S (successor), 〈., .〉 (pairing)
14¬ is not a primitive symbol.
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and (.)1, (.)2 (projection). As variables we use v0, v1, ....
We define LID(Q) as LID with an additional unary predicate symbol Q and LID(Q,P )
by adding the unary predicate symbol P in the same way to LID(Q).
For technical reasons in the following definitions it is convenient to define negation ¬ϕ
as an abbreviation for ϕ → 0¯ = 1¯. Note that LID(Q) and LHA have the same primitive
symbols (up to the way negation is handled). For notational convenience we denote the
objects defined in the following definitions by capital Latin letters.
Definition 3.2.2 The set of strictly positive (in P ) operator forms of LID(Q,P ) is built
up by the following clauses:
1. Every formula of LID(Q) is a strictly positive operator form.
2. For every term t the formula P (t) is a strictly positive operator form.
3. The strictly positive operator forms are closed under ∃,∀,∧ and ∨.
4. If A ∈ LID(Q) and B is a strictly positive operator form, then A→ B is a strictly
positive operator form.
The set of strictly positive operators is the set of those strictly positive operator forms that
contain at most v0 and v1 free.
An accessibility operator is a strictly positive operator that has the form
A ∧ ∀z[B(z)→ P (z)]
with A,B ∈ L(Q). The set of positive operators (forms) is the set of strictly positive
operators (forms) when it is restricted to LID(P ). The set of strong positive operators
(forms) is similarly defined as the set of positive operators (forms) but without including
condition 4 into the definition.
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As suggested before, one idea behind positive operators is that each of them, say A(P, x),
can serve to define a monotone operator
Φ : P(N)→ P(N)
by defining
Φ(S) := {n ∈ N : A(S, n)}
for S ∈ P(N). It is easy to prove monotonicity by using positivity.15 Conversely it is
well known that any monotone operator on P(N) can be defined by a positive operator
form, where the other free variables serve as parameters (see [37] for details). Moreover
it is well known that inductively definable sets coincide with the smallest fixed points of
monotone operators. However it is possible to strengthen this notions by going transfinite;
strictly positive operator forms can serve as a formalisation of transfinite iterations of
inductively definable sets by using Q as a place holder for previously defined sets. In
order to deal with inductively definable sets and their transfinite iterations in a first order
system we have to give them explicit names, which can serve then as predicate constants.
The next definition fixes a name for a set that is defined by an operator of LID(Q,P ).
Definition 3.2.3 The first order language L∗ID(strict) is built from LID by adding for
every strictly positive operator A ∈ LID(Q,P ) a new unary predicate symbol PA to
the primitive symbols of LID. The languages for accessible L∗ID(acc), positive operators
L∗ID(pos) and strong positive operators L∗ID(strong) are defined analogously.
According to the question that arose before about a theory formalising the principles
of inductive definitions one might suggest a theory that formalises all the principles that
have been given in the presentation of inductive definitions above, i.e. formulating axioms
expressing that PA is the least fixed point ofA. This theory is denoted by ID1 and defined
as follows.
15Φ is called monotone, if S1 ⊆ S2 implies Φ(S1) ⊆ Φ(S2).
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Definition 3.2.4 The theory ID1 is formulated in L∗ID(pos) and includes all axioms of
PRA, induction for all formulas of L∗ID(pos) and the following two axioms governing
the predicate symbols that are introduced by Definition 3.2.3:
(∀x)[PA(x)↔ A(PA, x)]
(∀x)[A(ϕ, x)→ ϕ(x)]→ (∀x)[PA(x)→ ϕ(x)],
where A(P, v1) is a positive operator and ϕ any formula of L∗ID(pos) with only one free
variable.16
But it causes problems to choose ID1 as a base theory for a hierarchy, i.e. forming
[ID1]≺ as [PA]≺ was formed above. Even when proof-theorists do not have any more
foundational issues with ID1 as they have with PA, ID1 is far to strong in order to make
[ID1]≺ useful. Since ‖ID1‖R = ψ(εΩ+1)17 (see [38]), the hierarchy [ID1]≺ already starts
at a level where it cannot distinguish many interesting theories from one another.
It was Buchholz who discovered an interesting consequence of the fact that the axiom
of choice is much weaker over intuitionistic logic than it is over classical. Because,
as Buchholz proves in [5], IDi1 without the second axiom that governs the predicates
denoting inductively defined sets and the first restricted to strong positive operators
(denoted by ÎD
i
1(strong)) is not stronger than HA.
Theorem 3.2.5 ÎD
i
1(strong) is conservative over HA with respect to almost negative
formulas.
The proof in fact gives ÎD
i
1(strong) ≤alm.neg. HA and can be lifted to
ÎD
i
1(strong) + TI(≺) ≤alm.neg. HA+ TI(≺)
16Here A(ϕ, x) and A(PA, x) denote the formulas generated by substituting the formulas ϕ(t), PA(t)
and the variable x for P (t) and v1 respectively in A(P, v1). Obviously, the term t varies from context to
context.
17An ordinal far higher than ε0.
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for a primitive recursive ordering ≺. However, as Ru¨ede and Strahm showed in [44],
this can be strengthened to theories dealing with iterations of inductive definitions up to
ω.18 In order to formulate these theories in a readable way we have to introduce two
conventions. In the following we identify
PAs (t) with P
A(〈t, s〉) and
PA<s(t) with t = 〈t0, t1〉 ∧ t1 < s ∧ PA(t).
Definition 3.2.6 The theory ÎD
i
n(strict), which is formulated in L∗ID(strict), is based
on intuitionistic logic. It comprises the axioms of HA with induction being extended to
L∗(strict) and includes for every strictly positive A(P,Q, v0, v1) the fixed point axiom:
(∀y < n)(∀x)[PAy (x)↔ A(PAy , PA<y, x, y)],
where A(PAy , P
A
<y, x, y) results from A(P,Q, v0, v1) by substituting for P (t) the atom
PAv1(t), for Q(t) the formula P
A
<v1
(t), for v0 the variable x and for v1 the variable y.19
Also we define ÎD
i
<ω(strict) :=
⋃
n∈N ÎD
i
n(strict).
The theories ÎD
i
<ω(acc) and ÎD
i
n(acc) are the respective subsystems where only
accessibility operators are used.
3.3 Reducing ÎD
i
<ω(strict) to HA
As already suggested before, Ru¨ede and Strahm showed the following theorem in [44].
Theorem 3.3.1 (Ru¨ede and Strahm)
18This obviously is the best possible, since to make sense of transfinite iterations in a theory one has to
add TI(≺) as well.
19in that order
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ÎD
i
<ω(strict) ≤alm.neg. HA
ÎD
i
<ω(strict) ≤Π02 HA
While Buchholz’s proof of the special case with n = 1, which is stated in Theorem 3.2.5,
is directly given via a nice coding and a realisability interpretation, Ru¨ede’s and Strahm’s
proof takes a little detour through a bunch of proof-theoretical results that have been
previously given by other logicians. It starts with another result that goes back to
Buchholz and is proved in [6].
Theorem 3.3.2 (Buchholz)
IDin(strict) ≤alm.neg. IDin(acc)
The proof of this statement shows that the following stronger statement can be proved as
well.
Theorem 3.3.3 ÎD
i
n(strict) ≤alm.neg. ÎD
i
n(acc)
By the results that are stated in [44] one can get rid of the principles of inductive
definitions in deductions by translating them into a second-order systems.
Theorem 3.3.4 (Ru¨ede and Strahm)
ÎDn(acc) ≤LHA ACA−n
The missing links from ACA−n to PA and from PA to HA are straightforward
constructions.20
Since the proofs are important for the result that will be given in Chapter 6, we give them
in full detail.
20The theory ACA−n will be introduced in Definition 3.3.13
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3.3.1 A Proof by Buchholz
The proof of Theorem 3.3.3 is given via a realisability translation that literally follows
Definition 2.2.18. However, since the translation operates on L∗ID(strict), we have to
add how to proceed with the additional predicates PA. This is not easy and already
includes the general proof idea. Moreover we have to take a detour through realisability
on LID(Q,P ) in order to precisely state it. Since LID(Q,P ) has the additional predicates
Q and P , we have to add two respective cases to Definition 2.2.18.
Definition 3.3.5 For every ϕ ∈ LID(Q,P ) we define xrϕ inductively on the complexity
of ϕ as we do in Definition 2.2.18 and add the following two cases:
• If ϕ ≡ P (t), then xrϕ :≡ P (〈t, x〉).
• If ϕ ≡ Q(t), then xrϕ :≡ Q(〈(t)0, (x)1, (t)1〉).
The central observation that is used to prove Theorem 3.3.3 is stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.3.6 For any strictly positive operator form A there is a accessibility operator
form B such that xrA↔ B is an intuitionistically valid tautology.
Proof
We start by defining a set X , which acts like an alternative definition for strictly positive
operator forms, by the following clauses.
1. L(Q) ⊂ X .
2. If ϕ ≡ P (x), then ϕ ∈ X .
3. X is closed under ∧ and ∀.
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4. If ϕ ∈ L(Q) and ψ ∈ X , then ϕ→ ψ ∈ X .
Note that, if a A ∈ L(Q,P ) is a strictly positive operator form, then xrA ∈ X . In the
next step we give for any ϕ ∈ X formulas ψ1, ψ2 ∈ L(Q) such that ϕ is intuitionistically
equivalent to ψ1 ∧ (∀x)[ψ2(x)→ P (x)]. The proof proceeds inductively on the definition
of X .
1. ϕ ∈ L(Q) : We take ϕ to be ψ1 and ⊥ to be ψ2. It is easy to see that
ϕ↔ ϕ ∧ (∀x)[⊥ → P (x)]
is an intuitinistcally valid tautology.
2. ϕ ≡ P (y) : We take 0¯ = 0¯ to be ψ1 and x = y to be ψ2. As before the following
formula is intuitionistically valid.
ϕ↔ 0¯ = 0¯ ∧ (∀x)[x = y → P (x)]
3. ϕ ≡ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 : By induction hypothesis we have ψi1, ψi2 ∈ L(Q) for i ∈ {1, 2}
such that
ϕi ↔ ψi1 ∧ (∀x)[ψi2(x)→ P (x)]
is intuitionistically valid. By taking ψ1 as ψ11 ∧ ψ21 and ψ2 as ψ12 ∨ ψ22 we can
show the equivalence as follows.
ϕ↔ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2
↔ ψ11 ∧ (∀x)[ψ12(x)→ P (x)] ∧ ψ21 ∧ (∀x)[ψ22(x)→ P (x)]
↔ ψ11 ∧ ψ21 ∧ (∀x)[(ψ12 → P (x)) ∧ (ψ22 → P (x))]
↔ ψ11 ∧ ψ21 ∧ (∀x)[ψ12 ∨ ψ22 → P (x))].
4. ϕ ≡ (∀y)χ(y) : By induction hypothesis we have χ1, χ2 ∈ L(Q) such that
χ(y)↔ χ1(y) ∧ (∀x)[χ2(y, x)→ P (x)]
is intuitionistically valid. We take ψ1 as (∀y)χ1(y) and ψ2 as (∃y)χ2(y, x). Hence
we get the following.
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ϕ↔ (∀y)χ(y)
↔ (∀y)[χ1(y) ∧ (∀x)[χ2(y, x)→ P (x)]]
↔ (∀y)χ1(y) ∧ (∀y)(∀x)[χ2(y, x)→ P (x)]
↔ (∀y)χ1(y) ∧ (∀x)[(∃y)χ2(y, x)→ P (x)].
5. ϕ ≡ ϕ1 → ϕ2 : Here ϕ1 ∈ L(Q). By induction hypothesis we have
ϕ2 ↔ ψ21 ∧ (∀x)[ψ22 → P (x)].
We take ψ1 as ϕ1 → ψ21 and ψ2 as ϕ1 ∧ ψ22. Therefore we can proceed as follows:
ϕ↔ ϕ1 → ϕ2
↔ ϕ1 → [ψ21 ∧ (∀x)[ψ22 → P (x)]]
↔ [ϕ1 → ψ21] ∧ [ϕ1 → (∀x)[ψ22 → P (x)]]
↔ [ϕ1 → ψ21] ∧ (∀x)[ϕ1 ∧ ψ22 → P (x)]].
2
Since the construction in the proof above does not change the occurrences of free
variables, one can find for any strictly positive operator an accessibility operator. This
makes the next definition possible.
Definition 3.3.7 If A(P,Q, v0, v1) is a strictly positive operator, then Ar(P,Q, v0, v1) is
the accessibility operator that is constructed from
xrA(P,Q, v0, v1) by the method given in the proof of Lemma 3.3.6.
We are now able to define the realisability translation for L∗ID(strict) as promised above.
Definition 3.3.8 For any ϕ ∈ L∗ID(strict) we inductively define xrϕ on the complexity
of ϕ as we did in Definition 2.2.18 and add the following case.
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• If ϕ ≡ PA(t) for a strictly positive operator A,
then xrϕ :≡ PAr(〈(t)0, x, (t)1〉).21
It is easy to see that the translation of Definition 3.3.8 is a translation from L∗ID(strict)
into its fragment L∗ID(acc) with the property that x is the only free variable that is added.
The next lemma gives a technical property of the translation. Since the identity that is
stated is an actual identity of formulas (not an equivalence), it does not affect the proof-
complexity considerations in Chapter 6. We can therefore skip the proof.
Lemma 3.3.9 For any ϕ ∈ LID(Q,P ),
xrϕ(PAy , P
A
<y) = (xrϕ)(P
Ar , PA
r
<y).
Proof
See [6, p. 231]. 2
We have to clarify one last technical fact before we are able to prove the actual theorem.
Lemma 3.3.10 Assume that ϕ(z) ∈ LID(Q,P ) is a strictly positive operator form and
ψ(z) :≡ {v}(y, w, (z)0, (z)1)rϕ((z)0).
For any strictly positive operator form A ∈ LID(Q,P ), with at most z1, ..., zn free, there
is a realiser (expressed by a p-term22) pA(x, v, w, y, z1, ..., zn) such that
HA ` (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pA(x, v, w, y, z1, ..., zn)rA(ϕ, PB<y).
21The x has to be in the middle of the triple, since 〈x, y, z〉 = 〈〈x, y〉, z〉 and the conventions we made
by formalising the iteration of inductive definitions.
22The set of p-terms is constructed by closing-off the set of terms of HA by λ-abstraction and Kleene-
brackets.
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Proof
The proof proceeds by induction on the complexity of A and is copied from [6, pp. 231-
232]. In the following we abbreviate pA(x, v, w, y, z1, ..., zn) by pA(x, z¯).
1. A ∈ LID(Q) : In this case (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ xrA(ϕ, PB<y) and we take x to be
pA(x, z¯).
2. A ≡ P (u) : Then (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ ψ(〈u, x〉) and xrA(ϕ, PB<y) ≡ ϕ(u). So by
definition,
HA ` ψ(〈u, x〉)↔ {v}(y, w, u, x)rϕ(u).
Therefore we can use {v}(y, w, u, x) as pA(x, z¯).
3. A ≡ A0 ∧ A1 : Then,
(xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ ((x)0rA0)(ψ, PB
r
<y) ∧ ((x)1rA1)(ψ, PB
r
<y).
By induction hypothesis,
HA ` ((x)irAi)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pAi((x)i, z¯)rAi(ϕ, PB<y)
for i ∈ {0, 1}. Hence,
HA ` (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ 〈pA0((x)0, z¯), pA1((x)1, z¯)〉rA(ϕ, PB<y).
4. A ≡ A0 ∨ A1 : In this case (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) is
[(x)0 = 0→ [((x)1rA0)(ψ, PBr<y)]] ∧ [(x)0 6= 0→ [((x)1rA1)(ψ, PB
r
<y)]].
By induction hypothesis,
HA ` ((x)1rAi)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pAi((x)1, z¯)rAi(ϕ, PB<y).
Therefore
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HA ` (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ [(x)0 = 0→ [pA0((x)1, z¯)rA0(ϕ, PB<y)]]
∧[(x)0 6= 0→ [pA1((x)1, z¯)rA1(ϕ, PB<y)]]
↔ 〈(x)0, f((x)0, pA0 , pA1)〉rA(ϕ, PB<y),
where f is a primitive recursive function that is defined by f(0, y, z) = y and
f(x+ 1, y, z) = z.
5. A ≡ (∀u)C(u) : This gives
(xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ (∀u)[({e}(u)rC)(ψ, PB
r
<y)].
The induction hypothesis gives
HA ` ({e}(u)rC)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rC(u)(ϕ, PB<y).
Hence
HA ` (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ (∀u)[pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rC(u, ϕ, PB<y)]
↔ λu.pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rA(ϕ, PB<y).
6. A ≡ (∃u)C(u) : Then
(xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ ((x)1rC((x)0))(ψ, PB
r
<y).
By the induction hypothesis
HA ` ((x)1rC((x)0))(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pC((x)1, z¯, (x)0)rC((x)0, ϕ, PB<y).
Consequently
HA ` (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pC((x)1, z¯, (x)0)rC((x)0, ϕ, PB<y)
↔ 〈(x)0, pC((x)1, z¯, (x)0)〉rA(ϕ, PB<y).
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7. A ≡ C → D : In this case
(xrA)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ (∀u)[(urC)(ψ, PB
r
<y)→ ({e}(u)rD)(ψ, PB
r
<y)].
Since A is a strictly positive operator form, C ∈ LID(Q,P ) and D is a strictly
positive operator form as well. Consequently (urC)(ψ, PBr<y) ≡ urC(ϕ, PB<y). Also
the induction hypothesis gives us
HA ` ({e}(u)rD)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pD({e}(u), z¯)rD(ϕ, PB<y).
Which gives
HA ` (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ (∀u)[(urC)(ψ, PBr<y)→ ({e}(u)rD)(ψ, PBr<y)]
↔ (∀u)[(urC)(ψ, PBr<y)→ pD({e}(u), z¯)rD(ϕ, PB<y)]
↔ λu.pD({e}(u), z¯)rA(ϕ, PB<y).
2
In the following we want to rely on Theorem 2.2.19. Therefore we have to show that
those axioms from ÎD
i
n(strict) that are not axioms of HA are realisable in ÎD
i
n(acc).
Lemma 3.3.11 For any formula ϕ of the form
(∀y < n)(∀x)[PAy (x)↔ A(PAy , PA<y, x, y)],
where A is a strictly positive operator, there is an m ∈ N such that
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` m¯rϕ.
Proof
Assume that ϕ is of the form (∀y < n)(∀z)[PAy (z) ↔ A(PAy , PA<y, z, y)] for a strictly
positive operator A. By Lemma 3.3.9
xrA(PAy , P
A
<y, z, y) = (xrA)(P
Ar
y , P
Ar
<y, z, y).
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Therefore
HA ` xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y)↔ Ar(PA
r
y , P
Ar
<y, x, y)
by Definition 3.3.7. By using this equivalence together with the fixed point axiom in
ÎD
i
n(acc), one gets
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` y < n→ [xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ PA
r
y (〈z, x〉)].
By Definition 3.3.5 this gives
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` y < n→ [xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ xrPAy (z)].
Therefore we can take m1 := pλyzx.xq as a realiser. The other direction of the axiom is
proved in almost the same way, but with the antecedent and the succedent inverted. Hence
we obtain an m2 as we obtained m1. Therefore we can take m := 〈m1,m2〉 such that
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` m¯rϕ.
2
Now we are able to prove Theorem 3.3.3.
Proof
(of Theorem 3.3.3) Let’s suppose for a sentence ϕ ∈ L∗ID(strict) that ÎD
i
n(strict) ` ϕ.
By Theorem 2.2.19 together with Lemma 3.3.11 there is an m ∈ N such that ÎDin(acc) `
m¯rϕ.
Which leads to
(∗) ÎDin(acc) ` (∃x)[xrϕ].
Moreover for almost negative ϕ Lemma 2.2.22 gives us
(∗∗) HA ` (∃x)[xrϕ]→ ϕ.
Combining (∗) and (∗∗) by modus ponens, one gets
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` ϕ.
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It should be clear to the reader that this can be done primitive recursively. 2
Corollary 3.3.12 ÎD
i
n(strict) ≤Π02 ÎD
i
n(acc)
Proof
Since LHA includes all primitive recursive functions as primitive symbols, any formula
in ∆0 is equivalent to an equation. Therefore any Π02 sentence (∀x)(∃y)ϕ is equivalent to
a (∀x)(∃y)[t1 = t2] in HA. The latter however is an almost negative formula according
to Definition 2.2.20. 2
3.3.2 A Proof by Ru¨ede and Strahm
As mentioned above, the aim is to prove that ÎDn(acc) ≤LHA ACA−n . Before this is done
the missing theory ACA−n is defined. Even though ACA
−
n is viewed as a second order
theory with parameter-free iterated arithmetic comprehension, the following definition
introduces ACA−n as a first order system. However it should be clear that the present
formulation is equivalent to the usual one by an obvious translation.
Definition 3.3.13 The language LACA−n is defined as LID(Q) with an additional Hϕ for
any ϕ(Q, x, y) ∈ LID(Q).23
ACA−n is based on classical logic, includes all axioms ofHA and comprises the following
first order comprehension axioms
(∀y < n)(∀x)[Hϕy (x)↔ ϕ(Hϕ<y, x, y)]
for any formula ϕ(Q, x, y) ∈ LID(Q).24
23Note that LID(Q) is the same as LHA extended by a new predicate symbol Q and that ¬ϕ is defined
as ϕ→ 0 = 1.
24Hϕy and H
ϕ
<y are defined as before for the theories of inductive definitions.
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In the next step we prove Theorem 3.3.4. Note that Theorem 3.3.4 talks about the classical
versions of the considered theories, which is essential for the diagonalisation taking place
in its proof.
Proof
(of Theorem 3.3.4)
We want to give a translation τ that assigns to a particular PA a Hτ(A) such that the
translations of the fixed point axioms are provable in ACA−n . Let A(P,Q, x, y) be an
accessibility operator. Hence there are ϕ, ψ ∈ LID(Q) such that
A(P,Q, x, y) ≡ ϕ ∧ (∀z)[ψ(z)→ P (z)].
Next we choose an n such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent to a Π0n(Q) and Σ
0
n(Q) formula
respectively.25 We aim for a fixed point construction, therefore we consider a universal
Π0n(Q)-formula for LID(Q), which is a formula En(Q, u, x, y, z) ∈ Π0n(Q) such that for
every ϕ ∈ Π0n(Q)
PA ` En(Q, pϕq, x, y, z)↔ ϕ.
Substituting En(Q, u, u, z, y) for P (z) in A(P,Q, x, y), one gets
A(En(Q, u, u, z, y), Q, x, y).
It is easy to see that A(En, Q, x, y) is equivalent to a Π0n(Q)-formula. Therefore there is
a k := pA(En, Q, x, y)q such that
ACA−n ` En(Q, k¯, u, x, y)↔ A(En(Q, u, u, z, y), Q, x, y).
Substituting k¯ for u, we get
ACA−n ` En(Q, k¯, k¯, x, y)↔ A(En(Q, k¯, k¯, z, y), Q, x, y).
25The definition of Π0n(Q) literally follows the usual definition of Π
0
n (see Definition 2.1.3) but
additionally considers Q(t) to be a ∆00 formula. Σ
0
n(Q) is similarly defined.
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We define D(Q, x, y) :≡ En(Q, k¯, k¯, x, y) for notational reasons.
The comprehension axiom gives
ACA−n ` (∀y < n)(∀x)[HDy (x)↔ D(HD<y, x, y)↔ En(HD<y, k¯, k¯, x, y)].
The definition of En gives:
ACA−n `
(∀y < n)(∀x)[En(HD<y, k¯, k¯, x, y)↔ A(En(HD<y, k¯, k¯, z, y), HD<y, x, y)].
Combining the two equivalences,
ACA−n ` (∀y < n)(∀x)[HDy (x)↔ A(HDy , HD<y, x, y)].
It is therefore possible to reduce IDn(acc) to ACA−n , by relating P
A to its HD through
a translation τ as stated at the beginning of the proof. Note that, since this translation is
uniform in the accessibility operators through En, the coding is primitive recursive and
the deductions appearing in this proof are uniform in the accessibility operators through
En, this translation gives a primitive recursive translation of IDn(acc)-deductions into
ACA−n -deductions. Consequently we have a proof-theoretical reduction. 2
It remains to reduce ACA−n to PA and PA to HA.
Theorem 3.3.14 ACA−n ⊂LPA PA
Proof
Let’s assume that the logic is formulated via a sequent calculus. In this case ACA−n ` ψ
means LK ` ∆ ⇒ ψ, where ∆ ⊂ ACA−n . Since LK ` ∆ ⇒ ψ, there is a cut-free
deduction d0 of ∆ ⇒ ψ in LK. Therefore, since ψ ∈ LPA, d0 includes only those
Hϕ which occur in ∆, say Hϕ1 , ..., Hϕk . The only axioms of ACA−n including an H
ϕi
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are those falling under the comprehension or induction schema. We temporarily ignore
induction and consider formulas of the form
(∀y < n)(∀x)[Hϕiy (x)↔ ϕi(Hϕi<y, x, y)].
By basic arithmetic these are equivalent to formulas of the form
n∧
j=1
(∀x)[Hϕij (x)↔ ϕi(Hϕi<j, x, j)].
However, since a sequent
n∧
j=1
χj,Γ⇒ ψ
is equivalent to
χ1, ..., χn,Γ⇒ ψ,
we obtain from d0 a deduction d1 where the conjuncts of the comprehension formulas
occur separately. (We continue to call the conjuncts of a conjunction that is equivalent to
a comprehension formula the conjuncts of this particular comprehension formula.)
We fix an m ≤ n such that
(∀x)[Hϕim (x)↔ ϕi(Hϕi<m, x, m¯)]
occurs in the sequent which is equivalent to ∆⇒ ψ as explained above. According to the
chosen notation, this gives that
Hϕim (t) is the formula H
ϕi(〈t, m¯〉)
and
Hϕi<m(t) is the formula t = 〈t0, t1〉 ∧ t1 < m¯ ∧Hϕi(t).
Basic arithmetic gives for m = 0 the equivalence
PA ` Hϕi<0(t)↔ 0¯ = 1¯
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and for m > 0 the equivalence
PA ` Hϕi<m(t)↔ Hϕi(〈t, 0¯〉) ∨ ... ∨Hϕi(〈t,m− 1〉).
This justifies the substitution26
s(Hϕi<0(t)) :≡ 0¯ = 1¯
s(Hϕi<m(t)) :≡ Hϕi(〈t, 0¯〉) ∨ ... ∨Hϕi(〈t,m− 1〉)
s(Hϕim (t)) :≡ ϕi([s(s(Hϕi<m(t)))], x, m¯)
s(ϕ ◦ ψ) :≡ s(ϕ) ◦ s(ψ) ◦ ∈ {∨,∧,→}
s(⊥) :≡ ⊥
s(Qzϕ) :≡ Qzs(ϕ) Q ∈ {∃,∀}
Using this substitution on d1, we obtain a d2 that does not include any occurrence of Hϕi .
Because, since s(ϕi(H
ϕi
<m, x, m¯)) gives literally the same formula as s(Hϕim (x)), the end
sequent of d2 contains formulas of the form
(∀x)[χ(x, m¯)↔ χ(x, m¯)]
instead of comprehension axioms. Since these equivalences are valid formulas, they can
be cut out from the final sequent. Consequently, and after substituting t = 0 into the
remaining induction formulas for Hϕi(t), we get a deduction d3 for a sequent ∆′ ⇒ ψ
such that ∆′ ⊂ ∆ ∩ PA and, hence, PA ` ψ. 2
Using the translation Friedman gives in [21], we can easily reduce PA to HA for every
Π02-sentence.
26ϕi([χ(t)], x, 0¯) is obtained from ϕi(H
ϕi
<m, x, 0¯) by substituting χ(t) for H
ϕi
<m(t).
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3.4 Conclusions
With Theorem 3.3.1 having been established, it is possible to rephrase Definition 3.1.3
without changing the ordering on theories that is induced by it. But before we can do so
we have to ensure that the presence of transfinite induction does not change the situation.
Hence we have to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1
[PA]≺ ≡Π02 [ÎD
i
<ω(strict)]≺
Theorem 3.4.1 will follow easily from the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4.2 Assume that ≺ is a primitive recursive relation on N and TI(≺) is the
schema that is defined in Definition 2.2.27. For any closure ϕ of an instance of TI(≺)
there is an n ∈ N such that
HA+ TI(≺) ` n¯rϕ.
Proof
As before we follow [59, p. 199] and give the proof in some detail, because we will need
it in Chapter 6. But for simplicity we restrict ourselves to the case of a closed instance of
TI(≺). Also we assume without loss of generality that any natural number is in the range
of ≺; hence ϕ is of the form
(∀x)[(∀y ≺ x)ψ(y)→ ψ(x)]→ (∀x)ψ(x).
We assume that
wr(∀x)[(∀y ≺ x)ψ(y)→ ψ(x)];
hence
(∀x)[{w}(x)r[(∀y ≺ x)ψ(y)→ ψ(x)]]
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by definition. Which expands to
(∀x, z)[zr(∀y ≺ x)ψ(y)→ {w}(x, z)rψ(x)].
Note that zr(∀y ≺ x)ψ(y) implies (∀y ≺ x)[{z}(y, 0)rψ(y)], since y ≺ x is quantifier
free in LHA for a primitive recursive relation ≺. We define
fc(u, x, y) :'
 0 : x  yu : x ≺ y .
It is easy to find a partial recursive function f such that
f(v, w, x) ' {w}(x, λyλu.fc({v}(w, y), y, x)).
The recursion theorem assures that there is an n¯ such that
{n¯}(w, x) ' {w}(x, λyλu.fc({n¯}(w, y), y, x)).
Using TI(≺) with respect to x, we can easily prove the totality of {n¯}(w, x) and that
{n¯}(w, x)rψ(x). For instance the latter follows from
(∀x)(∀y ≺ x)[{n¯}(w, y)rψ(y)→ {n¯}(w, x)rψ(x)].
Hence n¯ realises ϕ by Definition 2.2.18.2
With this lemma proved, the proof of Theorem 3.4.1 is almost trivial.
Proof
of Theorem 3.4.1.
The proof proceeds in three steps. To prove
[ÎD
i
n(strict)]≺ ≤alm.neg. [ÎD
i
n(acc)]≺
note that Lemma 3.4.2 provides the same resources for Theorem 3.4.1 as Lemma 3.3.11
provides for Theorem 3.3.3.
To prove
[ÎDn(acc)]≺ ≤LHA [ACA−n ]≺
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note that the proof of Theorem 3.3.4 is given by a translation τ . Hence any translation of
an instance of transfinite induction from LÎDn(acc) is an instance of transfinite induction
from LACA−n .
Since Theorem 3.3.14 is proved by a translation as well, as an analogous argument gives
[ACA−n ]≺ ≤LPA [PA]≺.
Combining these three steps, the theorem is proved. 2
Consequently we can rephrase Definition 3.1.3 as follows.
Definition 3.4.3 Let T be a theory as defined in chapter 2 andOT (β) an ordinal notation
system. If there is an α ∈ OT (β) such that
T ≡Π02 [ÎD
i
<ω(strict)]α,
then we call α the Π02-proof-theoretical-ordinal of T and denote it by ‖T‖Π02 .
The natural way of formalising an ordinal-analysis in [ÎD
i
<ω(strict)]≺, for an appropriate
≺, gives a recipe that is general enough for the purposes that are outlined in Chapter 5.
But before we discuss these, we will justify this claim of naturalness in the very next
chapter for the example of a system that includes the Ω-rule.
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Chapter 4
A formulation of the Ω-Rule in
ÎD
i
2(strict)
As explained in Section 3.1, it is of special interest to formalise the methods of ordinal-
analysis in a theory of arithmetic in order to obtain conservativity results. In several places
proof-theorists give such formalisations for infinite systems, e.g. systems that include the
ω-rule (see [38] and [51]). There are two ways of formalising infinite deductions. The
first is called the local version: the nodes of an infinite deduction-tree are coded as n-
tuples that include a recursive function enumerating the direct predecessors of the node.
The second is called the global version: the infinite deduction-trees are represented in
arithmetic through a code of their characteristic (recursive) function. In both versions
the codes of some recursive functions essentially appear in the representation of the
deduction-trees. Consequently to define an operation upon these representations in an
arithmetical theory one has to alter these codes in a recursive way, i.e. one has to
rely on a formalised version of the recursion theorem that is accessible in this theory.1
Hence the process of formalisation is not trivial and needs a lot of formalised recursion
1The most common non-formalised version of the recursion theorem is the following (see [24]): For any
recursive function f(~x, y) there exists an e such that {e}(~x) ' f(~x, e).
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theory. Moreover it lies in the nature of mathematical texts dealing with such matters
that they include a lot of handwaving in order to make them readable.2 Since the
applications of formalised recursion theory are not trivial, this sometimes causes doubts
in the community. In addition less commonly used concepts like the Ω-rule3, which is
given by Buchholz in [6], have never been properly formalised. This is not the case,
because the formalisation would be to long or painful to write down. Rather in the case
of the Ω-rule it is not clear what a formalisation in PA could look like. However in the
following we show that using ÎD
i
<ω(strict) helps to avoid these issues (as was promised
in Chapter 3). For in this theory the formalisation is straightforward. The present chapter
tries to convince the reader of this claim by giving a formalisation of an infinite system,
that comprises the Ω-rule, in ÎD
i
2(strict). However the claim is not that the formalisation
of ordinal-analysis in ÎD
i
<ω(strict) is less long, complex or painful than in PRA or PA.
The aim of this chapter is to show that a formalisation of the Ω-rule can be given and
that for most of the infinite systems, that are given in the literature, their formalisation
is straightforward; for formalised recursion theory is not needed. The reader may skip
the present chapter, when she autonomously sees how that might be done, because the
content of this chapter is not used in any other part of the present thesis. However we will
draw on the possibility of an Ω-rule formalisation later on.
4.1 A particular system including the Ω-rule
As was mentioned above, we aim to convince the reader that a formalisation of an ordinal-
analysis that uses the Ω-rule can be done in ÎD
i
<ω(strict). This is done by formalising a
provability predicate that includes the Ω-rule and is exemplary for those methods. We will
formalise the one that is given by Rathjen in [41], since it is used in the ordinal-analysis
2However I personally believe that Kleene’s [28] is a very nice piece of logical work. However not many
would agree.
3See Definition 4.1.3 and its following discussion.
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of theories that we will consider in Chapter 5. When this example is followed, it should
be easy to apply the techniques to other systems as well.
Definition 4.1.1 The language L2T∞ is a second order language which uses ∈ as
an mediator between first-order terms and second order variables. Moreover L2T∞
distinguishes between bound and free variables of any order and includes the logical
connectives ∨,∧,→ and ¬. Its primitive symbols are the same as those of LPRA. The
atoms are t1 = t2, t ∈ U , ¬(t1 = t2) and ¬(t ∈ U). The formulas are built from the
atoms through∧,∨,∀x,∀X, ∃x and ∃X . Hence we stipulate that formulas are in negation
normal form. Moreover we call formulas arithmetical, Π0∞-formulas or Π
1
0-formulas, if
they do not include bound second order variables. A formula is called weak, if it belongs
to Π10 ∪ Π11.4
Free second-order variables and bounded second-order variables are denoted by U, V,W
and X, Y, Z respectively on the meta-level. In [41] the complexity of a formula is
measured by the following function.
Definition 4.1.2 1. gr(A) = 0, if A is an atom.5
2. gr(∀XF (X)) = gr(∃XF (X)) = ω, if F (U) is arithmetical.
3. gr(A ∧B) = gr(A ∨B) = max{gr(A), gr(B)}+ 1
4. gr(∀xF (x)) = gr(∃xF (x)) = gr(F (0)) + 1
5. gr(∀XF (X)) = gr(∃XF (X)) = gr(F (U)) + 1, if F (X) is not arithmetical.
The next definition gives the infinite deduction system that we want to formalise. We
denote the system by T∞ to emphasis that the system is related to a theory T from
4The set of Π11-formulas includes the Π
1
0-formulas and is closed under second-order ∀-quantification.
5Note we defined ¬(t1 = t2) to be atoms as well.
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[41], which is not given here. Also we use the ordinal notation system of [41] merely
like a black-box and denote it by (OT (θ),≺,), where  is an additional ordering
on OT (θ) that is defined by using ≺. In addition  is entangled with a notion of
fundamental functions. However the actual definitions of  and fundamental functions
are of no interest here. We just simply note that they can be formalised in arithmetic by
an arithmetical formula. The following definition also lacks an explicit formulation of the
logical rules, but these formulations can be found in Appendix C at item 4.
Definition 4.1.3 Assume that α ∈ OT (θ), ρ ≺ ω + ω.
1. If A is a true atomic or negated-atomic sentence and A ∈ Γ, then T∞ `αρ Γ.
2. If Γ contains A(s1, ..., sn) and ¬A(t1, ..., tn) with grade 0 or ω, where si and ti
(1 ≤ i ≤ n) are terms with equal value, then T∞ `αρ Γ.
3. Assume that 〈Γ1, ...,Γn : Γ〉 is an instance of (∧), (∨), (∃1), (∀2) or (cut), where in
the case of a cut the cut-formula is of a grade ≺ ρ, and βi  α for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
If T∞ `βiρ Γi, then T∞ `αρ Γ.
4. If T∞ `βρ Γ, F (U) holds for some β  α and ω  gr(F (U)), i.e. F (U) is not
arithmetical, then T∞ `αρ Γ,∃XF (U).
5. If for anym ∈ N, both T∞ `βmρ Γ, A(m¯) and βmα holds, then T∞ `αρ Γ,∀xA(x).
6. Let f be a fundamental function. Moreover assume that
(a) f(Ω) α,
(b) T∞ `f(0)ρ Γ,∀XF (X), where ∀XF (X) ∈ Π11, and that
(c) T∞ `β0 ∆, ∀XF (X) implies T∞ `f(β)0 ∆,Γ for every set of weak formulas ∆
and any β ≺ Ω.
In this case T∞ `αρ Γ holds.
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Clause 6 is called the Ω-rule and was given by Rathjen in [41]. Rathjen himself developed
it from a natural-deduction version of an Ω-rule that is given by Buchholz in [6].
Buchholz justifies or explains the rule in the mode of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-
interpretation (see [6]). In this interpretation the justification of an implication, say A →
B, is viewed as a transformation of a presupposed justification for A into a justification
for B. Most of the contemporary intuitionistic literature identifies “justification” as a
formal deduction in some constructive system. Consequently a deduction of A → B has
to offer the possibility of transforming a deduction of A into a deduction of B, e.g. this is
often considered as the idea behind→-introduction in the calculus of natural deduction.
In this mood, Buchholz argues as follows: one is allowed to conclude an implication
PA(n) → C, where A is a strictly positive operator and C any formula, when one can
constructively find for any deduction of PA(n) a deduction of C. He is therefore allowed
to extend his formal system by the following rule.
Ω-rule: If for each direct6 deduction X of PA(n) the deduction YX proves
C, then one can form the deduction
YX....
C : for any direct deduction X with
X....
PA(n)
PA(n)→ C .
Note the differences between→-introduction and the Ω-rule. While the Ω-rule explicitly
and merely requires that any deduction for PA(n) can be transformed into a deduction of
C, →-introduction implicitly assures this constructibility requirement by presupposing
a logical claim that implies the possibility of a transformation. Consequently the Ω-
rule grasps the constructive character of the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-interpretation
more accurately than→-introduction does.7 Moreover the transformation requirement is
6Direct means that a deduction is cut-free or free of local maxima in a sequent calculus or in natural
deduction respectively.
7In other words, if one takes the →-introduction from natural deduction as the explication of the
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enough to ensure the possibility of eliminating local maxima, since the information of
how to return to a deduction of PA(n) is still available.
In Rathjen’s formulation the Ω-rule is a little more. Only the third part of clause 6
represents the actual Ω-rule; the rest extends the rule by a cut and connects it to the
fundamental functions. In order to understand Rathjen’s restriction to Π11-formulas, note
that in Buchholz formulation PA(n) can be seen as a Π11-formula, when P
A is considered
as a free second-order variable. Moreover Rathjen’s inclusion of a cut into clause 6
matches Buchholz’s intentions as well. Since Buchholz wants to eliminate local maxima
in his natural deduction formulation, he has to reduce an Ω-rule that is followed by an→-
elimination. However when one wants to reduce cuts in a sequent calculus, the analogous
case to Buchholz’s is an Ω-rule that is followed by a cut.
The issue of formalising such a rule should now be unravelled. The premiss quantifies
over all deductions of a certain kind; hence the premiss presupposes a previously defined
set whose elements are in the range of its metaquantifier. In other words, Definition 4.1.3
is a singularly iterated inductive definition. This cannot be covered (or at least not in an
obvious way) by a set of infinite trees whose branches are elementarily enumerable as the
deductions whose only infinite rule is the ω-rule can be. Therefore we cannot formalise
Definition 4.1.3 in the language of PA as the literature does with deductions of PAω. But,
since the definition is a singularly iterated inductive definition, the theory ÎD
i
2(strict) is
able to formalise it, as we will show in Section 4.3. In the next section however we
formalise several easy concepts, like “being a formula”, in order to have easy examples
that show how such a formalisation work.
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-interpretation, then it strongly undergenerates, i.e. the formal notion given
does not cover everything the Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-interpretation seems to allow.
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4.2 Working out concepts in ÎD
i
1
The present section shows how finite concepts of proof theory can be formulated
in ÎD
i
1(acc). In ÎD
i
1(acc) inductive definitions are not iterated. Therefore we can
work in the weaker language L(P ) and with operators that have no occurrence of v1.
Consequently we only use fixed point axioms of the following form:
(∀x)[Pϕ(x)↔ ϕ(Pϕ, x)].
Since we have to work in arithmetic, a minimum of coding the syntax is necessary. Let’s
assume that we have already fixed a Go¨del numbering. This allows us to express whether
a symbol is a free or bound variable of a certain order (FV 1(x), FV 2(x), BV 1(x), BV 2),
a constant (C(x)) or a function symbol (F (x)). Moreover we are able to define a function
that gives the arity of a symbol ( arity(x)) and to express that a string of symbols is an
atom (At(x)). Since all primitive recursive functions are in the language, there is a length
function for n-tuples lg(x) and a substitution function sub(x, y, z), which substitutes z
for y in x, in the language. The reader should bear in mind that the following formulas
are hard to read because of the special form they have to have. In order to reduce the
number of symbols in a formula, projection onto the i-th entry of a tuple x is denoted by
xi. We start with a formulation for what it means to be a term (Term(P, x)):
FV 1(x) ∨ C(x) ∨ [lg(x) = arity(x0) + 1 ∧ F (x0)
∧∀z((∃i < lg(x))(i 6= 0 ∧ z = xi)→ P (z))].
We denote the fixed point of this formula by P T . Note that this formula is an accessibility
operator.8 In a similar way one can formulate the notion of formula as an accessibility
operator Form(P, x):
[At(x) ∨ (lg(x) = 3 ∧ ((Q(x0) ∧ (BV 1(x1) ∨BV 2(x1))) ∨ PC(x0)]
8Note that the chosen coding cannot view variables and constants as codes for pairs.
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∧∀z[lg(x) = 3 ∧ [(Q(x0) ∧ (∃y < f(lg(x)))(z = sub(x2, x1, y)))
∨(PC(x0) ∧ (z = x1 ∨ z = x2)]→ P (z))].
Here Q(x) is x = p∀q ∨ x = p∃q and PC(x) is x = p∨q ∨ x = p∧q. The variable y can
be bounded by f(lg(x)) for some elementary recursive function f , because the number of
bound variables occurring in x is bounded by lg(x). However, f depends on the coding.
In order to formulate the provability predicate of [41], we need the grade function on
formulas. Therefore we reformulate Form(P, x) so that any formula is a pair containing
the actual formula and its grade. We achieve this by using the ordinal notation system
from [41] as a black box (OT,≺).
[lg(x) = 2 ∧OT (x1) ∧ [[At(x0) ∧ x1 = p0q]∨
[lg(x0) = 3 ∧ [(Q(x0,0) ∧ (BV 1(x0,1) ∨BV 2(x0,1))) ∨ PC(x0,0)]]]∧
∀z[lg(z) = 2 ∧ lg(x0) = 3 ∧ [[Q(x0,0) ∧ (∃y < f(lg(x0)))(z0 = sub(x0,2,0, x0,1, y)∧
[(BV 1(x0,1) ∧ x1 = pz1 + 1q) ∨ (BV 2(x0,1)∧
((z1 ≺ pωq→ x1 = pωq) ∨ (z2  pωq→ x1 = pz2 + 1q))]∨
[PC(x0,0) ∧ (z0 = x0,1 ∨ z0 = x0,2) ∧ x1 = pmax(x0,1,1, x0,2,1) + 1q]
→ P (z)]
We denote the fixed point of this formula by P F .
4.3 Formulating the Ω-rule
In this section we give a strictly positive operatorD that can be used in a fixed point axiom
and expresses the Ω-rule.
We do not use the predicates that were defined in the previous section here, since every
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use of an inductive definition in another one increases the number of iterations. Instead
we use a ∆1-formula Form(x) which gives formulas as pairs of the actual formula and
their grade. We have to do this in order to keep the iteration of the inductive definitions
below 2. T0(x) denotes the standard truth predicate for atoms; Π10(x) and Π
1
1(x) are
used to denote formulas which enumerate the codes of Π10 and Π
1
1 formulas respectively.
Sets of formulas {A1, ..., An} are viewed as sums of the form 2pA0q + ... + 2pAnq.9 We
use FS(x) to denote (∀y)(∀z)[x = 2y + z → Form(y)], which expresses that x is a
set of formulas, and y ∈ x to denote (∃z < x)[x = 2y + z]. Also we use x ∪ y to
denote x + y, when x and y are viewed as sets. In this view, we define set-difference as
x\u :=
 x− u : ∃y < x[x = u+ y]x : otherwise .
The dot-notation x˙ denotes the function that gives the x-th numeral, e.g. 3˙ :=
pS(S(S(0¯)))q. We use pAq and pΓq in formulas B(pAq) and B(pΓq) as abbreviations
for the formulas Form(x) ∧ B(x) and FS(x) ∧ B(x) respectively. Also we use this
notation in cases where pAq and pΓq are quantified by an ∃-quantifier. However in
the case of a ∀-quantification we use the implication-analogue.10 When we quantify
over an ordinal α from the notation system, we use pαq in a similar way. We also use
y ≺ gr(pAq) to denote Form(x) ∧ y ≺ (x)1.
We formalise the axioms of T∞ by the following formula Axiom(x)
FS(x) ∧ [(∃y < x)(y ∈ x ∧ At(y) ∧ T0(x)))∨
(∃y, z < x)(y ∈ x ∧ z ∈ x ∧ neg(y) = z ∧ (At(y) ∧ gr(y) = pωq))].
9Note that every natural number can be uniquely viewed as a sum of powers of 2.
10Which are Form(x)→ B(x) and FS(x)→ B(x) respectively. Consequently formulations like
(∀pAq)[...B(pAq)...]
denote formulas like
(∀x)[Form(x)→ ...B(x)...].
Also in some cases, where we build up formulas bit by bit, the actual formula is not specified before we say
how we quantify. However that should not cause any confusion.
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Here neg(pAq) := p¬Aq, which is primitive recursive.11
In the following we define a derivability predicate D(P,Q, x, y) for 5-tuples of the form
〈Γ, α, ρ, RI , A〉 in order to formalise T∞-provability. Here Γ is a set of formulas that is
provable with a cut-rank ρ in α many steps, RI is the inference rule that was used last in
the derivation and has A as its principal formula. Unfortunately, since we have to iterate
the inductive definition, we talk about pairs of this 5-tuples with a natural number that
counts the stage of iteration.
Since D(P,Q, x, y) has to be strictly positive, we have to ensure that no P is in the scope
of a ¬. Also, since the Ω-rule is defined with respect to certain functions, which are not
specified here, the following formulas are schemata in ϕf and Ψ, which act as place-
holders for the functions and their properties respectively.
The formula D(P,Q, x, y) is defined as follows:
x = 〈〈pΓq, pαq, pρq, i, pAq〉, y〉∧
[DAx ∨ D∨ ∨ D∧ ∨ Dcut ∨ D∃1 ∨ D∀2 ∨ D∃2 ∨ Dω ∨ DΩ],
where DΩ is the only formula that includes an occurrence of Q and i is a meta-notation
for a first order variable. Note that, even x is not explicitly shown in the following
metanotations of the subformulas of D, it actually occurs in the formulas; it is covered by
several formulations, e.g. “i =” and “pAq ∈”.12
DAx(x) is
i = RAx ∧ Axiom(pΓq) ∧ pAq ∈ pΓq
D∨(P, x, y) is
i = R∨ ∧ pAq = pB ∨ Cq∧
11Note that this function does not simply place a ¬ in front of the formula, because the formulas of T∞
are given in negation normal form.
12Note that these formulations denote formulas of L(Q,P ), since the pair function is in the language.
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(∃z)[z = 〈〈pΛq, pβq, pγq, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧ P (z)∧
[pBq ∈ pΛq ∨ pCq ∈ pΛq] ∧ pΛq\p{B,C}q = pΓq∧
pβq pαq ∧ pρq = pγq].
D∧(P, x, y) is
i = R∧ ∧ pAq = pB ∧ Cq∧
(∃z1, z2)[z1 = 〈〈pΛ1q, pβ1q, pγ1q, j, pF1q〉, y〉∧
z2 = 〈〈pΛ2q, pβ2q, pγ2q, j, pF2q〉, y〉 ∧ P (z1) ∧ P (z2)∧
pBq ∈ pΛ1q ∧ pCq ∈ pΛ2q ∧ p(Λ1 ∪ Λ2)\{B,C}q = pΓq∧
pβ1q pαq ∧ pρq = pγ1q ∧ pβ2q pαq ∧ pρq = pγ2q].
D∃1(P, x, y) is
i = R∃1 ∧ pAq = p∃vlB(vl)q∧
(∃z)(∃ptq)[z = 〈〈pΛq, pβq, pγq, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧ P (z)∧
pB[t/vl]q ∈ pΛq ∧ pΛq\p{B[t/vl]}q = pΓq∧
pβq pαq ∧ pρq = pγq].
D∀2(P, x, y) is
i = R∀2 ∧ pAq = p∀XB(X)q∧
(∃z)(∃pUq)[z = 〈〈pΛq, pβq, pγq, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧ P (z)∧
pB[U/X]q ∈ pΛq ∧ pΛq\p{B[U/X]}q = pΓq∧
pβq pαq ∧ pρq = pγq].
D∃2(P, x, y) is
i = R∃2 ∧ pAq = p∃XB(X)q∧
(∃z)(∃pUq)[z = 〈〈pΛq, pβq, pγq, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧ P (z)∧
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pB[U/X]q ∈ pΛq ∧ pΛq\p{B[U/X]}q = pΓq∧
pβq pαq ∧ pρq = pγq].
Dcut(P, x, y) is
i = Rcut ∧ (∃z1, z2)[z1 = 〈〈pΛ1q, pβ1q, pγ1q, j, pF1q〉, y〉∧
z2 = 〈〈pΛ2q, pβ2q, pγ2q, j, pF2q〉, y〉 ∧ P (z1) ∧ P (z2)∧
pAq ∈ pΛ1q ∧ p¬Aq ∈ pΛ2q ∧ p(Λ1 ∪ Λ2)\{A,¬A}q = pΓq∧
pβ1q pαq ∧ pβ2q pαq ∧ pρq = pγ1q ∧ pρq = pγ2q ∧ gr(pAq) ≺ pρq].
Dω(P, x, y) is
i = Rω ∧ pAq = p∀vlB(vl)q∧
(∀w)(∃z)[z = 〈〈pΛq, pβq, pγq, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧ P (z)∧
pB[w˙/vl]q ∈ pΛq ∧ pΛq\p{B[w˙/vl]}q = pΓq∧
pβq pαq ∧ pρq = pγq].
DΩ(Q,P, x, y) is
i = RΩ ∧ pAq = p∀XB(X)q ∧ Π11(pAq)∧
(∃ef )[Ψ(ef ) ∧ DΩ,1 ∧ (∃z)[DΩ,2 ∧ DΩ,3]]].
Here Ψ(ef ) is a formula expressing that ef is the code of a recursive function and satisfies
the definition of fundamental.13 In the following we will formulate the subformulas DΩ,1,
DΩ,2 and DΩ,3. Note that only DΩ,3 includes an occurrence of Q.
13The exact definition of fundamental does not concern us here, since it is a technicality of the proofs in
[41]. But it can be found in [41].
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DΩ,1 is
(∃w)[{ef}(pΩq) = w ∧ w  pαq)].
DΩ,2(P, x, y) is
z = 〈〈pΛq, pδq, pγq, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧ P (z)∧
pγq = pρq ∧ pδq = {ef}(0) ∧ pAq ∈ pΛq∧
pΓq = pΛ\{A}q.
DΩ,3(Q,P, x, y) is
(∀v)(∃w)[[v = 〈〈p∆q, pβq, p0q, j, pFq〉, y〉 ∧Q(v) ∧Weak(p∆q)∧
pAq ∈ p∆q ∧ pβq ≺ pΩq]→
[w = 〈〈pΘq, pµq, p0q, j, pGq〉, y〉 ∧ P (w)∧
pΘq = pΛ ∪∆\{A}q ∧ pµq = {ef}(pβq)]].
As one can easily verify, D(P,Q, x, y) is a formula of LID(Q,P ) which satisfies the
definition of a strict operator form. Moreover the only part including an occurrence of
Q is DΩ. Consequently a system that includes the ω-rule as its only infinite rule can be
formalised in ÎD
i
1(strict).
Note that the Ω-rule cannot occur nested, since the rank of the deduction must be smaller
than Ω in order to apply it and the rank of a deduction jumps above Ω after a single
application. Therefore a single iteration of D(P,Q, x, y) models the notion of T∞ `αρ Γ,
which can be done in ÎD
i
2(strict).
4.4 Conclusion
Since derivability can be formalised in this straightforward way, the formalised proof
follows the informal arguments in [41] almost literally. Hence, arguing in a similar way
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as in Chapter 3, one can establish
T ≡ ÎDi2(strict) + TI(≺ α),
for a theory T , whose ordinal-analysis uses the Ω-rule, with α = ‖T‖Π02 in the ordinal
notation system that was used in the analysis. Moreover by Theorem 3.4.1 we get all the
benefits of the well-studied theories
PA+ TI(≺ α).
But, before putting these benefits into action in Chapter 5, we repeat the methodological
advantages for any kind of ordinal analysis. The definition of D(P,Q, x, y) shows that
there is no need for fancy formalised recursion theory and complex constructions. For
instance, sinceD(P,Q, x, y) gives the previous step of a deduction through the the axiom
(∀y < n)(∀x)[PDy (x)↔ D(PDy , PD<y, x, y)]
by an existential quantifier, there is no need for a function that enumerates the premisses
of an infinite rule. Therefore no enumeration function has to be altered in order to operate
on the derivability predicate.
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Chapter 5
Proof-Complexity and the Deducibility
of Σ01-Sentences
The preceding chapters were mainly concerned with methodological considerations; in
this chapter however we will connect the notions developed and explain how these can
be put into action. We will introduce the notion of proof-complexity and connect it with
the previously given notions of proof-theoretical reduction and ordinal analysis. This will
lead to a straightforward method studying the proof-complexity of true Σ01-sentences. The
main idea is to connect the magnitude of a witness of a Σ01-sentence with the length of its
deduction.
5.1 Proof-Complexity
Kurt Go¨del developed the notion of proof-complextiy in 1936 in his paper [25], where he
introduced a notion of proof-complexity that counts the lines of a deduction in a Hilbert-
calculus, to explain that the transition to a higher order system does not merely allow
the deduction of new formulas, but also shortens the deductions of formulas that were
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already deducible in the lower-order system. However the notion of proof-complexity
as deduction-length is from a metatheoretic as well as from a practical point of view
inappropriate, because a short deduction might (in principle) still include monstrous
formulas. Hence we prefer the following definition.
Definition 5.1.1 Assume Σ is a countable set of symbols, which are called the primitive
symbols, and Σ∗ be the set of finite sequences of elements of Σ. A language L is an
inductively defined subset of Σ∗ whose elements are denoted by ϕi for i ∈ N.1 A set
of rules R is a set of finite sequences of elements of L. If r ∈ R has the form r =
〈ϕ1, ..., ϕn〉, then we call ϕ1, ..., ϕn−1 the premisses and ϕn the conclusion; an r = 〈ϕ1〉
is called an axiom. An F = 〈Σ,L,R〉 is called a formal system. The set of F-deductions
DF comprises elements d of the form 〈ϕ1, ..., ϕn〉 such that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is an
r ∈ R and 1 ≤ i1, ..., im < i with r = 〈ϕi1 , ..., ϕim , ϕi〉. Also we use d ` ϕ, if ϕ is the
last entry of d.
If lg is a length function for sequences and d = 〈ϕ1, ..., ϕn〉 in DF , we call lg(d) the
length of a deduction and
|d| :=
lg(d)∑
i=1
lg(ϕi)
its complexity.2 We use F `n ϕ, if F ` ϕ and
min{|d| : d ∈ DF and d ` ϕ} ≤ n.
It is a trivial consequence of this definition that, if max(d) denotes the length of the longest
formula in d, then |d| ≤ lg(d) ·max(d). We will silently use this fact throughout this and
the next chapter; it is the reason why most of the bounds that are given in Chapter 6 are
quadratic.
We can easily connect this notion of complexity with our notion of conservativity
1Note that a ϕi does not have to be a formula in the common sense, but can as well be a sequent of a
Gentzen-calculus. Because the ϕi denote the objects for which a deduction system is defined.
2Hence the complexity of a deduction d is the total number of occurrences of primitive symbols in d.
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(Definition 2.1.14) and therefore with proof-theoretical reduction (Definition 2.2.7) by
the following notion of speed-up, which is a generalisation of those given in [10].
Definition 5.1.2 Let 〈Fα〉α∈τ be a hierarchy of sets of total recursive functions with length
τ such that, if α < β, then Fα ( Fβ .3
Let F and F ′ be two formal systems that satisfy that there is a non-empty Γ ⊂ L ∩ L′
such that for any ϕ ∈ Γ, if F ′ ` ϕ, then F ` ϕ.
F has a Fα-speed-up over F ′ with respect to Γ, if there exists a sequence 〈ϕi〉i∈ω of
formulas from Γ such that, if dF
′
i and d
F ′
i are the shortest proofs of ϕi in F and F ′
respectively, then:
1. No Fβ with β < α includes a function f that satisfies |dF ′i | < f(|dFi |) for all i ∈ ω.
2. There is a function f ∈ Fα such that for any i ∈ ω it holds that |dF ′i | < f(|dFi |).
Definition 5.1.2 is only useful, when 〈Fα〉α∈τ stratifies recursive functions in accordance
with their growth rate. We give two examples of speed-ups in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1.3 1. IΣ1 has a non-elementary speed-up over PRA.
2. RCA has a polynomial speed-up over IΣ1.4
Proof
These are the main results of [10]. 2
A polynomial speed-up is usually seen as an insignificant speed-up. However we consider
an elementary speed-up an insignificant one; why this is the case will become clear from
the rest of this chapter.
3For a ω-long hierarchy see Definition B.4 for the Grzegorczyk Hierarchy. For a transfinite hierarchy
one can use the Hardy Hierarchy, which is given by Definition 5.2.8, in a similar manner as the inducing
functions of the Grzegorczyk Hierarchy.
4RCA is a second order system with comprehension for recursively definable sets and allows Σ1-
induction when second order parameters are present.
Chapter 5. Proof-Complexity and the Deducibility of Σ01-Sentences 122
5.2 The Deducibility of Σ01-Sentences
As stated in Theorem 2.1.10, any true Σ01-sentence can be deduced in Q. However the
complexity of the smallest possible deduction of some Σ01-sentence can significantly differ
between two theories extending Q. A good example is the Σ1-sentence Big, which is a
restriction of Kruskal’s Tree Theorem (see [41]) and states the following.
There exists an n ≤ 1 such that, if T1, ..., Tn are finite trees whose vertices are
labelled from {1, ..., 6}, where for all i, |Ti| < i, then there exist i < j ≤ n
such that Ti is label preserving embeddable into Tj .
Note that the only quantifier that is not bounded is the one that states the existence of n.
The rest of the sentence can be easily formulated by a ∆00-formula in LQ. In order to
motivate Big further, we would like to introduce the theories Π12 −BI and Π12 −BI0.
Definition 5.2.1 1. Let 〈A,≺〉 be such that A and ≺ are definable by Π10-formulas.
The (second order) formula WF (≺) is
(∀X)[(∀x)[[A(x) ∧ (∀y ≺ x)[y ∈ X]]→ x ∈ X]→ (∀x)[A(x)→ x ∈ X]].
2. The theory Γ − BI0 is formulated in classical second order logic and contains the
axioms of identity, the defining axioms of all primitive recursive functions, second
order induction
(∀X)[0¯ ∈ X ∧ (∀x)[x ∈ X → S(x) ∈ X]→ (∀x)[x ∈ X]]
together with the following schema:
(∃Y )(∀x)[x ∈ Y ↔ ϕ(x)],
where ϕ(x) ∈ Π0∞, and
WF (≺)→ TIΓ(≺)
for any Π10-definable relation ≺.
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3. The theory Γ−BI is the theory Γ−BI0 extended by the schema
ϕ(0) ∧ (∀x)[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))]→ (∀x)ϕ(x)
for any ϕ ∈ LΓ−BI .
One can quickly deduce Big in Π12 − BI . However any deduction of Big in Π12 − BI0
has to have a complexity of at least 211000 symbols (see [52]).
5 How can such a statement
be proved? The connections we drew in Chapter 3 between ordinal-analysis and proof-
theoretical reduction can help here. Let (∃x)ϕ(x) be a Σ01-sentence and assume that
‖T‖Π02 = α. If T `n (∃x)ϕ(x), then PA + TI(≺ α) `f(n) (∃x)ϕ(x). But the
computational resources of PA+ TI(≺ α) are well studied. Hence we know a hierarchy
of functions 〈Hβ〉β≺α such that, if PA + TI(≺ α) `f(n) (∃x)ϕ(x), then there is a
βf(n) ≺ α and an m < Hβf(n)(0) such that N |= ϕ(m). Hence, arguing indirectly, when
the witnesses of a Σ01-sentence are very big, then its deduction must have a certain length.
Since the ordinal notation systems being used in ordinal-analysis differ in the way how
function hierarchies can be defined, i.e. the assignment of fundamental sequences to limit
ordinals differs,6 one has to generalise the proofs of the step from PA + TI(≺ α) to a
〈Hβ〉β≺α uniformly in order to develop a general method of studying the proof-complexity
of Σ01-sentences. This is done by Weiermann in [60]; we will present Weiermann’s
methods in the next section.
5.2.1 A general characterisation of the provable recursive functions
of PA+ TI(≺ α)
We follow Weiermann’s approach of dealing with ordinal-notation systems that is given in
[60]. Instead of stating certain conditions that we require from an ordinal notation system
5Here 2x0 := x and 2
x
y+1 := 2
2xy .
6A fundamental sequence of a limit ordinal λ is a sequence 〈λn〉n∈ω such that λ = limn→∞ λn.
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ON(τ), e.g. Friedman and Sheard developed the notion of an elementary recursive
ordinal notation system (ERONS) in [22], we define a norm N on an actual ordinal τ
and require certain properties that a map
o : N→ τ
has to fulfil with respect to N . Also this saves us from defining ordinal arithmetic. In
addition, as is common in the literature, we trust the assurances of Buchholz, Friedman,
Rathjen and Weiermann that any ordinal notation systemON(τ) that was ever given in the
literature is elementarily recursively definable and induces a function o satisfying these
conditions.
Definition 5.2.2 We say that τ has a norm N : τ → N, if the following conditions are
satisfied:
• τ is an ε-number.7
• N satisfies:
1. N(0) = 0
2. N(α]β) = N(α) +N(β)
3. N(ω¯α) = N(α) + 1, where
ω¯α :=
 ωα+1 : (∃α0 < α)(∃n < ω)[ωα0 = α0 ∧ α = α0 + n]ωα : otherwise
4. {α < τ : N(α) < k} is finite for any k ∈ N.
• For a variant of the Ackermann function8 Φ : N→ N
7Hence for any α, β ∈ τ , α+ β, αβ, ωα ∈ τ .
8We use the Ackermann function just because we want to ensure that we are able to evaluate any
primitive recursive function. In cases where the language includes fewer function symbols one might use a
function with lower growth-rate.
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1. for any n, 2 ≤ Φ(n) and Φ(n) + Φ(n) + 2 ≤ Φ(n+ 1)
2. for any (n-ary) primitive recursive function f there is a p ∈ N such that
f(k1, ..., kn) < Φ(p+ max{k1, ..., kn})
for all k1, ...kn ∈ N.
• There is a binary primitive recursive relation≺ on a primitive recursively definable
A ⊂ N and a function o : A→ τ such that9
1. for any n,m ∈ N, if n ≺ m, then o(n) < o(m).
2. for any n ∈ N, N(o(n)) ≤ Φ(n) and n ≤ Φ(N(o(n))).
We can use N to define a new ordering on a 〈τ,N〉.
Definition 5.2.3 Assume that 〈τ,N〉 is an ordinal with a norm.
β <1n α :⇔ β < α and N(β) ≤ Φ(N(α) + n)
<n is the transitive closure of <1n.
Note that β <1n α and n ≤ m imply β <1m α.
Definition 5.2.4 Assume that 〈τ,N〉 is an ordinal with a norm and α, β ∈ τ .
Ψ(α) :=
 0 : α = 0max{Ψ(β) + 1 : β <10 α} : α > 0
Hα(x) := max({x} ∪ {Hβ(x+ 1) : β < α ∧N(β) ≤ 3N(α)+x+1})
Note that, if we take Φ(x) = Hωω(x), then the conditions that are demanded by
Definition 5.2.2 are satisfied.
9〈A,≺〉 plays the role of an ordinal notation system.
Chapter 5. Proof-Complexity and the Deducibility of Σ01-Sentences 126
Lemma 5.2.5 Let 〈τ,N〉 be an ordinal with a norm and Φ(x) = Hωω(x). Then:
1. for any m ∈ N Ψ(m) = m
2. β <0 α implies Ψ(β) < Ψ(α)
3. Ψ(α) := max{k : ∃(α1, ..., αk)[αk <10 ... <10 α0 = α]}
4. for any n ∈ N, Ψ(α + n+ 1) < Hωω(α+2)(n).
Proof
See [60, pp. 54-55].2
Note that (3) roughly links the function Ψ to descent recursion from [22]. As section 5.2.2
will show, the following theorem is a general theorem for the several characterisations of
the provable recursive functions of PA + TI(≺ α) that can be found in the literature for
several particular ≺.
Theorem 5.2.6 Assume that 〈τ,N〉 is an ordinal with a norm. Let ≺ be the ordering
that is demanded by Definition 5.2.2 and TI(≺ α) the schema that is defined as in the
discussion above Definition 3.1.2, if we take for α the element n of ≺ such that o(n) =
α = ωωα0 ≤ τ , for α0 > 0. Also let ϕ(x, y) be a ∆00-formula of LPA where only x and y
occur freely.
If PA+ TI(≺ α) ` (∀x)(∃y)ϕ(x, y), then
(∃β < α)(∀n ∈ N)(∃k < Ψ(β + n+ 1))[N |= ϕ(n¯, k¯)].
Proof
See [60, p. 59].2
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Corollary 5.2.7 Let ϕ(y) be a ∆00-formula of LPA where only y occurs freely. If PA +
TI(≺ α) ` (∃y)ϕ(y), then
(∃β < α)(∃k < Ψ(β + 1))[N |= ϕ(k¯)].
The proof in [60] is constructive, hence such a β can be explicitly given. Also the proof of
Theorem 5.2.6 shows that such a β can be found by using the complexity of the deduction
that deduces (∀x)(∃y)ϕ(x, y) in T , because the complexity of the deduction in PA +
TI(≺ α) depends on the complexity of the deduction in T ; and the complexity of the
deduction in PA + TI(≺ α) gives a good upper bound for the rank of a deduction in
PAω, which is the infinite system from Chapter 3. Using cut-elimination on the latter, we
get an explicit β for (∀x)(∃y)ϕ(x, y).
5.2.2 The classical approach
For a reader who is wondering how Ψ and Hα are related to the classical approach using
fundamental sequences, we discuss the common definition of the Hardy Hierarchy. Also
we prove that Ψ and Hα are provable total in PA in the case of 〈ε0, N〉 for an appropriate
N . We start with the canonical definition of the Hardy Hierarchy.
Definition 5.2.8 Let τ be an ordinal such that (∃τ0 > 0)[τ = ωωτ0] and ·[·] : τ ×N→ τ .
A pair 〈τ, ·[·]〉 is called a Bachmann system if
1. 0[n] = 0
(α + 1)[n] = α
α ∈ Lim⇒ α[n] < α[n+ 1] < α
Such a ·[·] is called an assignment of a fundamental sequence to an ordinal.
2. for any α, β, n,
α[n] < β < α⇒ α[n] ≤ β[0].
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The Hardy Hierarchy 〈H ′α〉α<τ of 〈τ, ·[·]〉 is defined as H ′0(n) := n and H ′α(n) :=
H ′α[n](n+ 1).
The next theorem shows the promised connection with Definition 5.2.4.
Theorem 5.2.9 Assume that 〈τ,N〉 is a normed ordinal and that p : τ → N is a function
such that for any α, N(α) ≤ p(α) + 1 ≤ p(α + 1). If we define ·[·]p by 0[n]p := 0 and
α[n]p := max{β < α : N(β) ≤ p(α + n)}, for α > 0, and take 〈H ′α〉α<τ as its Hardy
Hierarchy, then
1. 〈τ, ·[·]p〉 is a Bachmann system.
2. H ′α = max{H ′β(n+ 1) : β < α ∧N(β) ≤ p(α + n)}, for α > 0.
Proof
See [7, p. 9]. 2
Corollary 5.2.10 Assume that 〈τ,N〉 is a normed ordinal and that 〈τ, ·[·]3N(·)+·+1〉 is
defined as in Theorem 5.2.9. Then for any n ∈ N
Hα(n) = H
′
α(n).
It is also proved in [7] that the 〈Hα〉α<ε0 that is induced by 〈ε0, N1〉, where N1 is defined
as N1(0) := 0 and N1(ωα + β) := max{N1(α), N1(β)} + 1, is an elementary variant
of the most common textbook example of a Hardy Hierarchy, which is defined from
〈ε0, ·[·]textbook〉 (see [50, p. 157-158] for a definition). This means that, whenHα is induced
by 〈ε0, N1〉 and H ′α is the hierarchy of 〈ε0, ·[·]textbook〉, then
ERF(Hα) = ERF(H ′α),
Chapter 5. Proof-Complexity and the Deducibility of Σ01-Sentences 129
where ERF(f) is the smallest set of functions that comprises all elementary functions,
the function f and is closed under composition.10 Such connections can be generally
deduced, because all these ways of defining a Hardy Hierarchy have strong relations
to naturally definable descent functions by properties like the one that is stated in
Lemma 5.2.5 (3) (see [7, pp. 6-9]).
5.2.3 A bound for the witnesses of Σ01-sentences
As we emphasised at the beginning of this section, there is a connection between the
complexity of a deduction of a Σ01-sentence and the size of its witnesses. We will make
this precise by defining the following functions.11 It should be easy to see how to adapt
Definition 5.1.1 to the notion of a theory that was adopted in Section 2.1. Note that
Theorem 2.1.2 shows that any theory that has a Hilbert system attached has at most
an elementary speed-up over its version that has a Gentzen system attached and vice
versa. Hence the following definition is invariant in the used deduction-system modulo
elementary recursive speed-ups. Also we assume that for some α0 > 0, α = ωωα0.
Definition 5.2.11 1. For any T ⊃ Q we define
χT (n) := min{k : ϕ ∈ ∆00 ∧ T `n (∃y)ϕ(y)⇒ (∃m < k)[N |= ϕ(m¯)]}.
2.
χα(n) := χPA+TI(≺α)(n)
We immediately get the following connections with the notion of a speed-up.
10Note that here the closure under composition implies the closure under limited recursion, since the
bounded-µ-operator is an elementary function. The invariance of these hierarchies shown, when using the
elementary functions as a basis, is the reason for considering an elementary speed-up as an insignificant
one.
11These functions were defined by Michael Rathjen in a talk that was given at the Bertinoro International
Center for Informatics in 2011.
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Lemma 5.2.12 1. χα(n) < Ψ(α)
2. If T ′ ⊂Σ01 T and T has a Fα-speed-up over T ′, then there is an f ∈ Fα+1 such that
χT (n) ≤ χT ′(f(n)).
3. Assume T ⊃ Q such that ‖T‖Π02 = α and T has at most an elementary speed-up
over PA+ TI(≺ α). Then there is an m0 such that for any n ∈ N
χT (n) ≤ χα(2nm0).
Proof
1. Assuming that PA+ TI(≺ α) `n (∃y)ϕ(y), where ϕ ∈ ∆00, we can conclude
(∃βn < α)(∃m < Ψ(βn + 1))[N |= ϕ(m¯)]
by Corollary 5.2.7. Therefore
Ψ(βn + 1)) ∈ {k : ϕ ∈ ∆00 ∧ T `n (∃y)ϕ(y)⇒ (∃m < k)[N |= ϕ(m¯)]}.
Hence, by the minimality of χα(n), we get χα(n) ≤ Ψ(βn + 1)).
Since α and βn came from the cut-elimination that is given in [60], βn + 1 <0 α
and, therefore, Ψ(βn + 1) < Ψ(α).12
2. This is a trivial consequence of Definition 5.2.11.
3. This follows from (2) and the fact that for any elementary function f there is an m0
such that f(n) < 2nm0 for any n ∈ N.
12Note that the infinite system that is defined in [60, p. 55] proceeds over ordinals which are governed by
the relation <0.
Chapter 5. Proof-Complexity and the Deducibility of Σ01-Sentences 131
2
However here we face the problems that were raised in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. As
we said at the beginning of the present chapter, we are interested in the complexity of
deductions in Π12 − BI and Π12 − BI0, especially for the particular sentence Big. But
the ordinal-analysis of these systems is carried out by using the Ω-rule in [41]; in fact the
infinite system that is used in [41] is as given in Definition 4.1.3 and formalised throughout
Chapter 4. The result of this ordinal-analysis is
‖Π12 −BI0‖Π02 = θΩω0,
which is also called the Ackermann ordinal or small Veblen ordinal. As was extensively
explained in Chapter 3, for any primitive recursive ≺ on N we have
PA+ TI(≺) ≡Π02 ÎD
i
2(strict) + TI(≺).
Hence Ψ and χα, when α is the ordinal-type of ≺, are still meaningful here. However,
since the direction is as follows
Π12 −BI0 ⊆Σ01 ÎD
i
2(strict) + TI(≺) ⊆Σ01 PA+ TI(≺),
the question whether ÎD
i
2(strict)+TI(≺) has an elementary speed-up over PA+TI(≺)
for Π02-sentences is of a special interest for the study of the proof-complexity of Big.
Moreover, since we are aiming a general method of studying the proof-complexity of Σ01-
sentences, this question is of general interest, as is explained through Lemma 5.2.12 (2)
and (3). We will give a positive answer in the next chapter.
Chapter 5. Proof-Complexity and the Deducibility of Σ01-Sentences 132
133
Chapter 6
ÎD
i
<ω(strict) has at most an elementary
speed-up over PA
In Chapter 2 I described the general framework of theory reduction, and compared
it to associated contexts. Subsequently I used the notions of Chapter 2 to discuss
ordinal-analysis in Chapter 3. There I explained why a “better” base theory for ordinal-
analysis is needed and presented the arguments available in the literature supporting the
theory ÎD
i
<ω(strict). Chapter 4 indicates the benefits of ÎD
i
<ω(strict) when formalising
technically elaborate notions of provability, e.g. those which are constituted by the Ω-rule.
In Chapter 5 I explained Rathjen’s and Weiermann’s idea concerning a general method to
give a lower bound for the complexity of deductions of Σ01-sentences. There we were left
with the issue that, in order to make this general method work, an ordinal analysis has to
be given and that in many cases this analysis uses the Ω-rule. Hence the transition from
ÎD
i
<ω(strict) + TI(≺ α) to PA+ TI(≺ α) might increase the finite deduction of a Σ01-
sentence and, therefore, the method might pick a function that is higher up in the Hardy
hierarchy than the ordinal α would have suggested. We will settle this issue by proving
that ÎD
i
<ω(strict) + TI(≺ α) has at most an elementary speed-up over PA+ TI(≺ α).
As in Chapter 3 we start by proving that ÎD
i
<ω(strict) has at most an elementary speed-up
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over PA and then show that this result can be easily extended to the cases where axioms
for transfinite induction are present. We show this by bounding the length-increment of
deductions, which is caused by the deduction-transformations that are used in Chapter 3.
6.1 Bounding Buchholz
We start with Buchholz, who heavily used Theorem 2.2.19 (Soundness of Realisability)
in [6], which he took from [59]. The proof of Theorem 2.2.19 that is given in Chapter 2
is a literal copy from [59, pp. 190-192], but, since it relies on many facts from recursion
theory that are not made explicit, it has many gaps which become crucial here. Moreover,
since we are interested in upper bounds of the deduction-length-increment, the precise
way of formalising recursion theory in HA plays a part; we want the facts of recursion
theory to be accessible in full generality, because, if we are able to establish a formula
(∀x)ϕ(x) in c many lines, then the deduction-length for an instance ϕ(n¯) is bounded
by c + 1 and, hence, independent from the particular instance. Therefore we are able
of constructing deductions schematically in the instances. This gives a uniform way to
construct deductions and it is, therefore, easy to extract a bound for their length. The
canonical source for formalised recursion theory is Kleene’s [28], which is the main
reference of the following section.
6.1.1 Formalised Recursion Theory
To make this section more readable we occasionally use Kleene-brackets as we already
did in Chapter 2. However, in proofs we try to avoid such abbreviations and give the actual
formulas, because it might be easier for the reader to estimate the length of a formula and
the shape of its deduction, when the full structure of the formula is revealed.
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Theorem 6.1.1 (S-m-n Theorem)
For every m and n there is a primitive recursive function snm such that
HA ` (∀x1, ..., xm+n)[{z}(x1, ..., xm+n) = {snm(z, x1, ..., xm)}(xm+1, ..., xm+n)]
Proof
See [28, p. 67]. 2
Here we face our first difficulty. Since the S-m-n Theorem is in fact a set of theorems, i.e.
one theorem for every pair 〈n,m〉, the length of its HA-deductions is a function in n and
m. However the deductions are fairly regular (as it is described in [28, p. 67]) and their
length can therefore be bounded by mcn, where cn is a constant depending on n. Since
we are going to use the S-m-n Theorem only in cases where either n or m is fixed, its
contribution to the length-increment of a deduction is only linear.
By using {e1}(x1) ' {e2}(x2) as a meta-abbreviation for
(∃v)T (e1, x1, v)→ (∃w)T (e2, x2, w)∧
(∀v)(∀w)[T (e1, x1, v) ∧ T (e2, x2, w)→ U(v) = U(w)],
to imitate the notion of equality between two partial recursive functions, we can state the
famous Normal Form Theorem.
Lemma 6.1.2 (Formalised Normal Form Theorem)
There is a e0 ∈ N such that
HA ` (∀x, y)[{e¯0}(x, y) ' {x}(y)]
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Proof
See [28, p. 67] and note that {x}(y) is an ordinary p-term in the sense of [28]. 2
Since the S-m-n Theorem can be proved, it is possible to proof a version of the Recursion
Theorem as well in HA.
Theorem 6.1.3 (Formalised Recursion Theorem)
HA ` (∀x)(∃y)(∀z)[{x}(〈y, z〉) ' {y}(z)]
Proof
See [28, p. 68] or [59, p. 27] for a less detailed proof. 2
6.1.2 Deduction-Complexity Increment for Basic Moves in Logic
In [59] Troelstra used Go¨del’s Hilbert-style system for intuitionistic logic, which is
described in Appendix C, to prove Theorem 2.2.19. We say that ϕ is deducible with
complexity n in Go¨del’s system, in symbols `nG ϕ, if there is a sequence of formulas
containing at most n occurrences of symbols, which is build up in accordance with the
axioms and rules of Go¨del’s system, and the formula occurs somewhere in the sequence
(see Definition 5.1.1). However we will also talk about the length of a deduction
as its number of lines, because the length-measurement is in many cases the stronger
requirement for complexity. To extract deduction-complexity bounds from the proof of
Theorem 2.2.19, we have to start by analysing the deduction-complexity increment that is
caused by the usage of meta-theorems in a Hilbert-style system. The following Lemmata
ensure that the deduction-complexity increment that is caused by the Deduction Theorem
and ∀-quantification of free-variables is linearly bounded.
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Lemma 6.1.4 (Deduction Theorem)
There is an cD ∈ N such that,
T, ψ `n ϕ⇒ T `cDn ψ → ϕ
for a ψ not sharing any free variables with ϕ.
Proof
We define cl := max{16, cdis + 8, cass + 4}, where cdis and cass are the length of the
uniform deduction for distributivity and associativity respectively. We assume that there
is a deduction 〈α1, ..., αl〉, where αl = ϕ, with
∑l
i=1 lg(ϕi) ≤ n. The proof proceeds by
induction on l. In every induction step we substitute into the original deduction for every
αi the formula ψ → αi. Then we show that we can fill the gap between ψ → αl−1 and
ψ → αl by less than cl formulas in order to get a deduction that proceeds from ψ → αl−1
to ψ → αl. Since the induction hypothesis ensures that this is possible for any index
which is smaller than l, we establish a deduction of length cll. By taking cD := clcF ,
where cF is the length of the longest schema that is used in the 9 cases below, we get
T `cDn ψ → ϕ (see the remark below Definition 5.1.1).
1. Assume that l = 1. Then ϕ is ψ. Hence ψ → ψ can be deduced as follows.
1. ` ψ → ψ ∧ ψ by (b).
2. ` ψ ∧ ψ → ψ by (c).
3. ` ψ → ψ by (h) from 1 and 3.
Since 3 < cl, we are done.
2. Assume that l = 1 and that ϕ is an axiom of (a)-(f) or a formula in T . Then we can
prove ψ → ϕ as follows.
1. ` ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ by (c).
2. ` ϕ→ (ψ → ϕ) by (i) from 1.
3. ` ϕ by being an axiom or element of T .
4. ` ψ → ϕ by (g) from 2 and 3.
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Since 4 < cl, we are done.
3. Assume that ϕ is derived by (g) from a γ and a γ → ϕ. By induction hypothesis
we therefore get a deduction of length cl(l − 1) for ψ → γ and ψ → (γ → ϕ). In
the following we show how this deduction can be extended to a deduction ψ → ϕ.
0. ` ψ → γ by I.H.
0’. ` ψ → (γ → ϕ) by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ γ → ϕ by (j) from 0’.
2. ` γ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ γ by (d).
3. ` γ ∧ ψ → ϕ by (h) from 1 and 2.
4. ` γ → (ψ → ϕ) by (i) from 3.
5. ` ψ → (ψ → ϕ) by (h) from 0 and 4.
6. ` ψ ∧ ψ → ϕ by (j) from 5.
7. ` ψ → ψ ∧ ψ by (b).
8. ` ψ → ϕ by (h) from 6 and 7.
Since cl(l − 1) + 8 < cll, we are done.
4. Assume that ϕ is the formula γ → δ and is derived by (h) from γ → χ and χ→ δ.
By induction hypothesis we have a deduction of length cl(l − 1) of ψ → (γ → χ)
and ψ → (χ → δ). This deduction can be enlarged to prove ψ → (γ → δ) in the
following way.
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0. ` ψ → (γ → χ) by I.H.
0’. ` ψ → (χ→ δ) by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ γ → χ by (j) from 0.
2. ` ψ ∧ χ→ δ by (j) from 0’.
3. ` χ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ χ by (d).
4. ` χ ∧ ψ → δ by (h) from 2 and 3.
5. ` χ→ (ψ → δ) by (i) from 4.
6. ` ψ ∧ γ → (ψ → δ) by (h) from 0’ and 5.
7. ` (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ ψ → δ by (j) from 6.
8. ` ψ ∧ (ψ ∧ γ)→ (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ ψ by (d).
9. ` ψ ∧ (ψ ∧ γ)→ δ by (h) from 7 and 8.
10. ` ψ → [(ψ ∧ γ)→ δ] by (i) from 9.
11. ` ψ ∧ γ → ψ by (c).
12. ` ψ ∧ γ → (ψ ∧ γ → δ) by (h) from 10 and 11.
13. ` (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ (ψ ∧ γ)→ δ by (j) from 12.
14. ` ψ ∧ γ → (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ (ψ ∧ γ) by (b).
15. ` ψ ∧ γ → δ by (h) 13 and 14.
16. ` ψ → (γ → δ) by (i) from 15.
Since cl(l − 1) + 16 ≤ cll, we are done.
5. Assume that ϕ is of the form γ → (δ → χ) and is deduced from γ ∧ δ → χ by (i).
By induction hypothesis we have `c(l−1) ψ → (γ ∧ δ → χ). This deduction can be
enlarged to prove ψ → [γ → (δ → χ)] in the following way.
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0. ` ψ → (γ ∧ δ → χ) by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ (γ ∧ δ)→ χ by (j) from 0.
...
...
... The uniform deduction of
cass + 1. ` (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ δ → ψ ∧ (γ ∧ δ) associativity in cass many lines.
cass + 2. ` (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ δ → χ by (h) from 1 and cass + 1.
cass + 3. ` ψ ∧ γ → (δ → χ) by (i) from cass + 2.
cass + 4. ` ψ → [γ → (δ → χ)] by (i) from cass + 3.
Since cl(l − 1) + cass + 4 ≤ cll, we are done.
6. Assume that ϕ is of the form γ ∧ δ → χ and deduced from γ → (δ → χ) by (j).
By induction hypothesis we have `c(l−1) ψ → [γ → (δ → χ)].This deduction can
be enlarged to prove ψ → (γ ∧ δ → χ) in the following way.
0. ` ψ → [γ → (δ → χ)] by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ γ → (δ → χ) by (j) from 0.
2. ` (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ δ → χ by (j) from 1.
...
...
... The uniform deduction of
cass + 2. ` ψ ∧ (γ ∧ δ)→ (ψ ∧ γ) ∧ δ associativity in cass lines.
cass + 3. ` ψ ∧ (γ ∧ δ)→ χ by (h) from 2 and cass + 2.
cass + 4. ` ψ → (γ ∧ δ → χ) by (i) from cass + 3.
Since cl(l − 1) + cass + 4 ≤ cll, we are done.
7. Assume that ϕ is of the form χ ∨ γ → χ ∨ δ and deduced from γ → δ by (k).
By induction hypothesis, we have `c(l−1) ψ → (γ → δ).This deduction can be
enlarged to prove ψ → (χ ∨ γ → χ ∨ δ) in the following way.
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0. ` ψ → (γ → δ) by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ γ → δ by (j) from 0.
2. ` χ ∨ (ψ ∧ γ)→ χ ∨ δ by (k) from 1.
...
...
... The uniform deduction of
cdis + 2. ` (χ ∨ ψ) ∧ (χ ∨ γ)→ χ ∨ (ψ ∧ γ) distributivity in cdis lines.
cdis + 3. ` (χ ∨ ψ) ∧ (χ ∨ γ)→ χ ∨ δ by (h) from 2 and cdis + 2.
cdis + 4. ` χ ∨ ψ → (χ ∨ γ → χ ∨ δ) by (i) from cdis + 3.
cdis + 5. ` ψ → ψ ∨ χ by (c).
cdis + 6. ` ψ ∨ χ→ χ ∨ ψ by (d).
cdis + 7. ` ψ → χ ∨ ψ by (h) from cdis + 5 and cdis + 6.
cdis + 8. ` ψ → (χ ∨ γ → χ ∨ δ) by (h) from cdis + 4 and cdis + 7.
Since cl(l − 1) + cdis + 8 ≤ cll, we are done.
8. Assume that ϕ is γ → (∀x)δ(x) and was deduced from γ → δ(x) by (l). By
induction hypothesis, we have `c(l−1)G ψ → (γ → δ(x)). In the following we show
how this deduction has to be extended to deduce ψ → [γ → (∀x)δ(x)].
0. ` ψ → [γ → δ(x)] by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ γ → δ(x) by (j) from 0.
2. ` ψ ∧ γ → (∀x)δ(x) by (l) from 1. Note that ϕ and
ψ don’t share free variables.
3. ` ψ → [γ → (∀x)δ(x)] by (i) from 2.
Since cl(l − 1) + 3 ≤ cll, we are done.
9. Assume that ϕ is (∃x)γ(x) → δ and deduced from γ(x) → δ by (m). By
induction hypothesis we have `c(l−1)G ψ → (γ(x) → δ). In the following we
show how this deduction has to be extended to deduce ψ → [(∃x)γ(x) → δ].
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0. ` ψ → [γ(x)→ δ] by I.H.
1. ` ψ ∧ γ(x)→ δ by (j) from 0.
2. ` γ(x) ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ γ(x) by (b).
3. ` γ(x) ∧ ψ → δ by (h) from 1 and 2.
4. ` γ(x)→ (ψ → δ) by (i) from 3.
5. ` (∃x)γ(x)→ (ψ → δ) by (m) from 4. Note that ϕ and
ψ don’t share free variables.
6. ` (∃x)γ(x) ∧ ψ → δ by (j) from 5.
7. ` ψ ∧ (∃x)γ(x)→ (∃x)γ(x) ∧ ψ by (d).
8. ` ψ ∧ (∃x)γ(x)→ δ by (h) from 6 and 7.
9. ` ψ → [(∃x)γ(x)→ δ] by (i) from 8.
Since cl(l − 1) + 9 ≤ cll, we are done.
2
Lemma 6.1.5 (Generalisation)
T `nG ϕ(x)⇒ T `7nG (∀x)ϕ(x).
Proof
Assume that T `nG ϕ(x), then by (c) and (i) we get T `n+2nG ϕ(x)→ [(⊥ → ⊥)→ ϕ(x)].
An application of (g) gives T `n+3nG (⊥ → ⊥) → ϕ(x). By (l) we get
T `n+4nG (⊥ → ⊥) → (∀x)ϕ(x), which leads to T `n+6nG (∀x)ϕ(x) by (a) and
(g). 2
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6.1.3 Realisability in HA
The next step is to extract a deduction-complexity-increment bound for realisability from
the proof of Theorem 2.2.19, which is given in Chapter 2. However it would be an
unnecessarily hard task to extract such a bound from the actual formulation, because
Theorem 2.2.19 states that there is an explicitly given natural number which realises a
particular formula and its proof shows how this natural number can be constructed. But
after a closer examination of Buchholz’s proof that is given in Chapter 3 the reader will
recognise that only the existence statement is needed in order to prove Theorem 3.3.3.
We therefore reformulate Theorem 2.2.19 to the weaker existential statement and, hence,
avoid actual calculations in HA. This spares us from giving a complexity-analysis of
basic calculations and the coding-machinery for recursive function.
The proofs of the following lemmata use the fact that the formula-length increment that
is caused by the realisability translation can be linearly bounded:
|xrϕ| ≤ 30|ϕ|,
which can be easily verified by Definition 2.2.18.1
Lemma 6.1.6 Assume that ϕ(~x) ∈ L1HA and all free variables are shown. Then there is
a c ∈ N such that
HA `mG ϕ(~x)⇒ HA `m
2c
G (∃y)[yr(∀~x)ϕ(~x)].
Proof
The numeration of the cases follows Appendix C. In the case of an axiom, we assume
at first that there are no free variables occurring in the formulas. However, after we
1The function |ϕ| gives the total number of symbol occurrences at ϕ. Also note that Definition 2.2.18
expands a formula from the outside and adds only a constant number of symbols in every step. Hence for
any symbol only a constant number of symbols is added; which leads to a linear bound.
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have gone through all the axiom cases, we will show by a general argument how the
presence of free variables affects the deduction-complexity increment. In the following
we only count the lines of the new deduction. The reader however can easily check that
no formula is longer than its respective formula in the original deduction times a constant
cForm. Consequently the constant c can be taken as the product of cForm and the biggest
constant appearing in the deduction-length increment-bound.
(a) The realiser of an axiom of the form ⊥ → ϕ is a code of the constant 0 function of
the same variables as the axiom, which is pλ~x.0q =: e0. Hence we have to find a
deduction in HA of the formula e0r[⊥ → ϕ].
We can deduce
⊥ → 0rϕ
in one line by (a). From this we can deduce in HA the formula
⊥ → (∃v)[T (e0, u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ].
Since ur⊥ ≡ ⊥, we get
e0r[⊥ → ϕ]
by generalisation in, say, ca many lines.
(b) • The realiser of an axiom with the form ϕ ∨ ϕ→ ϕ is a code of the projection
function that projects to the second variable pλx.p2(x)q =: ep2 . We expand
the realised formula according to Definition 2.2.18:
ep2r[ϕ ∨ ϕ→ ϕ]
(∀u)[urϕ ∨ ϕ→ (∃v)[T (ep2 , u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ]]
(∀u)[[(p1(u) = 0→ p2(u)rϕ) ∧ (p1(u) 6= 0→ p2(u)rϕ)]→
(∃v)[T (ep2 , u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ]]
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Since the computation of a single explicitly given elementary function can
be primitive-recursively constructed, there is a primitive recursive function f ,
which is contained in LHA as a function symbol, such that HA ` p2(u) =
U(f(u)).2 This gives us
HA ` (p1(u) = 0→ p2(u)rϕ) ∧ (p1(u) 6= 0→ p2(u)rϕ)→
T (ep2 , u, f(u)) ∧ U(f(u))rϕ,
where the deduction-length corresponds only to the particular coding that is
used to formulate T and U . Therefore the deduction.length is the same for
every realised instance of the axiom schema (b). By logic alone we can
quantify f(u) by an existential quantifier, which gives us the realised version
of the axiom. So let’s say that the deduction is cb1 lines long.
• The realiser of an axiom of the form ϕ → ϕ ∧ ϕ is a code of the pairing
function that has only one input pλx.〈x, x〉q =: e〈,〉. The realiser translates
the formula as follow.
e〈,〉r[ϕ→ ϕ ∧ ϕ]
(∀u)[urϕ→ (∃v)[T (e〈,〉, u, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ ∧ ϕ]]
(∀u)[urϕ→ (∃v)[T (e〈,〉, u, v) ∧ p1(U(v))rϕ ∧ p2(U(v))rϕ]]
As before, we can find a primitive recursive function f that outputs the
computation of the pairing function, in accordance with e〈,〉, such that HA `
〈x, x〉 = U(f(x)). However, since u = pi(〈u, u〉) = pi(U(f(u))) this proof is
even relatively simple, because it is essentially an application of (b) through
urϕ → urϕ ∧ urϕ. So the proof-length is therefore uniform in urϕ and has,
say, cb2 lines.
We put those two constants together by taking the maximum cb := max{cb1 , cb2}.
2By a computation of a recursive function f we mean a sequence or a tree that is inductively constructed
by computing through f in accordance with one of its codes.
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(c) • For the axioms ϕ → ϕ ∨ ψ the obvious realiser is a code for the pair-0-
with-x function pλx.〈0, x〉q =: e〈0,〉. As before we expand according to the
translation.
e〈0,〉r[ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ]
(∀u)[urϕ→ (∃v)[T (e〈0,〉, u, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ ∨ ψ]]
(∀u)[urϕ→ (∃v)[T (e〈0,〉, u, v)∧
(p1(U(v)) = 0→ p2(U(v))rϕ) ∨ (p1(U(v)) 6= 0→ p2(U(v))rψ)]]
Again, since the representation of the function is explicitly given as a code, we
can construct a primitive recursive function f , which is therefore present in the
language as a function symbol, which gives us a computation for a given input,
i.e. HA ` 〈0, x〉 = U(f(x)). Since u = p2(〈0, u〉) = p2(U(f(u))) and 0 =
p1(U(f(u))) are both deducible in HA, we can deduce the realised statement
by taking v as f(u). Note that this deduction works entirely schematically in
urϕ and has therefore a constant number of lines, let’s say cc1 many, for any
ϕ.
• In the case of an axiom ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ the realiser is a code of the projection
function to the first entry, i.e. pλx.p1(x)q =: ep1 . Moreover the realisation
expands as follows.
ep1r[ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ]
(∀u)[ur[ϕ ∧ ψ]→ (∃v)[T (ep1 , u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ]]
(∀u)[[p1(u)rϕ ∧ p2(u)rψ]→ (∃v)[T (ep1 , u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ]]
As before, by constructing a primitive recursive function from ep1 that gives
the computation of ep1 for an input, we get HA ` p1(x) = U(f(x)). So by
Chapter 6. ÎD
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instantiating v by f(u) we get a proof which is uniform in urϕ, let’s say, in
length cc2 .
By taking the maximum of these two numbers cc := max{cc1 , cc2}, we can bound
the deductions for every use of axiom (c).
(d) • The realiser for an axiom of the form ϕ∨ψ → ψ ∨ϕ is a code of the function
that changes the first entry of a pair from 0 to something else and conversely,
i.e. pλx.〈1−˙p1(x), p2(x)〉q =: e〈1−,〉. This realiser expands the axiom as
follows.
e〈1−,〉r[ϕ ∨ ψ → ψ ∨ ϕ]
(∀u)[ur[ϕ ∨ ψ]→ (∃v)[T (e〈1−,〉, u, v) ∧ U(v)r[ψ ∨ ϕ]]]
(∀u)[(p1(u) = 0→ p2(u)rϕ) ∧ (p1(u) 6= 0→ p2(u)rψ)→
(∃v)[T (e〈1−,〉, u, v)∧
(p1(U(v)) = 0→ p2(U(v))ψ) ∧ (p1(U(v)) 6= 0→ p2(U(v))ϕ)]]
As before we can find a primitive recursive function f that gives the
computation of e〈1−,〉 for a given input x. Therefore we get HA `
〈1−˙p1(x), p2(x)〉 = U(f(x)). As before it is clear that this formula can
be deduced by taking f(u) as v in a way that is schematic in p2(u)rϕ and
p2(u)rψ. Therefore this deduction is constant in length for any substitution of
this formula. Let’s say that it has cd1 many lines.
• A realiser for the axiom ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ ϕ is a code of the function that
changes the order of the entries in a pair, i.e. pλx.〈p2(x), p1(x)〉q =: eswap. In
according with the realisability translation, the formula expands as follows.
eswapr[ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ ϕ]
(∀u)[ur[ϕ ∧ ψ]→ (∃v)[T (eswap, u, v) ∧ U(v)r[ψ ∧ ϕ]]
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(∀u)[(p1(u)rϕ ∧ p2(u)rψ)→
(∃v)[T (eswap, u, v) ∧ p1(U(v))rψ ∧ p2(U(v))rϕ]
As before, by defining an appropriate function, the proof is schematic in
p1(u)rϕ and p2(u)rψ and has a length of, say, cd2 many lines.
To combine these two cases we take cd := max{cd1 , cd2}.
(e) The realiser of an axiom which has the form (∀x)ϕ(x) → ϕ(t) is a code, say e{.},
for the function
y 7→ {y}(t).
This gives for
pλy.{y}(t)qr[(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t)]
the formula
(∀u)[ur(∀x)ϕ(x)→ (∃v)[T (e{.}, u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(t)]].
By using Definition 2.2.18 again, we get
(∀u)[(∀x)(∃z)[T (u, x, z) ∧ U(z)rϕ(x)]→ (∃v)[T (e{.}, u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(t)]].
To deduce this formula in HA, we assume that
(∀x)(∃z)[T (u, x, z) ∧ U(z)rϕ(x)].
By an application of (g) and (j) we get
(∃z)[T (u, t, z) ∧ U(z)rϕ(t)].
By Theorem 6.1.2 we get the code e0 for the function
〈x, y〉 7→ {x}(y)
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in HA. Since substituting for y the term t into e0 can be done primitive recursively,
we can construct in HA the code e{.} from e0 and ptq such that
(∃v)[T (e{.}, u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(t)]
is deducible. By using the deduction theorem and generalisation we get
e0r[(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t)]
by a deduction that is schematic in xrϕ. So for every instance of axiom (e) we get
a deduction of
(∃y)[yr[(∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t)]]
of constant length, say of ce many lines.
(f) In the case of an axiom of the form ϕ(t) → (∃x)ϕ(x) we choose the realiser to be
the code of the pair-with-t function
y 7→ 〈t, y〉.
By Definition 2.2.18 we get that
e〈t,.〉r[ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x)]
translates into
(∀u)[urϕ(t)→ (∃v)[T (e〈t,.〉, u, v) ∧ U(v)r[(∃x)ϕ(x)]]].
Using Definition 2.2.18 again, we get
(∀u)[urϕ(t)→ (∃v)[T (e〈t,.〉, u, v) ∧ p1(U(v))rϕ(p2(U(v))]].
However it is clear that
HA ` (∀x, y)[T (e〈t,.〉, x, y)→ p1(U(y)) = t ∧ p2(U(y)) = x].
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So assuming that urϕ(t), we can deduce in HA
(∃v)[T (e〈t,.〉, u, v) ∧ p1(U(v))rϕ(p2(U(v))]
schematically in xrϕ(y). Consequently by using the deduction theorem and
generalisation, we get
e〈t,.〉r[ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x)]
in a constant number of lines, say cf many.
We have seen so far that the length of a deduction that deduces a realised version
of a free-variable free instance of any axiom can be bounded by a constant cax :=
max{ca, cb, cc, cd, ce, cf}. In the case of an axiom ϕ(~x) with n free variables x1, ..., xn
we can deduce in the same way that there is an m such that HA ` m¯rϕ(~x) and that the
length of its deduction is bounded by cax. It is not possible to quantify the whole formula
in order to introduce a ∀-quantifier at the right side of the realiser, since (∀x)[m¯rϕ] is not
the same as m¯r(∀x)ϕ. Therefore we have to proceed by the following construction:
First we note that there is a primitive recursive function f such that
HA ` (∀x, y, z)[T (f(z), x, y) ∧ U(y) = z], (∗)
because f only gives the code for the constant-z-function with the additional input
variable x. Also note that in this case HA deduces the totality of this function, since
z is explicitly given. Since (∗) is provable by a fixed deduction, all its instances for z are
deducible in the same number of lines, say cgen many. Consequently we get in cgen lines
(∀x, y)[T (f(m¯), x, y) ∧ U(y) = m¯]. This gives together with n¯rϕ(~x) a deduction for
(∀xn)(∃yn)[T (f(m¯), xn, yn) ∧ U(yn)rϕ(~x)]
in, say, cax + cgen + c′ many lines. This is
f(m¯)r(∀xn)ϕ(~x).
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If we repeat this process n− 1 many times, then we get
f...f(m¯)r(∀~x)ϕ(~x)
in cax + n · (cgen + c′) many lines. Since the existence statement
(∃y)[yr(∀~x)ϕ(~x)]
is only 2 more lines away, we can bound all axiom cases by (n+ 1) · caxiom for
caxiom := max{(cax + 2), (cgen + c′ + 2)}.
Now that we have dealt with all the cases of axioms, we continue with the rules that
constitute the calculus.
(g) Assume that there is an application of Modus Ponens with the premisses ϕ(~x) and
ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x). We also assume that only nmutually distinct free variables x1, ..., xn
occur in these two formulas. By induction hypothesis we have deductions for
(∃e1)[e1r(∀~x)ϕ(~x)]
(∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]].
So we can assume that there are such e1 and e2 by adding the formulas
e1r(∀~x)ϕ(~x)
e2r(∀~x)[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]
to the deduction.
According to Definition 2.2.18 the first formula can be expanded to
(∀x1)(∃y1)[T (e0, x1, y1) ∧ (∀x2)(∃y2)[T (U(y1), x2, y2)∧
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U(y2)r(∀x3, ..., xn)ϕ(~x)]].
Using Kleene brackets, we can write this as
{{e1}(x1)}(x2)r(∀x3, ..., xn)ϕ(~x).
By Theorem 6.1.2 we get
{e0}({e1}(x1), x2)r(∀x3, ..., xn)ϕ(~x).
Since the composition of two codes can be done primitive recursively, there is a
function symbol in the language such that
{f(e0, e1)}(x1, x2)r(∀x3, ..., xn)ϕ(~x).
Since f is a function symbol in LHA and Theorem 6.1.2 is deducible in full
generality in HA, this enlarges the deduction in a constant number of lines; let’s
say in cg1 many. Repeating this process another n − 2 times we get in (n − 1)cg1
lines
{f(e0, ...f(e0, f(e0, e1))...)}(x1, x2, ..., xn)rϕ(~x).
In the following we take t1 to be t1 := f(e0, ...f(e0, f(e0, e1))...). Similarly
proceeding for e2r(∀~x)[ϕ(~x) → ψ(~x)], we get in 2(n − 1)cg1 many lines the
formulas
(∀~x)(∃y)[T (t1, ~x, y) ∧ U(y)rϕ(~x)]
and
(∀~x)(∃y)[T (t2, ~x, y) ∧ U(y)r[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]].
The latter is
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(∀~x)(∃y)[T (t2, ~x, y) ∧ (∀u)[urϕ(~x)→ (∃v)[T (U(y), u, v) ∧ U(v)rψ(~x)]]].
By a deduction which is uniformly constructed from urϕ(~x) and urψ(~x) these two
formulas yield the formula
(∀~x)(∃y, z)[T (t2, ~x, y) ∧ T (t1, ~x, z) ∧ (∃v)[T (U(y),U(z), v) ∧ U(v)rψ(~x)]].
Using Kleene brackets, we can denote this formula by
{{t2}(~x)}({t1}(~x))rψ(~x).
By Theorem 6.1.2 and the fact that concatenation can be done primitive recursively,
we get
{h(e0, t1, t2)}(~x)rψ(~x)
for some function symbol h. The last moves are schematic in urϕ(~x) and urψ(~x),
hence the deduction is enlarged by a constant number of lines, say cg2 many.
Therefore we reach 2(n − 1)cg1 + cg1 many lines. To quantify at the right side
of the realiser we have to look at
(∀~x)(∃v)[T (h(e0, t1, t2), ~x, v) ∧ U(v)rψ(~x)].
Using the S-m-n theorem, we get
S1n−1(h(e0, t1, t2), x1, ..., xn−1)r(∀xn)ψ(~x).
Since h, f and S1n−1 are primitive recursive, we can find a primitive recursive
function h′ such that
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(∀x1, ..., xn−1)(∃v)[T (h′(e0, e1, e2, ef , eh, eS1n−1), 〈x1, ..., xn−1〉, v)∧
U(v)r(∀xn)ψ(~x)
can be deduced in cg3 many lines. Repeating this procedure n − 1 times, we get a
term t3(e1, e2) such that
t3(e1, e2)r(∀~x)rψ(~x)
is deducible in 2(n− 1)cg1 + cg2 + n · cg3 many lines.
Hence, by adding two more lines, we get
(∃y)[yr(∀~x)rψ(~x)].
In total we need less than 3ncg¯ lines, where
cg¯ := max{2, cg1 , cg2 , cg3}.
Using the deduction theorem twice for the two assumptions respectively and some
logic, we get a deduction of
(∃y)[yr(∀~x)rψ(~x)]
with at most 3ncg¯c2D + cg4 many lines. Taking cg := max{3cg¯c2D, cg4}, we therefore
get an upper bound for this case of
(n+ 1)cg many lines.
(h) By induction hypothesis we have a deduction for (∃e1)[e1r(∀~x)[ϕ(~x) → χ(~x)]]
and (∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[χ(~x) → ψ(~x)]]. Moreover, in these two formulas, the variables
x1, ..., xn are the only freely occurring variables. We assume that
e1r(∀~x)[ϕ(~x)→ χ(~x)]
and
e2r(∀~x)[χ(~x)→ ψ(~x)].
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By similar constructions as in (g) we get in 2 · (n− 1) · ch1 lines the formulas
(∃v)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ(~x)→ χ(~x)]]
and
(∃w)[T (t2(e2), ~x, w) ∧ U(w)r[χ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]],
which are
(∃v)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v)∧
(∀u)[urϕ(~x)→ (∃v′)[T (U(v), u, v′) ∧ U(v′)rχ(~x)]]]
and
(∃w)[T (t2(e2), ~x, w)∧
(∀u)[urχ(~x)→ (∃w′)[T (U(w), u, w′) ∧ U(w′)rψ(~x)]]].
We enlarge this deduction by yrϕ(~x) and get after several lines
(∃v)(∃v′)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ T (U(v), y, v′) ∧ U(v′)rχ(~x)].
Using Theorem 6.1.2 and the fact that composing two codes is primitive recursive,
we get
(∃v)[T (t3(e1), 〈~x, y〉, v) ∧ U(v)rχ(~x)].
Next we perform a similar construction with
(∃w)[T (t2(e2), ~x, w)∧
(∀u)[urχ(~x)→ (∃w′)[T (U(w), u, w′) ∧ U(w′)rψ(~x)]]]
to get
(∃w)[T (t4(e1, e2), 〈~x, y〉, w) ∧ U(w)rψ(~x)].
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Using the S-m-n Theorem, we get
(∃w)[T (t5(e1, e2, ~x), y, w) ∧ U(w)rψ(~x)].
Since the recursion theory needed is available in HA in full generality and the
constructions that have been given so far, are schematic in urϕ, urχ and urψ, we
obtain the last result in a constant number of lines, say ch2 many. Therefore we
reach a length of 2(n − 1)ch1 + ch2 . Using the deduction theorem for yrϕ(~x), we
get
yrϕ(~x)→ (∃w)[T (t5(e1, e2, ~x), y, w) ∧ U(w)rψ(~x)]
by (n− 1)2ch1cD + ch2cD many lines. By generalisation we get
t5(e1, e2, ~x)r[ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]
in (n−1)2ch1cD+ch2cD+4 many lines. Using the constructions that are described
in (g), we get
t6(e1, e2)r(∀~x)ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]
in (n−1)2ch1cD +ch2cD +4+(n−1)ch3 many lines. Using the deduction theorem
twice and some logic, we get
(∃e3)[e3r(∀~x)ϕ(~x)→ ψ(~x)]]
in (n − 1)2ch1c3D + ch2c3D + 4c2D + (n − 1)ch3c2D + ch4 many lines. Taking ch =
max{4ch1c3D, 2ch2c3D, 8c2D, 2ch3c2D, 2ch4}, we can bound this case by
(n+ 1)ch many lines.
(i) We assume that there is a deduction of (∃e1)[e1r(∀~x)[ϕ∧ψ → χ]]. We choose such
an e1 by adding the formula e1r(∀~x)[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ] to the deduction. We extend this
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deduction by two lines for yrϕ(~x) and zrψ(~x). Therefore we get 〈y, z〉r[ϕ ∧ ψ].
From e1r(∀~x)[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ] we get by the same procedure as in (g)
(∃v)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ]]
in (n − 1)ci1 many lines. By a deduction that is schematic in 〈y, z〉r[ϕ ∧ ψ], we
therefore get
(∃v)(∃w)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ T (U(v), 〈y, z〉, w) ∧ U(w)rχ(~x)].
As in the earlier cases we get
(∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, y, z〉, w) ∧ U(w)rχ(~x)].
Using the S-m-n Theorem, we obtain
(∃w)[T (t3(e1, ~x, y), z, w) ∧ U(w)rχ(~x)]
in (n− 1)c′i + (n + 1)ci2 many lines. By using the deduction theorem for zrψ(~x),
we get
t3(e1, ~x, y)r[ψ → χ]
in (n− 1)ci1cD + (n+ 1)ci2cD + 6 many lines. Since t3 is built up by symbols for
primitive recursive functions, we can use Theorem 6.1.2 to get a t4 such that
{t4(e1)}(~x, y)r[ψ → χ].
Hence, using the S-m-n theorem, we get a t5 such that
{t5(e1, ~x)}(y)r[ψ → χ]
is deducible in (n−1)ci1cD + (n+ 1)ci2cD +nci3 many lines. Using the Deduction
Theorem for yrϕ, we can therefore deduce
t5(e1, ~x)r[ϕ→ [ψ → χ]]
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in (n−1)ci1c2D+(n+1)ci2c2D+nci3cD+6 many lines. By using similar constructions
as in (g), we get in (n− 1)ci1c2D + (n+ 1)ci2c2D + nci3cD + (n− 1)ci4 many lines
t6(e1)r(∀~x)[ϕ→ [ψ → χ]].
Using the Deduction Theorem for e1r(∀~x)[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ] and some logic, we get
(∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[ϕ→ [ψ → χ]]
in (n− 1)ci1c3D + (n+ 1)ci2c3D +nci3c2D + (n− 1)ci4cD + ci5 many lines. Choosing
ci in an appropriate way, we therefore get an upper bound of
(n+ 1)ci many lines.
(j) By the induction hypothesis we have a deduction for (∃e1)[e1r(∀~x)[ϕ → (ψ →
χ)]]. We assume that e1 is a witness, by assuming the formula e1r(∀~x)[ϕ→ (ψ →
χ)]. Using the same procedure as in (g), this gives a t1 such that
(∃v)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ→ (ψ → χ)]]]
is deducible in (n−1)cj1 many lines. We also assume that yr[ϕ∧ψ]. Hence p1(y)rϕ
and p2(y)rψ can be proved in a uniform way. From p1(y)rϕ we get
(∃v1)(∃w1)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v1) ∧ T (U(v1), p1(y), w1) ∧ U(w1)r[ψ → χ]].
Moreover Theorem 6.1.2 gives us
(∃w1)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p1(y)〉, w1) ∧ U(w1)r[ψ → χ]].
Using p2(y)rψ, we get
(∃w)[T (t3(e1), 〈~x, p1(y), p2(y)〉, w) ∧ U(w)rχ]
by Theorem 6.1.2. Consequently we reach a length of (n− 1)cj1 + cj2 lines.
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Therefore we get
(∃w)[T (t4(e1, ~x), 〈p1(y), p2(y)〉, w) ∧ U(w)rχ]
by the S-m-n Theorem. This leads to
(∃w)[T (t4(e1, ~x), y, w) ∧ U(w)rχ]
by HA ` y = 〈p1(y), p2(y)〉. Since the S-m-n Theorem is used, the deduction has
a length of (n − 1)cj1 + cj2 + ncj3 many lines. Using the Deduction theorem with
yr[ϕ ∧ ψ] and generalisation, we therefore get
t4(e1, ~x)r[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ]
in (n − 1)cj1cD + cj2cD + ncj3cD + 6 many lines. By a similar construction as in
the preceding cases, we get therefore
t5(e1)r(∀~x)[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ]
in (n− 1)cj1cD + cj2cD + ncj3cD + cj4 many lines. Using the Deduction Theorem
with e1r(∀~x)[ϕ→ (ψ → χ)] and some logic, we get
(∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[ϕ ∧ ψ → χ]]
in (n − 1)cj1c2D + cj2c2D + ncj3c2D + cj4cD + cj5 many lines. If cj is chosen big
enough, then it is possible to bound the deduction by
(n+ 1)cj many lines.
(k) By induction hypothesis we have a deduction for (∃e1)[e1r(∀~x)[ϕ → ψ]]. We
assume that e1 is such a realiser, by assuming the formula e1r(∀~x)[ϕ → ψ]. By a
similar construction as in the previous cases, we get
(∃v)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ→ ψ]]
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in (n − 1)ck1 many lines. In order to use the Deduction Theorem, we start by
assuming that yr[χ ∨ ϕ]. This is
(p1(y) = 0→ p2(y)rχ) ∧ (p2(y) 6= 0→ p2(y)rϕ).
We assume that p1(y) = 0 and get, therefore, in two lines p2(y)rχ. Hence, by a
schematic deduction (we only need logic), we obtain
(p1(y) = 0→ p2(y)rχ) ∧ (p1(y) 6= 0→ p2(y)rψ).
Using the Deduction theorem, we get a deduction of
p1(y) = 0→ (p1(y) = 0→ p2(y)rχ) ∧ (p2(y) 6= 0→ p2(y)rψ),
which is
p1(y) = 0→ yr[χ ∨ ψ].
Therefore the deduction reaches (n1)ck1 + ck2cD many lines.
Next, we assume that p1(y) 6= 0. This gives p2(y)rψ; which together with
(∃v)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ U(v)r[ϕ→ ψ]]
the formula
(∃v)(∃w)[T (t1(e1), ~x, v) ∧ T (U(v), p2(y), w) ∧ U(w)rψ].
By Theorem 6.1.2 and primitive recursive operations, we, therefore, get
(∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w) ∧ U(w)rψ].
Hence we are able to obtain
(∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w)∧
(p1(y) = 0→ U(w)rχ) ∧ (p1(y) 6= 0→ U(w)rψ)].
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Because, since we have assumed that p1(y) 6= 0 holds, (p1(y) = 0 → U(w)rχ)
is deducible and (p1(y) 6= 0 → U(w)rψ) is just a weakening of U(w)rψ. By
Definition 2.2.18 and facts about the 〈., .〉 function, we therefore get
(∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w) ∧ 〈p1(y),U(w)〉r[χ ∨ ψ]]
in (n−1)ck1+ck2cD+ck3 many lines. Using the Deduction Theorem with p1(y) 6= 0,
we get a deduction of
p1(y) 6= 0→ (∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w) ∧ 〈p1(y),U(w)〉r[χ ∨ ψ]],
in (n− 1)ck1 + ck2cD + ck3cD many lines. Consequently both formulas,
p1(x) = 0→ yr[χ ∨ ψ]
and
p1(x) 6= 0→ (∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w) ∧ 〈p1(y),U(w)〉r[χ ∨ ψ]],
are included in one deduction of length (n−1)ck1 +ck2cD+ck3cD. It is well known
that arithmetic can combine logical connectives between two equations into one
equation. Therefore we get a deduction for
(∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w) ∧ tr[χ ∨ ψ]],
where t = (1−˙p1(y))y + sgn(p1(y))) · 〈p1(y),U(w)〉. Since the composition of a
recursive function with finitely many primitive recursive ones can be done primitive
recursively, there is a function symbol f such that
HA ` (∀~x, y, z)[(T (f(e1), 〈~x, y〉, z)→
(∃w)[T (t2(e1), 〈~x, p2(y)〉, w) ∧ U(w) = t(y,U(z))]].
Therefore we get
(∃w)[T (f(e1), 〈~x, y〉, w) ∧ U(w)r[χ ∨ ψ]]
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in (n− 1)ck1 + ck2cD + ck3cD + ck4 many lines. Using the S-m-n Theorem, we can
obtain
(∃w)[T (t3(e1, ~x), y, w) ∧ U(w)r[χ ∨ ψ]]
in (n − 1)ck1 + ck2cD + ck3cD + ck4 + nck5 many lines. By using the deduction
theorem for yr[χ∨ϕ] and generalisation, we therefore get in (n−1)ck1cD+ck2c2D+
ck3c
2
D + ck4cD + nck5cD + 6 many lines
t3(e1, ~x)r[χ ∨ ϕ→ χ ∨ ψ].
As in (g), we get from this
t4(e1)r(∀~x)[χ ∨ ϕ→ χ ∨ ψ]
in (n − 1)ck1cD + ck2c2D + ck3c2D + ck4cD + nck5cD + 6 + (n − 1)ck6 many lines.
Using the deduction theorem with e1r[ϕ→ ψ], we obtain
(∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[χ ∨ ϕ→ χ ∨ ψ]
in (n − 1)ck1cD + ck2c2D + ck3c2D + ck4cD + nck5cD + 6 + (n − 1)ck6 + ck7 many
lines. Choosing ck big enough, we obtain a bound for this case of
(n+ 1)ck.
(l) To stay in line with the notation that is used in the rest of the present proof, let’s
use y to denote the free variable that is quantified by the rule (l). Assume that
we have a deduction for (∃e1)[e1r[(∀~x, y)(ψ → ϕ(y))]]. Hence we assume that
e1r[(∀~x, y)(ψ → ϕ(y))], which gives the formula
(∀y)(∃z)[T (t1(e1), 〈~x, y〉, z) ∧ (∀u)[urψ → (∃v)[T (U(z), u, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(y)]]
by the same constructions as in (g) and Definition 2.2.18. Using Theorem 6.1.2
and the fact that concatenation can be done primitive recursively, we get a primitive
recursive function f1 such that
(∀~x, y, u)[urψ → (∃v)[T (f1(e0, t1(e1)), 〈~x, y, u〉, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(y)]].
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Hence the deduction reaches (n − 1)cl1 + cl2 many lines. As in previous cases,
we want to use the deduction theorem and assume therefore that zrψ. We can then
conclude
(∀~x, y)(∃v)[T (f1(e0, t1(e1)), 〈~x, y, z〉, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(y)].
Using the formalised S-m-n theorem, we get
(∀y)(∃v)[T (t2(e1, ~x, z), y, v) ∧ U(v)rϕ(y)]
in (n− 1)cl1 + cl2 + ncl3 many lines. This is
t2(e1, ~x, z)r[(∀y)ϕ(y)].
Since t2 is built up by function symbols for primitive recursive function, we can
find a primitive recursive f2 such that
HA ` (∀~x, y, z)[T (f2(e1, ~x), y, z)→ t2(e1, ~x, y) = U(z)]
and
HA ` (∀~x, y)(∃z)T (f2(e1, ~x), y, z).
Hence we get
(∃v)[T (f2(e1, ~x), z, v) ∧ U(v)r[(∀y)ϕ(y)]].
The construction of this deduction is schematic in xrϕ(x) and uses formalised
recursion theory which is provable in full generality in HA. Consequently this
extension of the deduction is bounded by (n − 1)cl1 + cl2 + ncl3 + cl4 many lines.
Using the deduction theorem (with zrψ) and generalisation, we get
f2(e1, ~x)r[ψ → (∀y)ϕ(y)].
Hence, using similar constructions as in the other cases, we get in (n−1)cl1 + cl2 +
ncl3 + cl4 + (n− 1)cl5 many lines the formula
t3(e1)r(∀~x)[ψ → (∀y)ϕ(y)].
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Using the deduction theorem with e1r(∀~x, y)[ψ → ϕ(y)] and combining this with
the induction hypothesis, we get
(∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[ψ → (∀y)ϕ(y)]]
in (n− 1)cl1cD + cl2cD +ncl3cD + cl4cD + (n− 1)cl5cD + cl6 many lines. Choosing
cl big enough, we can bound this case by
(n+ 1)cl.
(m) By the induction hypothesis we have a deduction of
(∃e1)[e1r[(∀~x, y)(ϕ(~x, y)→ ψ(~x))]].
So we assume that e1 is such a witness by assuming the formula
e1r[(∀~x, y)(ϕ(y)→ ψ)].
This formula is, according to Definition 2.2.18 and by similar constructions as in
(g), equal to the formula
(∀y)(∃z)[T (t1(e1), 〈~x, y〉, z) ∧ (∀u)[urϕ(y)→ (∃v)[T (U(z), u, v) ∧ U(v)rψ]]].
This leads to a deduction-length increment of (n − 1)cm1 many lines. Using the
same construction as in case (l), we get
(∀y, u)[urϕ(y)→ (∃v)[T (f(e1), 〈~x, u, y〉, v) ∧ U(v)rψ]].
In order to prove the conclusion of (m), we assume that ur(∃y)ϕ(y). This is,
according to Definition 2.2.18, equal to the formula p1(u)rϕ(p2(u)). Consequently
we can deduce
(∃v)[T (f(e1), 〈~x, 〈p1(u), p2(u)〉, y〉, v) ∧ U(v)rψ]].
This leads to
(∃v)[T (f(e1), 〈~x, u, y〉, v) ∧ U(v)rψ]]
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by using that
HA ` (∀x)[〈p1(x), p2(x)〉 = x].
Using the Deduction Theorem, similar constructions as in (g) and generalisation,
we get
t2(e1, ~x)r[(∃y)ϕ(y)→ ψ]
in (n− 1)cm1cD + cm2 many lines. Using Theorem 6.1.2 n− 1 many times, we get
a deduction for
t3(e1)r(∀~x)[(∃y)ϕ(y)→ ψ]
after (n− 1)cm1cD + cm2 + (n− 1)cm3 many lines. Using the Deduction Theorem
and some logic, we obtain
(∃e2)[e2r(∀~x)[(∃y)ϕ(y)→ ψ]]
by a deduction of length (n + 1)cm for a suitable cm, which was chosen as in
previous cases.
This finishes the logical part of a HA-deduction. In the following cases we continue with
the arithmetical part.
(n) (We exceptionally assume that we have m free variables, since unfortunately this is
case (n).) Note that all axioms defining a primitive recursive function and the first
identity-axiom (x = x) are of the form
t(~x) = s(~x),
i.e. they are atoms. Therefore they are their own realisations. Consequently, using
for an m-ary function-axiom the code for the m-ary constant-0-function, we can
deduce {e0}(~x)rt(~x) = s(~x) in one line. Using the same constructions as we did
for the logical axioms, we get
(∃e1)[e1r(∀~x)t(~x) = s(~x)]
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in mcn + cn = (m+ 1)cn many lines.
(o) The next group of axioms is realised by a constant-0-function with appropriate arity.
x = y ∧ y = z → x = z
S(x) 6= 0
S(x) = S(y)→ x = y
These are three axioms with at most three variables. Hence the deduction of their
realised versions can be bounded by the number co. The axiom schema
xi = y → [ϕ(x1, ..., xi, ..., xn)↔ ϕ(x1, ..., y, ..., xn)]
has n free variables. Hence we choose co big enough such that nco bounds the
length of this axiom’s deduction.
(p) The last step is the case of an induction axiom. To deduce the realised version of an
induction axiom in HA, we assume that
ur[ϕ(0, ~x) ∧ (∀y)[ϕ(y, ~x)→ ϕ(S(y), ~x)]].
As is explained in the proof of Theorem 2.2.19, we can use the Formalised
Recursion Theorem to obtain a realiser for (∀y)ϕ(y) that is also total. The length of
the deduction that establishes totality is independent from ϕ, since it depends only
on the realiser’s construction by the Formalised Recursion Theorem. Consequently
we get a t1 such that
t1(~x)r[[ϕ(0, ~x) ∧ (∀y)[ϕ(y, ~x)→ ϕ(S(y), ~x)]]→ (∀y)ϕ(y, ~x)]
is deducible in cp many lines. Using a similar construction as in previous cases, we
therefore get a deduction of
t2r(∀~x)[ϕ(0, ~x) ∧ (∀y)[ϕ(y, ~x)→ ϕ(S(y), ~x)]]→ (∀y)ϕ(y, ~x)],
with a constant term t2, that has ncp many lines.
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We finish the proof by noting that the total number of occurrences of free variables in the
deduction is bounded by m. 2
At this stage the reader should recapitulate the extension of the realisability translation
for LHA to the language LID(Q,P ), which is given by Definition 3.3.5. We continue our
investigation by having a closer look at the complexity of deductions that are given by
Lemma 3.3.6. In order to do this, we define a complexity function that ignores the length
of formulas from LID(Q).
`(ϕ) :=

1 : ϕ ∈ LID(Q) or ϕ ≡ P (x)
`(ψ1) + `(ψ2) + 1 : ϕ ≡ ψ1 ◦ ψ2 for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨,→}
`(ψ) + 1 : ϕ ≡ ∀yψ(y)
Note that ` grows linearly in the the code of ϕ.
In the following every constant that is used in the estimation of a deduction-complexity
is denoted by c. Of course this c is always a different c. If we refer to previous results in
a proof, then c always denotes the product of all constants that have been introduced so
far.3 With this convention we try to prevent an overuse of indices.
Lemma 6.1.7 For any strictly positive operator form A there is a accessibility operator
B and a c ∈ N such that
``(xrA)2cG xrA↔ B.
Proof
Since the proof of Lemma 3.3.6 uses only logic, the length increment in every case is
bounded by a constant (the constructions are very similar to those that were used to prove
Theorem 4.1.3). By taking c as the maximum of these constants, we can bound the length
3By using the product rather than the maximum, we take into account that the length of a deduction
times the length of its longest formula bounds this deduction’s complexity.
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of the deductions by `(xrA)c, because the proof goes by induction on `(xrA). However,
in addition the length of the schemata, which are used in the deductions, are constant in
every case. Hence we can bound them by `(xrA)c as well.4 2
Before we are able to extend Lemma 6.1.6 to LID(strict), we have to ensure that some
technicalities, which are proved in Lemma 3.3.10, do not enlarge the length of the
deductions to much.
Lemma 6.1.8 Assume that ϕ(z) ∈ LID(Q,P ) is a strictly positive operator form and
that
ψ(z) :≡ {v}(y, w, (z)0, (z)1)rϕ((z)0).
There is a c such that for any strictly positive operator form A ∈ LID(Q,P ), where
z1, ..., zn are the only freely occurring variables, there is a realizer (which is expressed by
a p-term) pA(x, v, w, y, z1, ..., zn) such that
HA ``(A)c (xrA)(ψ, PBr<y)↔ pA(x, v, w, y, z1, ..., zn)rA(ϕ, PB<y).5
Proof
First notice that pA(x, v, w, y, z1, ..., zn)rA(ϕ, PB<y) is neither a formula nor a translation
of one by itself. It is an abbreviation which denotes a realised formula that might include
an occurrence of the T formula, which is used in the coding of recursive functions.
The proof proceeds on the inductive definition of strictly positive operator forms. The
cases are enumerated in accordance with the proof of Lemma 3.3.10. The cases 1-4 and 6
include only logic, identity axioms and general facts about primitive recursive functions
4We distinguish the length of the schema and the length of the formula that is an instance of this schema,
e.g. ([(ϕ∧ψ)∧ (ϕ∧ψ)]→ (ϕ∧ψ)) has a length of 21 as a formula but a length of 9 as an instance of the
schema ((ϕ ∧ ϕ)→ ϕ).
5The set of p-terms is constructed by closing the set of terms of HA by λ-abstraction and Kleene-
brackets.
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(like pairing, projection and the function f of case 4). Therefore these cases are schematic
in ϕ, which makes the deductions that are given by these cases uniformly constructible.
Hence the lengths of these deductions are obviously bounded by a constant. The only
cases which remain problematic, because of they involve formalised recursion theory, are
5 and 7.
However the only problematic step in case 5 is the construction of a deduction for
(∀u)[pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rC(u, ϕ, PB<y)]↔ λu.pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rA(ϕ, PB<y).
But note that this is equivalent to
pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rC(u, ϕ, PB<y)↔ λu.pC({e}(u), z¯, u)rA(ϕ, PB<y),
which is just a generalisation at the right side of r. This can be done by a similar
construction as in the proof of Lemma 6.1.6. Since all the resources of formalized
recursion theory that are needed here are provable in full generality, the deductions given
thus are length-bounded by a constant.
In case 7 the situation is simpler. The only problematic step here is
(∀u)[(urC)(ψ, PBr<y)→ pD({e}(u), z¯)rD(ϕ, PB<y)]↔ λu.pD({e}(u), z¯)rA(ϕ, PB<y).
This can be done by the S-m-n Theorem (for a fixm and n) and the fact that concatenation
of two recursive functions can be done primitive recursively. Hence this case’s length-
increment is bounded by a constant as well.
Since the proof proceeds by an induction on `(A), we can bound the length-increment
by `(A)c, where c is the the maximum of all constants that are used in the present proof.
To bound the formulas in the deductions we have a similar situation. In all cases the
formulas are bounded by `(A)c as well. 2
Lemma 6.1.9 There is a c such that for any formula ϕ following under the schema
(∀y < n)(∀x)[PAy (x)↔ A(PAy , PA<y, x, y)],
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where A is a strictly positive operator, there is an m ∈ N such that
ÎD
i
n(acc) ``(A)
2c m¯rϕ.
Proof
Assume that ϕ is of the form (∀y < n)(∀x)[PAy (x) ↔ A(PAy , PA<y, x, y)] for a strictly
positive operator A. First notice that, since A is a strictly positive operator, ϕ is a
sentence. By Lemma 3.3.9 we know that xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y) and (xrA)(PA
r
y , P
Ar
<y, z, y)
are identical formulas. Therefore we get
HA ``(xrA)2c xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y)↔ Ar(PA
r
y , P
Ar
<y, 〈z, x〉, y)
by Definition 3.3.7 and Lemma 6.1.7. Using this equivalence together with the fixed point
axiom in ÎD
i
n(acc), one gets
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` y < n→ [xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ PA
r
y (〈z, x〉)].
The deduction is bounded by `(xrA)2c+`(xrA)2c1, because this step is only using logical
moves, which are schematic in the formulas used. By Definition 3.3.5 this gives
ÎD
i
n(acc) ` y < n→ [xrA(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ xrPAy (z)].
Therefore we can take m1 := pλuyzx.xq and use it as a realiser. To prove
m1r[y < n→ [A(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ PAy (z)]]
from this result one only needs a constant numbers of steps. For the deduction is uniform
in A and A includes not more than three free variables. Note that the variable u appearing
in m1 comes from the fact that
m1r[y < n→ [A(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ PAy (z)]]
is
(∀u)[ur(y < n)→ {m}(u)r[A(PAy , PA<y, z, y)→ PAy (z)]].
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This does not cause a problem, since ur(y < n) is identical to y < n by the Definition of
realisability.
The other direction of the axiom is provable in almost the same way, but with the
antecedent and the succedent permuted. So we can take m2 as the same as m1. Since
we can rely on the established equivalence
xrA(PAy , P
A
<y, z, y)↔ Ar(PA
r
y , P
Ar
<y, 〈z, x〉, y),
which was given in the previously shown direction, in a Hilbert-system, this needs only
a constant number of steps. Hence by taking m := 〈m1,m2〉 we can deduce m¯rϕ in
2(`(xrA)2c + `(xrA)2c2) many steps in ÎD
i
n(acc). Moreover we know that there is a
constant c3 such that `(xrA) ≤ c3`(A). Therefore we get a bound for the complexity of
the deduction by `(A)2c4, where c4 is our new c. 2
Before we are able to use those facts to extract a bound from the proof of Theorem 3.3.3
we have to go back to Chapter 2 one last time to have a closer look of Proposition 2.2.22.
Lemma 6.1.10 If ϕ is almost negative, then there is a c such that
HA `c·|ϕ|2 (∃x)(xrϕ)↔ ϕ.
Proof
The proof follows that of Proposition 2.2.22. It should not be hard to see that all cases
lead to a uniformly constructed deduction and, hence, can be bounded by a constant. So
by choosing the maximum of these constants we have found our c. As before we can
bound the formulas by a linear function as well and therefore reach a quadratic bound. 2
Remark 6.1.11 Note that the bound given in Lemma 6.1.10 is possible, because case 2
in the proof of Proposition 2.2.22 is rather ambiguous. Usually one would want to give
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i
<ω(strict) has at most an elementary speed-up over PA 172
a uniform function which chooses the minimum of the y, whose existence is assumed (as
is done in [59, p.193]). However choosing the minimum involves a computation of the
terms t and s involved. Therefore the deduction cannot be uniformly constructed. Here
the uniformity of choosing an instance is in tension with the uniformity of constructing a
deduction for which this instance satisfies the formula.
Theorem 6.1.12 There is a constant c such that for any almost negative sentence ϕ ∈
LHA
ÎD
i
n(strict) `m ϕ⇒ ÎD
i
n(acc) `(m+1)
12c ϕ.
Proof
Assume that ϕ ∈ LHA is an almost negative sentence with ÎD
i
n(strict) `m1 ϕ. Also
assume that the deduction of ϕ includes only k many instances of the fixed point axiom
ψ1, ..., ψk and that the biggest formula includes not more than l many symbols. Therefore
k, l < m and
HA ` ψ1 → ...→ ψk → ϕ
in m2cD many steps, by k applications of the Deduction Theorem with formulas whose
length is bounded by (m+ 1)m. Using Lemma 6.1.6, we get
HA `((m+1)4cD)2c (∃x)[xr[ψ1 → ...→ ψk → ϕ]].
By Lemma 6.1.9 we get
ÎD
i
n(acc) `m
2c m¯1rψ1
...
ÎD
i
n(acc) `m
2c m¯krψk.
After combining these deductions we can apply a Modus Ponens construction as in case
(g) from the proof of Lemma 6.1.6 and get
ÎD
i
n(acc) `((m+1)
4cD)
2c+2km2c (∃x)[{x}(m¯1, ..., m¯k)rϕ],
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where the term 2km2c emerges from k deductions of length m2c and m applications
of the modus ponens construction, which is bounded by c as defined in the proof of
Lemma 6.1.6. Taking c2 big enough so that c2Dc + c + c1 < c2, where c1 is the length of
the logical deduction that is needed to introduce (∃y),6 we get
ÎD
i
n(acc) `2((m+1)
4)3c2 (∃y)[yrϕ].
By Lemma 6.1.10 we get
HA `m2c2 (∃y)[yrϕ]→ ϕ.
This leads to
ÎD
i
n(acc) `3(m+1)
12c2 ϕ.
Hence, by taking 3c2 as our new c, we are done. 2
6.2 Bounding Ru¨ede Strahm
Since we gave a bound for ÎD
i
n(strict) ≤Π02 ÎD
i
n(acc), the next step is to give a bound
for ÎD
i
n(acc) ≤Π02 ACA−n ≤Π0∞ PA. As is described in Chapter 3 we give a translation
τ : L∗ID → LACAn ,
which is induced by a mapping
PA 7→ Hτ(A)
for every accessibility operator A. From the proof of Theorem 3.3.4 we can extract a
bound for the proof-theoretic reductions given above. However, as the reader might
have already noted, the proof of Theorem 3.3.4 includes the use of a formalised truth
predicate for Π0n-formulas of LID(Q). To make this notion precise we have to alter
6This inequality is ensured by the definition of c. Note that c was defined by adding such constructions
to some multiples of cD by the arguments in this chapter.
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Definition 2.1.3 and the Truth-predicate given in Theorem 2.1.11. Definition 2.1.3 is
extended to the language with includes all primitive recursive functions, i.e. equations
with terms including function symbols for primitive recursive functions are viewed as ∆0-
formulas, and we add the clause that Q(t) is viewed as a ∆0-formula. Since we want to
keep the possibility of talking about Πn-formulas in the original sense of Definition 2.1.3,
we call this new notion the Πn(Q)-formulas. Before we avoided the definition of a truth
predicate by citing Theorem 2.1.11. Here however we have to describe the truth predicate
that is in use in order to analyse how it acts in a formal deduction. Hence we sketch its
definition in a way that allows us to estimate how many lines are needed to deduce basic
properties of the truth predicate in our Hilbert-style system. It is possible to define an
evaluation function that evaluates every term of LID(Q) by a ∆1-formula ϕev. The ∆1-
formula ϕev states the existence of a formal computation of the term in question. Here,
again, we have to use the so called dot-notation for free variables, where x˙ denotes the xth
numeral. Hence, for a term t(x), the evaluation function is formulated as ϕev(pt(x˙)q, y),
which is a formula where only x and y occur freely.
We can use the evaluation function to formulate a truth predicate for Πn(Q)-formulas.
According to the definition of Πn(Q)-formulas, the atomic case is divided into the
following two cases:
Tid(pt1 = t2q) ≡ (∀x, y)[ϕev(pt1q, x) ∧ ϕev(pt2q, y)→ x = y],
which is in fact a ∆1-formula, since ϕev defines a function, and
TQ(pQ(t)q) ≡ Q(t),
becauseQ is a predicate symbol that is not given a meaning by the axioms. Then Tatom(x)
can be built up from Tid(x) and TQ(x) in the obvious way.
In the following considerations it will be necessary to measure the deduction-length of
deductions establishing the equivalence
TΠn(Q)(pϕq)↔ ϕ.
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For the atomic case the complexity of terms occurring in the formula will govern
the length-increment of these deductions. It is therefore necessary to specify how all
primitive recursive functions can be introduced by definitions like Definition 2.1.4 and
Definition 3.2.1. For the following proofs it is convenient to introduce primitive recursive
functions by axioms governing complex function symbols, i.e. the function symbols have
a structure that reflects the axioms which govern them.
Definition 6.2.1 The set of primitive recursive function symbols (p.r.f.s) is inductively
defined as follows:
1. The symbol for the successor function S is a symbol for a p.r.f.s of arity 1.
2. The symbol for the constant-0-function of arity n, Cn, is a p.r.f.s of arity n.
3. The symbol for the projection into the k-th input out of n inputs, P nk , is a p.r.f.s of
arity n.
4. If fn11 , ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
are p.r.f.s with their arities shown, then [Sub(fn11 , ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
)]n,
where n := max{n2, ..., nn1+1}, is a p.r.f.s of arity n.7
5. If fn11 , f
n2
2 are p.r.f.s with their arities shown, then [Rec(f
n1
1 , f
n2
2 )]
n, where n :=
max{n1 + 1, n2}, is a p.r.f.s of arity n.
Definition 6.2.1 determines the way that the p.r.f.s have to be introduced into a theory,
e.g. the theories that are defined in Definition 2.1.4 and Definition 3.2.1.
Definition 6.2.2 The axioms of the p.r.f.s are the universal closures of the following
formulas.
7Note that n1 function symbols have to be substituted into a function symbol with arity n1.
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1. For S:
¬S(x) = 0¯
S(x) = S(y)→ x = y
2. For a Cn:
Cn(x1, ..., xn) = 0¯
3. For a P nk :
P nk (x1, ..., xn) = xk
4. For a fn ≡ [Sub(fn11 , ..., fnn1+1n1+1 )]n:
fn(x1, ..., xn) = f
n1
1 (f
n2
2 (x1, ..., xn2), ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
(x1, ..., xnn1+1))
5. For a fn ≡ [Rec(fn11 , fn22 )]n:
fn(0, x1, ..., xn−1) = f
n1
1 (x1, ..., xn1)
fn(S(y), x1, ..., xn−1) = f
n2
2 (f
n(y, x2, ..., xn−1), y, x3, ..., xn2)
Note that in the axioms of case 4 and 5 the right term’s function symbols are less complex
than those of the left term. However the depth of the right is less than the left term’s. To
deal with this in the proof of the next lemma, we introduce two complexity notions.
Definition 6.2.3 Assume that f is a p.r.f.s. The degree of f , in symbols dg(f), is defined
as follows:
1. If f is S,Cn or P nk , then dg(f) = 1.
2. If f ≡ [Sub(fn11 , ..., fnn1+1n1+1 )]n, then
dg(f) =
n1+1∑
i=0
dg(fi) + 1.
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3. If f ≡ [Rec(fn11 , fn22 )]n, then
dg(f) = dg(f1) + dg(f2) + 1.
The degree of a term t ∈ LID(Q) is defined as the maximum of the degrees of all p.r.f.s
occurring in t.
The rank of t, rk(t), is defined as follows.
1. If t ≡ x or t ≡ 0¯, then rk(t) = 0.
2. If t ≡ f(t1, ..., tn), then rk(t) = n(max{rk(ti)|1 ≤ i ≤ n}+ 1).
The next lemma bounds the deduction-length of deductions whose existence is stated in
Lemma 2.1.11 for the atomic case.
Lemma 6.2.4 8 If ϕ is an atomic formula of LID(Q), then
PA `c·2(2d+6)r Tatom(Q, pϕq)↔ ϕ,
where r := rk(ϕ) and d := dg(ϕ).
Proof
In the case of ϕ ≡ Q(t), there is a constant c→Q bounding all deductions independently
8In the first version of my thesis, which was handed in for examination, this lemma demanded a super-
exponential growth rate and was proven by a double induction on the rank and degree of a term. But I
blocked the super-exponential growth rate by restricting the language to functions with a degree smaller
than 4. However the external examiner, Georg Moser, realised that the induction basis of this double
induction was not matching the induction step and announced his feelings that an exponential bound might
be possible. When I tried to fix the mismatch, I realised that no induction on the rank is needed and came
up with the proof that is given below. This also smoothens the rest of this chapter, because I do not have to
discuss the super-exponential growth rate away.
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from t.
In the case where ϕ is t1(~x) = t2(~x), we proceed by induction on
dg(ϕ) := dg(t1) + dg(t2)
.
• Induction base: Assume dg(ϕ) = 0. Hence ϕ is x1 = x2, 0¯ = x, x = 0¯ or 0¯ = 0¯.
We only check the case where x1 = x2; the others are entirely analogous. The
assumption Tatom(px˙1 = x˙2q) gives
(∀x, y)[ϕev(x˙1, x) ∧ ϕev(x˙2, y)→ x = y].
Therefore a very short deduction gives x1 = x2. The other direction follows easily
from the fact that
PA ` ϕev(x˙, x)
for every x by the definition of ϕev.
Bound: All four cases are schematic in the variables and can therefore be bounded
by a constant c. Also the maximal length of the formulas is bounded by a c.
• Induction step: Before we start with the argument we note that PA proves the
following sentences
(∀x)Tatom(px˙ = x˙q)
(∀x, y)[Tatom(px˙ = y˙q)→ Tatom(py˙ = x˙q)]
(∀x, y, z)[Tatom(px˙ = y˙q) ∧ Tatom(py˙ = z˙q)→ Tatom(px˙ = z˙q)].
Assume that dg(ϕ) > 0. In the proof we construct ψ1, ...ψm with dg(ψi) < dg(ϕ)
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ m on which the induction hypothesis can be applied. We know
that either dg(t1) ≤ dg(t2) or dg(t2) ≤ dg(t1), and we pick the term with the
higher degree (or t1, when they have the same). Without loss of generality we
pick t1, which can be assumed to be of the form f(s1, ..., sn). In the next step
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we introduce new variables x1, ..., xn, y and reformulate the problem through the
following equations
f(x1, ..., xn) = y
xi = si for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n
y = t2.
We continue to do that until all formulas have the form g(~x) = y. If such a ψi has
dg(ψi) < dg(f), then we apply the induction hypothesis. For the rest we proceed
as follows. According to Definition 6.2.1 we have to consider five cases:
1. f is S1: This case is trivial and bounded by a constant, because S(x˙) and ˙S(x)
give the same output.
2. f is a Cn: Here we note that dg(0¯ = y) < dg(f(~x) = y). Hence
Tatom(p0¯ = yq)↔ 0¯ = y,
by the induction hypothesis. Using the definition of ϕev, we get
Tatom(pCn(~x) = yq)↔ Tatom(p0¯ = yq).
Using the axioms governing Cn and identity, we get a deduction for
Cn(~x) = y ↔ 0¯ = y.
Combining this by logic, we get the desired implications.
Bound: Here the length increment is bounded by a constant.
3. f is a P nk : This case is analogous to the case for C
n.
4. f is a [Sub(fn11 , ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
)]n: Using the definition of ϕev and the axioms
governing Sub, we get deductions that are schematic in the terms and function
symbols in f(~x) = y for the following formulas; for readability we abbreviate
fn11 (f
n2
2 (x1, ..., xn2), ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
(x1, ..., xnn1+1)) by t.
Tatom(p[Sub(fn11 , ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
)]n(x1, ...xn) = yq)↔ Tatom(t = yq)
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[Sub(fn11 , ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
)]n(x1, ...xn) = y ↔ t = y.
Note that
dg(t) < dg([Sub(fn11 , ..., f
nn1+1
n1+1
)]n(x1, ...xn)).
Hence
Tatom(pt = yq)↔ t = y
by the induction hypothesis for dg, which fills the gap.
Bound: Here the length increment is bounded by a constant as in the cases
before, but we get n < r many new formulas of the form zi = fnii (x1, ..., xni)
on which the induction hypothesis is applied.
5. f is a [Rec(fn11 , f
n2
2 )]
n: In this case we know that the first subterm of t1 (which
we denoted by s1) is of the form S(...S(0)...) (denoted by Sm(0)). From the
definition of Tatom and the assumption
Tatom(pf(Sm(0), x2, ..., xn) = yq),
we get in a deduction of length mc the formulas:
Tatom(pfn22 (fn(Sm−1(0), x2, ..., xn−1), Sm−1(0), x3, ..., xn2) = yq)
Tatom(pfn(Sm−1(0), x2, ..., xn−1) =
fn22 (f
n(Sm−2(0), x2, ..., xn−1), Sm−2(0), x3, ..., xn2)q)
...
Tatom(pfn(S(0), x2, ..., xn−1) = fn22 (fn11 (x1, x2, ..., xn−1), 0, x3, ..., xn2)q).
The degree of all the formulas is smaller than that dg(f), therefore we can
deduce their appropriate equivalences by the induction hypothesis for dg.
Then we can combine these equivalences in a deduction of a length that is
linear in m to establish the equivalence for f(~x) = y; and we are done.
Bound: Note that m < r hence we have a bound on the length increment of
c · r2 (m deduction with a length of at most m · c lines).
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Now we summarise the restrictions on the bound. According to the preparation
step that splits the formulas to those of the form f(~x) = y, we have at most r many
formulas on which the induction hypothesis is applied to. In the five cases above
the number of applications of the induction hypothesis is bounded by r. Hence the
total number of applications is bounded by 2r. In addition any of the five cases
above adds at most c · r2 many lines to the deduction. Hence the length-bound is
given by the following recursion
h(d+ 1) = 2r · h(d) + r2 · c.
Calculations lead to
h(d) < c · (2r)d+3.
In order to bound the formulas, it should be clear that the length of the deduction
grows stronger than the length of the formulas, because all formulas introduced
are shorter than the previously given and substituted into schematic deductions.
Hence by squaring the deduction length and choosing a new constant c we have a
complexity bound of c · r2d+6, which can be bounded by c · 2(2d+6)r.
2
Lemma 6.2.5 If ϕ is any Π0n-formula of LID(Q) whose function symbols do not have a
degree bigger than g, then there is a truth-predicate Tn such that
PA `c·|ϕ|2·2(2g+6)·|ϕ| Tn(Q, pϕq)↔ ϕ.
Proof
The proof uses the previous lemmata together with the fact that a standard truth predicate
is inductively defined on the construction of a formula. Hence the bound for the
deduction-length is obtained from the bound of the atomic case, which may appear |ϕ|
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many times, and a linear factor that respects the complexity of the formula. In the same
way the formula-length is bounded linearly as well. Also note that the rank of the term is
bounded by the total length of the term and therefore by the total length of the formula. 2
Lemma 6.2.6 For any ϕ ∈ LID(Q) there is an n ∈ N and a pi ∈ Π0n(Q) such that
PA `c·|ϕ|2 ϕ↔ pi.
Proof
Reduction to prenex form is well known. The proof goes in both directions of the
implication by induction on the construction of ϕ. According to the main connectives
and the quantifiers there are several different cases. One of them has the longest
deduction-length increment and another the longest formula-length increment; which
therefore gives a constant. 2
Lemma 6.2.7 There is polynomial in natural coefficients P [X] such that the length of
a ACA−n -deduction for the translations of the fixed point axioms for the accessibility
operator A, which only contains function symbols of degree smaller than g, can be
bounded by P [2(2g+6)·|A|].
Proof
We work in ACA−n and follow the proof of Theorem 3.3.4. Assume that A(P,Q, x, y) is
an accessibility operator. Hence there are ϕ, ψ ∈ LID(Q) such that
A(P,Q, x, y) ≡ ϕ ∧ (∀z)[ψ(z)→ P (z)].
We also assume that the degree of all functions occurring in these formulas is bounded
by g. Then we choose an n such that ϕ and ψ are equivalent to a Πn(Q)-formula (ϕ¯)
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i
<ω(strict) has at most an elementary speed-up over PA 183
and a Σn(Q)-formula (ψ¯) respectively. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3.4, we replace
P (z) in A(P,Q, x, y) by a truth-predicate and therefore get a formula equivalent to a
Πn(Q)-formula. We denote this Π2(Q)-formula by A¯ and can deduce its equivalence to
the original one with a c · |A|2-complex deduction. A¯ has a Go¨del number k¯ and we can
therefore prove by a deduction of complexity
|A¯|2 · c · [2(2g+6)·|A¯| + 1]2
the equivalence
Tn(Q, k¯, u, x, y)↔ A¯(Tn(Q, u, u, z, y), Q, x, y).
Adding a constant c to the already reached complexity, we can substitute u by k¯ to get
Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, x, y)↔ A¯(Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, z, y), Q, x, y).
For notational reasons we abbreviate En(Q, k¯, k¯, x, y) by D(Q, x, y). Hence we get
(∀y < n)(∀x)[HDy (x)↔ D(HD<y, x, y)]
in one line by the comprehension Axiom with a formula of length |A¯|+ c.
Moreover, from the formula
Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, x, y)↔ A¯(Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, z, y), Q, x, y),
we can deduce
(∀y < n)(∀x)[Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, x, y)↔ A¯(Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, z, y), Q, x, y)]
in a constant number of lines. Hence we have reached a complexity of
|A¯|2 · c · [2(2g+6)·|A¯| + 1]2 + 2c2 · |A¯|.
Note, since we are only talking about implications, the length-increment of formulas can
be linearly bounded. Combining these two equivalences by another schematic deduction
we get
(∀y < n)(∀x)[HDy (x)↔ A¯(Tn(Q, k¯, k¯, z, y), Q, x, y)]
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in a deduction with complexity
|A¯|2 · c · [2(2g+6)·|A¯| + 1]2 + 3c · |A|.
However in order to arrive at the version with A instead of A¯, we have to add the
equivalence of these two formulas plus a schematic deduction which puts them together.
Therefore we reach a complexity of
|A¯|2 · c · [2(2g+6)·|A¯| + 1]2 + |A|2 · c+ 4c2 · |A¯|.
To finish the proof note that |A¯| ≤ c · |A| by reduction to prenex form. 2
Now we are able to bound the proof-theoretical reduction given by Theorem 3.3.4. For
readability we introduce the notation `mg , which means that there is a deduction of
complexity m in which only function symbols occur that have a degree less than g.
Theorem 6.2.8 There is a polynomial in natural coefficients P [X] such that
ÎDn(acc) `mg ⇒ ACA−n `P [2
(2g+6)m]
g ϕ.
Proof
The theorem follows easily by the previous Lemma and the fact that ACA−n and
ÎDn(acc) differ only in one axiom schema. 2
The next lemma gives the next link to the end-result.
Lemma 6.2.9 There is a polynomial in natural coefficients P [X] such that for any
formula ϕ ∈ LPA
ACA−n `mg ϕ⇒ PA `P [m]g ϕ.
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Proof
To prove the statement we use the substitution defined in the proof of Theorem 3.3.14.
However we do not proceed as in that proof, because the proof of Chapter 3 uses
cut-elimination which has super-exponential length increment. Instead we proceed
inductively on the length of the deduction. Since the logic and most of the axioms are
the same, the only interesting case is the basis case of a comprehension axiom
(∀y < n)(∀x)[Hϕy (x)↔ ϕ(Hϕ<y, x, y)],
which is equivalent to
n−1∧
k=0
(∀x)[Hϕk (x)↔ ϕ(Hϕ<k, x, k¯)]
over basic arithmetic. However that might cost a deduction-length increment of c · n and
an increment of formula-length of m · n.
Then we can use s from the proof of Theorem 3.3.14, which trivialises these formulas to
tautologies and adds c · n many lines to the deduction in order to deduce them. However
the formula-length increment after applying s to one of the sides of the equivalence is
(k + 1)! · (|ϕ| · 3)k+1, which we will prove next.9 However this is still only a polynomial
formula-length increment. For (n + 1)! is only a constant for a particular theory ACA−n
and k < n. We prove the bound by induction on k.
Induction Base: The formula s(Hϕ0 (t)) is ϕ([0¯ = 1¯], x, 0¯). Which gives
|s(Hϕ0 (t))| ≤ |ϕ| · |0¯ = 1¯| ≤ 1! · (|ϕ| · 3)1.
Since s(Hϕ0 (t)) ≡ s(ϕ(Hϕ<0, x, 0¯)), we are done with the base case.
Induction Step: As before we note that s(Hϕk+1(t)) and s(ϕ(H
ϕ
<k+1, x, 0¯)) give the same
formula. Therefore it is enough to take a closer look at only one of these formulas.
s(Hϕk+1(t)) ≡ ϕ([s(s(Hϕ<k+1(t)))], x, k¯)
≡ ϕ([s(Hϕ0 (t) ∨ ... ∨Hϕk (t))], x, k¯)
≡ ϕ([s(Hϕ0 (t)) ∨ ... ∨ s(Hϕk (t))], x, k¯)
9The function n! is defined by 1! := 1 and (n+ 1)! := (n+ 1) · n!.
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And for this formula we can see that
|ϕ([s(Hϕ0 (t)) ∨ ... ∨ s(Hϕk (t))], x, k¯)| ≤ |ϕ| · k · (k + 1)! · (|ϕ| · 3)k+1
≤ (k + 2)!(|ϕ| · 3)k+2.
2
The last step is to translate PA into HA.
Lemma 6.2.10 There is a polynomial in natural coefficients P [X] such that for any Π02-
sentence ϕ
PA `mg ϕ⇒ HA `P [m]g ϕ
Proof
See the trick Friedman uses in [21], which is schematic in the formula that is in use,
and can therefore be constructed uniformly. Since the proof relies on a logical trick, the
deductions can be bounded by a polynomial. 2
6.3 Sticking together and Conclusion
Sticking together Theorem 6.2.8, Lemma 6.2.10 and Lemma 6.2.9 gives the final result
of this chapter.
Theorem 6.3.1 There is a polynomial in natural coefficients P [X] such that for any Π02-
sentence ϕ
ÎD
i
n(acc) `mg ϕ⇒ HA `P [2
(2g+6)m]
g ϕ
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Obviously this result confirms the claim from the beginning of this chapter that the
proof-theoretic reduction gives at most an elementary speed-up for ÎD
i
n(acc) over PA
and HA. But in order to be useful for our aims we have to extended this result to
cases where axioms for transfinite induction are present. However Theorem 6.3.1 can
be easily extended to the cases with axioms for transfinite induction, because the proof
of Lemma 3.4.2 uses the same constructions as the proof of Theorem 2.2.19 does and
gives, therefore, also only a polynomial complexity increment; and Theorem 3.4.1 can
be complexity-analysed in the same way as Theorem 3.3.1 was. For, following the
proof of Theorem 3.4.1, in the realisability-step it makes no difference for an appeal to
Theorem 6.1.6 what logical form a realisable axiom has. Also in the case of a step that
uses one of Ru¨ede’s and Strahm’s translations a one line deduction for a TI(≺ α) axiom
in one language is translated into a one line deduction of a TI(≺ α) axiom in another
language. Moreover Lemma 6.2.10 can be easily extended to the cases with transfinite
induction so that they only give a polynomial deduction-complexity increment (as can be
easily seen from [21]). Hence, using Theorem 6.3.1, we get the following theorem.
Theorem 6.3.2 Assume that ≺ is a primitive recursive relation whose characteristic
function is in LPA. Also assume that α is an element in the domain of ≺. Then there
is a polynomial in natural coefficients P [X] such that for any Π02-sentence ϕ
ÎD
i
n(acc) + TI(≺ α) `mg ϕ⇒ HA+ TI(≺ α) `P [2
(2g+6)m] ϕ.
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Appendices
A Gentzen’s Method can be done Elementarily
As explained in Chapter 3, ordinal-analysis usually uses infinitary systems to establish
cut-elimination. As Mint proved in [33], this cut-elimination can be done elementary-
recursively. This raises the question whether those part of Gentzen’s method that do not
use the well-foundness of the ordinal-notation system OT (ε0) can be done elementarily
as well. Or in other words whether Gentzen’s method, which is usually viewed as
establishing
PRA+ PRWO(≺ε0) ` Con(PA),
can also be used to prove
EA+ ERWO(≺ε0) ` Con(PA).
The answer to this questions is yes and we will show this in the present appendix.10 A
similar result was given by Hajek and Pudlak in their book [26, pp. 373-375]. However
the proof of the result is less explicit by its shorter presentation.
10The schema PRWO(≺ε0) is the set of all formulas of the form
(∀~x)(∃y)[f(~x, y) ε0 f(~x, y + 1) ∨ “f(~x, y) is not an element of OT (ε0)′′],
where f is a function symbol of LPRA. ERWO(≺ε0) is similarly defined as PRWO(≺ε0) but is
formulated with the defining formulas of elementary recursive functions.
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The following presentation of Gentzen’s method follows almost entirely that given in
[57]. The crucial point in the reduction method that is given there is that, if one tags the
proofs with ordinals in a certain way, the output of the reduction has a smaller ordinal
than the input had. But, since we are not interested in the consistency proof itself, we skip
the ordinal part entirely.11 This has the disadvantage that we cannot emphasise why the
reduction method is useful. Moreover we are not able to formulate the statement about
the reduction as it is formulated in [57]. Instead we refer to the indicated lemma in [57]
and define the reduction algorithms in the actual proof of its elementariness. This saves
us from writing the definition of the reduction twice.
The consistence proof of PA operates on a sequent calculus (with a division of bounded
and free variables as two separate sets of symbols) in the ordinary language of arithmetic
with rules for all propositional connectives and both quantifiers (see [57, p. 9]). The meta-
logical vocabulary for sequent calculi, which includes primary and auxiliary formulas, is
defined as usual (see [57]). The logical axioms are of the form A ⇒ A for atomic A and
the mathematical axioms include the usual ones for equality as well as the following:
S(t1) = S(t2)⇒ t1 = t2
S(t) = 0⇒
⇒ t+ 0 = t
⇒ t1 + S(t2) = S(t1 + t2)
⇒ t · 0 = 0
⇒ t1 · S(t2) = (t1 · t2) + t1.
The crucial point is the reformulation of the induction axiom as a rule:
ϕ(a),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(S(a))
ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t) IND
11We can do that, because it is folklore that the standard ordinal notation systhemOT (ε0) is elementarily
definable.
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where t is an arbitrary term and a a free variable.
Note: All axioms are atoms, since induction is formulated as a rule.
In order to define the reduction method we have to give a bunch of definitions. It
should be clear that these notions can be defined elementarily by using some sort of
standard coding (like the one described later in this appendix).
Definition A.1 1. Fix a deduction D. The successor of a formula ϕ is defined as
follows:
(a) If ϕ is a cut formula, then ϕ has no successor.
(b) If ϕ is an auxiliary formula of an deduction rule other than a cut or exchange,
then the principal formula is the successor of ϕ.
(c) If ϕ is an auxiliary formula of exchange then in the lower sequent of exchange
ϕ is the successor of ϕ.
(d) If ϕ is the k-th formula of Γ,Π,∆ or Λ in the upper sequence, then the k-th
formula of Γ,Π,∆ or Λ in the lower sequent is the successor of ϕ.
2. A sequence of sequents will be called a thread in a deduction D if the following
properties are satisfied:
(a) The sequence begin with an (logical or mathematical) axiom and ends with
the end-sequent of D.
(b) Every sequent in the sequence except the last is an upper sequent of an
inference, and is immediately followed by the lower sequent of this inference.
3. Assume that S1,S2 and S3 are sequents in a deduction D. The sequent S1 is above
S2 (or S2 is below S1) iff there is a thread containing S1 and S2 and S1 appears
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before S2. The sequent S3 is between S1 and S2 iff S1 is above S3 and S2 is below
S3.
4. An inference is below a sequent S iff the lower sequent of the inference is below S.
5. Let D be a deduction and S a sequent in D. We call D′ the subdeduction of S in
D iff D′ is a deduction and contains exactly those sequents, which appear, in every
thread of D, above S.
6. A formula ϕ is called an axiom-formula or end-formula of D iff ϕ is contained in
an axiom or the end-sequent of D.
7. A sequence of formulas is called a bundle iff it satisfies the following conditions:
(a) The sequence begins with an axiom-formula or weakening-formula.
(b) The sequence ends with an end-formula or cut-formula.
(c) Every formula except the last in the sequence is immediately followed by its
successor.
8. Assume that ϕ and ψ are formulas. The formula ϕ is called the ancestor of ψ and
ψ is called the descendant of ϕ iff there is a bundle containing ϕ and ψ in which ϕ
appears before ψ.
9. The notation of implicit and explicit:
(a) A bundle is called explicit iff the the last formula in the bundle is an end-
formula.
(b) A bundle is called implicit iff the the last formula in the bundle is an cut-
formula.
(c) A formula in a deduction is called implicit or explicit iff the bundle which
contains the formula is implicit or explicit.
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(d) A sequent in a deduction is called implicit or explicit iff the sequent contains
a formula which is implicit or explicit.
(e) A logical inference is called implicit or explicit iff the principal formula of the
logical inference is implicit or explicit.
10. A part E of a deduction D is called the end-piece of D if it satisfied the following
properties:
(a) The end-sequent is in E.
(b) The upper sequent of an inference other than an implicit logical inference is
contained in E iff the lower sequent of the inference is in E.
(c) The upper sequent of an implicit logical inference is not in E.
Or for short: An sequent in a deduction is in the end-piece iff there is no implicit
logical inference below this sequent.
11. An inference I is in the end-piece of a deduction iff the lower sequent of I is in the
end-piece.
12. An inference I is a boundary iff the lower sequent of I is in the end-piece and the
upper is not.
13. A cut in the end-piece is called suitable iff each cut formula of the cut has an
ancestor which is the principal formula of a boundary.
Definition A.2 A deduction D is called regular iff D satisfies:
1. All eigenvariables in D are distinct.
2. If a is a free variable which occurs as a eigenvariable in a sequent S of D, then a
occurs just in sequents above S.
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In the following we define a coding and prove some facts about it. We have to scrutinise a
particular coding, since the main result will be proved by analysing the numerical growth
of codes under syntactical operations.
According to this task, we choose to code numbers and sequences by taking a detour over
firstly translating these into finite 0-1-strings as in [9]. Consequently we can take the
corresponding natural number of a basis-2-representation number-systhem as the code of
this string. In the following we sketch how this idea proceeds. The details that are not
mentioned here can be found in [9, pp. 89-94].
We start by defining functions, which allow us to deal with 0-1-strings in number theory:
|x| := dlog2(x+ 1)e
LenBit(y, x) := bx/ycmod 2
Bit(i, x) := LenBit(2i, x).
Here |x| serves as a length function for the binary representation of a natural number,
since it gives the least n such that 2n is bigger than x. The function Bit(i, x) serves as a
decoding function. Because, in the case where y = 2i is satisfied, LenBit(y, x) gives the
i−th bit in the binary expansion of x. Here the least significant bit is by convention the
zeroth bit. Consequently Bit(i, x) gives the i−th bit of the 0-1-string that is coded by x.
Also LenBit(y, x) and Bit(i, x) are polynomial bounded.
To code sequences of natural numbers, we identify their entries with their binary
representation. Consequently sequences can be viewed as strings of the symbols “0”, “1”
and “,”. To code those we translate them to a full 0-1-string by the following translation
rules:
, 7→ 01
0 7→ 10
1 7→ 11.
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For example the sequence 〈3, 0, 4〉 is viewed as , 11, , 100 (we add a comma at the
beginning to separate numbers form sequences). Hence, using the translation rules, we
get 0111110101111010, which represents the number 32122. Consequently 32122 is the
code of 〈3, 0, 4〉. We use p〈a0, ..., an〉q to denote the code of 〈a0, ..., an〉.
Using the functions that are defined so far, we can define the usual properties and, using
a trick, also a decoding and length function
β(i, 〈a0, ..., an〉) = ai for i ≤ n
Lg(〈a0, ..., an〉) = n+ 1,
which are polynomial bounded. But, since we are primarily interested in elementary
functions and substitution is necessarily exponential (as Proposition A.4 will show), we
skip the definitions and refer to [9] instead.
The next proposition gives the crucial fact of our coding.
Theorem A.3 For every sequence 〈a0, ..., an〉 it holds that
p〈a0, ..., an〉q ≤ 22·(Σni=0|ai|+n+1)
and
p〈a0, ..., an〉q ≤ 22n·(max(|ai|)+2).
Proof
Take an arbitrary sequence a¯ = 〈a0, ..., an〉. According to our coding the binary
representation of a¯ is build up by the binary representation of the ai and n + 1 commas.
By the translation rules for comma, 0 and 1 the length doubles. Consequently we get
|p〈a0, ..., an〉q| = 2 · (Σni=0|ai| + n + 1). Since n ≤ 2|n| for any n ∈ N, the first result
follows. The second statement is an easy consequence of the first. 2
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An interesting and (of course) well known result is that metamathematics cannot be
done with a class of functions that is properly contained in the elementary functions,
presupposing some natural closure properties.
Theorem A.4 The function Sub(〈a0, ..., an〉, a, b), which gives the sequence that is
obtained from 〈a0, ..., an〉 by substituting for every occurrence of a the number b, is
elementary and grows super-polynomially.
Proof
That the definition can be carried out primitive recursively with elementary functions is
easy to see, but it is also quite long to write down. Elementarity and super-polynomiality
can be shown in one step by showing that this application of primitive recursion can be
bounded by an elementary function.
Take a sequence a¯ = 〈a0, ..., an〉 and assume that it has m occurrences of a. By
the definition of our coding it is easy to see that |a¯| changes to |a¯| − 2m|a| + 2m|b|
after substituting b for a. Without loss of generality we can assume that |a¯| ≤ |b|.
Consequently we get |Sub(a¯, a, b)| ≤ |b|2. Finally, using Proposition A.3, we get
Sub(a¯, a, b) ≤ 2|Sub(a¯,a,b)| ≤ 2|b|2 . Since that is obviously the best one can do and 2|b|2 is
elementary, we are done.2
From [9] by some results of [50] it is easy to see that all the usual syntactical operations
on proofs and formulae are elementary; we will therefore take these results as given in
the following. The following theorem shows that the additional operations, that Takeuti
presents in [57], do not lead out of the realm of elementary functions. To show this we will
use an argument that is similar to the proof of Proposition A.4. It will give an elementary
bound on Takeuti’s transformations, which is formulated with elementary functions.
Since the functions used are elementary and it can be seen that the methods, which are
described in the proof, can be defined by a single application of primitive recursion,
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the bound shows that the transformation is elementary according to Definition 2.1.1.
Moreover Proposition A.4 shows that this is the best possible result according to the
classes that are usually used in subrecursive hierarchy theory.
Theorem A.5 The function Φ defined in the proof of [57, Lemma 12.8, p. 105] can be
carried out elementarily.
Proof
In the following we will proceed as in the proof of [57, Lemma 12.8, p. 105]. We
iteratively define Φ on the codes of proofs. But instead of giving an analysis of how Φ
lowers the ordinal rank, we estimate the numerical output of Φ. This will show that the
function is dominated by an elementary function. Since Φ can be defined via elementary
functions by primitive recursion, it follows from Definition 2.1.1 that Φ is elementary.
For this purpose we code a proof as a sequence of sequents. Consequently the length of a
deduction D, which is denoted by Lg(D), can be defined as the length of a sequence as
was mentioned above. The rank of a formula, which is denoted by rk(ϕ), is the number
of logical symbols in ϕ.
Φ operates on deductions D of a contradiction (denoted by D `⇒) and gives a new
deduction D′ of a contradiction; we define Φ which outputs 0 for all the other deductions.
Since being a deduction of a contradiction is an elementary predicate, we do not leave
the realm of elementary functions.
Assume that D is a deduction of a contradiction. We can also assume that D is regular,
since making a proof regular is an elementary operation by Proposition A.4. In the
following we describe the function iteratively. Here it is important to note that Φ includes
a case distinction of four cases. These four cases are described in step 2 to 5, while step 1
is only a preparation for step 2. We call the functions into which Φ is divided by the case
distinction Φ1,Φ2,Φ3 and Φ4. If one of the Φi is divided by a case distinction as well,
then we emphasis the distinction by an additional index, e.g. we use Φ3,1.
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Step 1: Assume that D contains a free variable a that is not used as an eigenvariable.
Replace a by the constant 0. This step applies as many times as possible.
Arbitrarily iterative substitution is not elementary; but here the length does not change
anyway. Because 0 is a single symbol.
Step 2:(Φ1) Assume that the end-piece of D contains some inferences that are
applications of IND. Assume that the lowest one is I and that it is of the form
....
ϕ(a),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(S(a))
ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t) IND....⇒ .
We denote the part of the subproof above I by P (a). When step 1 has been performed, t
is closed. Assume that the evaluation of t is n.12 Next we replace the subdeduction P (a)
by another deduction P ′ for ϕ(0),Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t). We construct deductions P ′n inductively
(on n) of ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(n).
n = 0: Here we replace P (a) by a deduction for ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(0). It is easy to see that
this can be deduced by a purely logical deduction of length ≤ 4 · rk(ϕ(0))2 + Lg(Γ) +
Lg(∆). Hence the deduction P ′0 satisfies
Lg(P ′0) ≤ 4 · rk(ϕ(0))2 + Lg(Γ) + Lg(∆) + Lg(D)− Lg(P (a)).
We call this bound p0.
n→ n+ 1: Assume that we already have a deduction P ′n. Then we can combine it with
P (n) by a cut in order to get P ′n+1 as follows:
P ′n....
ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(n)
P (n)....
ϕ(n),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(S(n))
ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(S(n)) Cut.
12Note that t is formulated in LQ. Hence the evaluation function can be chosen as elementary.
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An easy induction ensures the following:
Lg(P ′n) ≤ max{(Lg(P (0)) + n) · n, p0}.
In order to get the conclusion of I one has to deduce ϕ(n),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t). It can be easily
seen that one can do that by a deduction of length≤ 4·rk(ϕ(n))2+Lg(Γ)+Lg(∆)+f(ptq)
(which we call pt) for some uninteresting elementary function f . Hence, combining these
deductions with P ′n as follows
P ′n....
ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(n)
....
ϕ(n),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t)
ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t) Cut.
one gets the conclusion of I. We call this deduction P ′. Substituting P ′ for P (a) and I
into D, one gets the required D′. Since Lg(P (a)) ≤ Lg(D), p0 ≤ pt and because of the
fact that below ϕ(0),Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t) the deductions D′ and D are identical, we get
Lg(D′) ≤ max{(Lg(D) + 1 + n) · n, pt},
where n is the evaluation of t from the original application of IND.
Since no sequent in D′ has a code that is numerically bigger than the biggest in D, an
application of Proposition A.3 gives
pD′q = Φ1(pDq) ≤ 22·max{(d+1+n)·n,pt}·(dmax+2)
where d = Lg(D), dmax is the code of the maximal sequent in D and n, t are as before.
From now on we assume that there is no IND in D.
Step 3:(Φ2) Assume that the end-piece of D contains a logical axiom, say ϕ⇒ ϕ. Since
D `⇒ and there are no logical inferences in an end-piece, ϕ has to be cut out on both
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sides.
Case 1: The ϕ from the antecedent is cut out first.
Consider the subdeduction D0 that ends with the cut
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ϕ,Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Λ
where ϕ (from the succedent) is in Λ. So we can deduce Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Λ (we call it S) from
Γ ⇒ ∆, ϕ, using weakening and exchange, and get a new deduction for S that is called
D′0. Replacing D0 by D
′
0 in D, leads to a deduction D
′.
Note that the sequent with the biggest code in D, say dmax, also dominates all the codes
of sequents in D′. Consequently we get
pD′q = Φ2,1(pDq) ≤ 22·(Lg(D)+Lg(Π)+Lg(Λ))·(dmax+2)
by Proposition A.3.
Case 2: In the case where ϕ from the succedent is cut out first the argument is analogous.
Therefore we can assume that there is no application of IND and no logical axiom in the
end-piece of D.
Step 4:(Φ3) Assume that there is a weakening in the end-piece and letR be the lowest of
these. Since D `⇒, there must be a cut C below R such that the principal formula of R
is the cut formula of C, because the descendent of a formula has to be the formula itself
in the end-piece of any deduction that ends in the empty sequence. So a part of D has the
form:
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Π′ ⇒ Λ′
ϕ,Π′ ⇒ Λ′ R....
ϕ,Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Λ C .
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Case 1: If no contraction is applied to ϕ between R and C, then reduce D to D′ by
replacing the considered part of D by the following:
Π′ ⇒ Λ′....
Π⇒ Λ
weakenings and exchanges
Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Λ .
Since the part from Π′ ⇒ Λ′ to Π ⇒ Λ is as long as the corresponding part in D and the
number of weakenings is bounded by the number of added formulas, we get
pD′q = Φ3,1(pDq) ≤ 22·(Lg(D)+Lg(Γ)+Lg(∆))·(dmax+2),
where dmax is again the code of the sequent with the biggest code. Note that the biggest
sequent of D and D′ is the same object.
Case 2: Assume that case 1 does not hold. Then we consider the uppermost application
of contraction in the range between R and C and replace it as described below to get a
deduction D′ from D.
D D′
Π′ ⇒ Λ′
ϕ,Π′ ⇒ Λ′ Π′ ⇒ Λ′
....
ϕ, ϕ,Π′′ ⇒ Λ′′
ϕ,Π′′ ⇒ Λ′′
....
ϕ,Π′′ ⇒ Λ′′
....
ϕ,Π⇒ Λ
....
ϕ,Π⇒ Λ
Obviously
pD′q = Φ3,2(pDq) ≤ 22·Lg(D)·(dmax+2),
where dmax is the sequent with the biggest code in D.
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From now on we assume that there is no application of weakening in the end-piece of D.
Step 5:(Φ4) Assume that there is a suitable cut in the end-piece of D. In fact one can
prove that there is allays one, which shows that the case distinction is complete, but we
do not pay attention to this here. The lowermost of these cuts, called C, will be reduced.
Case 1: The cut formula of C has the form φ ∧ ψ, so D has the form
....
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ
....
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ψ
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ ∧ ψ R1....
Γ⇒ Θ, ϕ ∧ ψ
....
ϕ,Π′ ⇒ Λ′
ϕ ∧ ψ,Π′ ⇒ Λ′ R2....
ϕ ∧ ψ,Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ Θ,Λ C....
∆⇒ Ξ....⇒
where ∆ ⇒ Ξ is a sequent whose ordinal-tag satisfies some properties. Since there is an
elementary ε0 representation, ∆⇒ Ξ can be found elementarily and this search does not
affect the argument.
Consider the following deductions:
D′1:
....
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ
Γ′ ⇒ ϕ,Θ′
Γ′ ⇒ ϕ,Θ′, ϕ ∧ ψ weakening....
Γ⇒ ϕ,Θ, ϕ ∧ ψ
....
ϕ ∧ ψ,Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ ϕ,Θ,Λ R31....
∆⇒ ϕ,Ξ
∆⇒ Ξ, ϕ
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D′2:
....
Γ⇒ Θ, ϕ ∧ ψ
....
ϕ,Π′ ⇒ Λ′
Π′, ϕ⇒ Λ′
ϕ ∧ ψ,Π′, ϕ⇒ Λ′ weakening....
ϕ ∧ ψ,Π, ϕ⇒ Λ
Γ,Π, ϕ⇒ Θ,Λ R32....
∆, ϕ⇒ Ξ
ϕ,∆⇒ Ξ
Now D′ is constructed from D′1 and D
′
2 by sticking them together using a cut, and this
follows from ∆⇒ Ξ as in Dˆ.
D′1
∆⇒ Ξ, ϕ
D′2
ϕ,∆⇒ Ξ
∆⇒ Ξ....⇒ .
To bound this function we denote the subproof of D that proves ∆⇒ Ξ by P and the one
ending inR1 by R.
Note that the subproof of D′1 that ends with the new weakening has length ≤ Lg(R) +
Lg(Θ′). Consequently
Lg(D′1) ≤ Lg(P ) + Lg(Θ′) + Lg(Ξ).
Analogously
Lg(D′2) ≤ Lg(P ) + Lg(Θ′) + Lg(∆).
Since Lg(P ) ≤ Lg(D) and the new cut introduces 2 lines we get
Lg(D′) ≤ 2 · Lg(D) + Lg(Θ′) + Lg(∆) + Lg(Ξ) + 2.
In the following we will call this bound h(D).
Unlike the cases so far, the codes of the sequents in D′ are in general not bounded by the
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biggest of D (denoted by dmax). Since the only formulas that are added to the sequents
are ϕ, ϕ∧ψ and concatenations of (old) formulas with these two, we get that all sequents
in D′ are bounded by dmax ∗ pϕq ∗ pϕ ∧ ψq. The ∗ means concatenation, which is an
elementary function as well.
Applying Proposition A.3 as before we get
pD′q = Φ4,1(pDq) ≤ 22·h(D)·(dmax∗pϕq∗pϕ∧ψq+2).
Case 2: The cut formula of C has the form ∀xϕ(x), so D has the form
....
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ(a)
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ∀xϕ(x) R1....
Γ⇒ Θ,∀xϕ(x)
....
ϕ(s),Π′ ⇒ Λ′
∀xϕ(x),Π′ ⇒ Λ′ R2....
∀xϕ(x),Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ Θ,Λ C....
∆⇒ Ξ....⇒ .
As in case 1 D′ is constructed from two deductions D′1 and D
′
2 defined as follows.
D′1 : ....
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ(s)
Γ′ ⇒ ϕ(s),Θ′
Γ′ ⇒ ϕ(s),Θ′,∀xϕ(x) weakening....
Γ⇒ ϕ(s),Θ,∀xϕ(x)
....
∀xϕ(x),Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ ϕ(s),Θ,Λ....
∆⇒ ϕ(s),Ξ
∆⇒ Ξ, ϕ(s)
where the deduction of Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ(s) comes from the deduction of
Γ′ ⇒ Θ′, ϕ(a) by substitution.
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D′2 :
....
Γ⇒ Θ,∀xϕ(x)
....
ϕ(s),Π′ ⇒ Λ′
Π′, ϕ(s)⇒ Λ′
∀xϕ(x),Π′, ϕ(s)⇒ Λ′ weakening....
∀xϕ(x),Π, ϕ(s)⇒ Λ
Γ,Π, ϕ(s)⇒ Θ,Λ....
∆, ϕ(s)⇒ Ξ
ϕ(s),∆⇒ Ξ
From these two deductions, D′ is defined as follows:
D′1
∆⇒ Ξ, ϕ(s)
D′2
ϕ(s),∆⇒ Ξ
∆⇒ Ξ....⇒ .
The boundary can be found analogously to case 1.
For the rest of the cases the proof is very similar to the two which have been given.
Since any Φi for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4, which build the case distinction of Φ, can be bounded by an
elementary function, Φ is bounded by the sum of these bounds. Consequently Φ ∈ ERF
by Definition 2.1.1. 2
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B The Proof-Theoretic Ordinal of EA
The theory EA comprises the following axioms
1. (∀x)[S(x) 6= 0]
2. (∀x, y)[S(x) = S(y)→ x = y]
3. (∀x)[x+ 0 = x]
4. (∀x, y)[x+ S(y) = S(x+ y)]
5. (∀x)[x ∗ 0 = 0]
6. (∀x, y)[x ∗ S(y) = (x ∗ y) + x]
7. 20 = S(0)
8. (∀x)[2S(x) = 2x + 2x]
9. (∀x)[x ≤ 0↔ x = 0]
10. (∀x, y)[x ≤ S(y)↔ [x ≤ y ∨ x = S(y)]]
11. together with
ϕ(0) ∧ (∀x)[ϕ(x)→ ϕ(S(x))]→ (∀x)ϕ(x),
for every ϕ(x) ∈ ∆00 (for LEA).
We analyse EA in accordance to the following definition of proof-theoretic ordinal.
Definition B.1 Let T be a theory and OT (ε0) the natural ordinal notation system for
ordinals smaller than ε0 (see [57]). Assume that there are some ordinals α, β ∈ OT (ε0)
such that
T ` ERWF (α),
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but
T 6` ERWF (β).
Then we call the≺ε0-least of the β the bounded proof-theoretical ordinal of T and denote
it by ‖T‖min.
Here ERWF (α) is the set of all formulas of the form
(∀~x)(∃y)[f(~x, y + 1) 6≺ f(~x, y) ∨ f(~x, y) 6≺ α]
where f is an elementary recursive function.13
Remark B.2 One might want to define ‖T‖min via TI∆00(α) instead. I was sure that this
should be equivalent, because I expected that
EA+ {TI∆00(β)|β ≺ α} ≡Π02 EA+ {ERWF (β)|β ≺ α}
and TI∆00(α) is a Π
0
2-sentence. However this is not the case, because Sommer proved in
[54]
EA+ TI∆00(ω
2) ≡ IΣ1.
But IΣ1 proves ERWF (β) for any β < ωω (see [22]).
The proof-theoretic ordinal of EA will turn out to be ω3 and the proof uses mainly
recursion theoretic techniques; it only uses proof-theory through the back-door by
referring to Theorem 2.1.9.14 We will use results about the well known Grzegorczyk
Hierarchy, which is defined by using the following functions.
13Our formulation of the schema is of course an abbreviation, since we do not have all elementary
functions as function symbols in the language. f(y) = γ is used as an abbreviation of the natural Σ01-
formula that represents the graph of the function f in LEA.
14In fact I tried to give an ordinal-analysis by proof-theoretic methods and failed, because logical-
complexity is too rough a measure below IΣ1.
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Definition B.3 We define a sequence of primitive recursive functions 〈En〉n∈N as follows.
E0(x, y) := x+ y
E1(x) := x
2 + 2
En+2(0) := 2
En+2(x+ 1) := En+1(En+2(x))
By using this function we can define the Grzegorczyk Hierarchy.
Definition B.4 The set of primitive recursive functions E0 includes the successor function
S, the constant zero function 0 and for any n andm the projection function pnm. In addition
E0 is closed under composition and limited recursion.
En+1 is a superset of En, includes En and is closed under composition and limited
recursion.
In the following ERF and PRF are the sets of elementary and primitive recursive
functions respectively. We can prove the following facts about the Grzegorczyk
Hierarchy.
Theorem B.5 1. For any n ∈ N, En ( En+1.
2. E3 = ERF
3.
⋃
n∈ω En = PRF
Proof
1. Easy.
2. See [43, p. 33].
3. See [43, p. 35].
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2
The following definition regulates the connections between these sets and an ordering.
Definition B.6 A function θ is called a predecessor function for an ordering 〈N,≺〉, if it
satisfies the following conditions:
θ(0) = 0
x > 0 implies θ(x) ≺ x.
We say that f is defined from g and h by recursion on ≺, if
f(~x, y) :=
 g(~x) : y = 0h(~x, y, f(~x, θ(~x, y))) : y > 0
The following theorem is the main recursion-theoretic result for the ordinal analysis which
follows.
Theorem B.7 Assume that 〈N,≺〉 is a well-founded ordering with order-type ωn. Let f
be a function that is definable by functions from En by recursion on ≺. Then f ∈ En+1.
Proof
See [43, p. 59, Theorem 1.2]. 2
By these two theorems we can easily conclude the following corollary.
Corollary B.8
‖EA‖min  ω3
Proof
To prove the corollary we have to ensure that
EA 6` ERWF (ω3).
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We will proceed indirectly. So lets assume that
EA ` ERWF (ω3).
Theorem 2.1.9 and Theorem B.5 (2) ensure that we can define all functions of E3 in
EA. Consequently, using ERWF (ω3), we can deduce the totality of any function f
that is definable by elementary functions along the well-ordering ≺0 |ω3 . But the order
type of ≺0 |ω3 is ω3. Hence f is in E4 by Theorem B.7; which is a contradiction to
Theorem 2.1.9. 2
In order to give an ordinal-analysis it remains to prove that
ω3  ‖EA‖min.
However we start by showing that ω2 ≺ ‖EA‖min.
Lemma B.9
EA ` ERWO(ω2)
Proof
Assume f is an elementary recursive function. Then the function
g(~x) := µy[f(~x, y + 1) 6≺ f(~x, y)]
is defined in terms of elementary recursive functions. However the µ-operator is not
elementary, but the bounded-µ-operator is. Hence, finding an elementary t(~x) such that
g(~x) := µy < t(~x)[f(~x, y + 1) 6≺ f(~x, y)],
we can prove that g is elementary and can proceed as follows. Since g is elementarily, its
totality can be deduced inEA by Theorem 2.1.9. ConsequentlyERWO(ω2) is witnessed
by g; and we are done.
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Hence we have to find such a t(~x). To keep the following readable, we skip the free
variables. Note that all the ordinals below ω2 have the form ωk1+k2 and are usually coded
as (or at least their codes are elementary transformable to) 〈k1, k2〉. Hence, assuming the
range of f is bounded by ω2, the descending sequence that is defined by f looks like this:
ωkf(0) + k
′
f(0)  ωkf(1) + k′f(1)...  ωkf(n) + k′f(n)...
If kf(n) stays the same, then there are only k′f(n) many possibilities to be strictly smaller.
However there are only kf(0) many possibilities for strictly smaller kf(n). Hence
y <
p1(f(0))∑
i=0
(
p2(f(i))∑
j=0
j).
Since elementary functions are closed under bounded sums, projection is elementary and
f is elementary by assumption, we have found our t. 2
Theorem B.10 For any n,m ∈ N,
EA ` ERWF (ωm)→ ERWF (ωmn).
Proof
We prove the theorem by metainduction on n.
n = 1: The induction basis is equivalent to an instance of the tautology ψ → ψ.
n⇒ n+ 1: We work in EA and assume the two formulas
ERWF (ωmn)
ERWF (ωm).
The first gives a number z for counting down an f along ωmn and the latter gives a number
w for counting down ωm. Note that ordinal addition is (or is elementarily recursively
transformable to)
α + β := {〈x, γ〉|[x = 0→ γ ≺ α] ∧ [x = 1→ γ ≺ β]},
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when it is ordered lexicographically. Using the same line of argument as in Lemma B.9,
we can therefore bound y in a
(∀~x)(∃y)[f(~x, y + 1) 6≺ f(~x, y) ∨ f(~x, y) 6≺ ωmn+ ωm]
by z + w + 1, which is an elementary bound. Moreover this is equivalent to
ERWF (ωm(n+ 1)). Hence we are done.
2
This leads to the following corollary.
Corollary B.11
ω3  ‖EA‖min
Hence the following theorem can be proved.
Theorem B.12
‖EA‖min = ω3
Proof
By Corollary B.11 and Corollary B.8, we get
ω3  ‖EA‖min  ω3.
2
Remark B.13 One might suspect that Takeuti’s note in [57, p.29] that cut-elimination
can be proved by ω2-induction together with Minc’s elementary cut-elimination from [33]
implies cut-elimination in EA. This is not the case. It is true that a deduction in LK with
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cut-rank r and deduction height h can be seen as being labelled by ωr + h. However
there is an important difference between formalised finite and infinite cut-elimination.
In continuous cut-elimination one has to decorate the well-formed quasi-deductions by
ordinal labels in order to formally prove that they are in fact deductions; one has to
ensure that all their branches end in an axiom and not in an infinite chain of repetition
rules. Whether labelling is done during the cut-elimination procedure or afterwards is
inessential. The labelling starts by labelling the formal deduction by the estimated result,
which is taken from the informal proof. For instance, in the ordinal analysis of PA (see
Chapter 3), a cut-elimination starting from `αr ϕ would assign to the end-formula of the
resulting cut-free deduction the ordinal ωαr and then rebuild the deduction accordingly.
This can be done elementarily because the operation on the ordinal notation system
(α, β) 7→ ωαβ
is elementary (in this ordinal notation system). However in the finite case, labelling
LK `hr Γ ⇒ ∆ by ωr + h, Minc’s cut-elimination has to assign 2hr to the resulting cut-
free deduction in order to have enough room to construct a well-formed cut-free quasi-
deduction. But
(n,m) 7→ 2nm,
which is a function on numbers and not on ordinal terms, is not elementary. This problem
does not occur in the finite fragment of the infinite system that is used in the ordinal-
analysis of PA, because a finite deduction in this infinite system cannot include the ω-
rule and, hence, its end-formula must be a Σ01-formula. Consequently the cut-rank can be
bounded in these cases.
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C Deduction Systems
The following systems are all logical in nature and implicitly or explicitly used in the
present thesis in various places.
1. Go¨del’s system for intuitionistic logic is a Hilbert style system defined by the
following schemata for an arbitrary first-order language.
(a) ⊥ → ϕ
(b) ϕ ∨ ϕ→ ϕ and ϕ→ ϕ ∧ ϕ
(c) ϕ→ ϕ ∨ ψ and ϕ ∧ ψ → ϕ
(d) ϕ ∨ ψ → ψ ∨ ϕ and ϕ ∧ ψ → ψ ∧ ϕ
(e) (∀x)ϕ(x)→ ϕ(t)
(f) ϕ(t)→ (∃x)ϕ(x)
(g)
ϕ ϕ→ ψ
ψ
(h)
ϕ→ χ χ→ ψ
ϕ→ ψ
(i)
ϕ ∧ ψ → χ
ϕ→ (ψ → χ)
(j)
ϕ→ (ψ → χ)
ϕ ∧ ψ → χ
(k)
ϕ→ ψ
χ ∨ ϕ→ χ ∨ ψ
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(l)
ψ → ϕ(x)
ψ → (∀x)ϕ(x),
where x does not occur freely in ψ.
(m)
ϕ(x)→ ψ
(∃x)ϕ(x)→ ψ,
where x does not occur freely in ψ.
2. The sequent calculus LK for classical logic is defined as follows.
(a) Logical Axioms:
ϕ⇒ ϕ
for every atomic ϕ ∈ L(τ).
(b) Structural rules:
i. Weakening:
Γ⇒ ∆
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ (left)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ (right)
The formula ϕ is called the weakening-formula.
ii. Contraction:
ϕ, ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ (left)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ (right)
iii. Exchange:
Γ, ψ, ϕ,Π⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ, ψ,Π⇒ ∆ (left)
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ, ϕ,Λ
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ, ψ,Λ (right)
iv. Cut:
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ϕ,Π⇒ Λ
Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Λ
The formula ϕ is called the cut-formula. The rules (a)-(c) are called weak
structural rules.
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(c) Logical Rules:
i. Negation:
(¬ϕ),Γ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ (¬-left)
Γ⇒ ∆, (¬ϕ)
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ (¬-right)
ii. Conjunction:
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(ϕ ∧ ψ),Γ⇒ ∆ (∧-left1)
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆
(ψ ∧ ϕ),Γ⇒ ∆ (∧-left2)
and
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, (ϕ ∧ ψ) (∧-right)
iii. Disjunction:
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆ ψ,Γ⇒ ∆
(ϕ ∨ ψ),Γ⇒ ∆ (∨-left)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ
Γ⇒ ∆, (ϕ ∨ ψ) (∨-right1) and
Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, (ϕ ∨ ψ) (∨-right2)
iv. Implication:
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ ψ,Π⇒ Λ
(ϕ→ ψ),Γ,Π⇒ ∆,Λ (→ -left)
ϕ,Γ⇒ ∆, ψ
Γ⇒ ∆, (ϕ→ ψ) (→ -right)
v. Generalisation:
ϕ(t),Γ⇒ ∆
∀xϕ(x),Γ⇒ ∆ (∀-left)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(a)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∀xϕ(x) (∀-right)
where t is a term and a is a free variable not occurring in the lower
sequent, which is called the eigenvariable.
vi. Existence:
ϕ(a),Γ⇒ ∆
∃xϕ(x),Γ⇒ ∆ (∃-left)
Γ⇒ ∆, ϕ(t)
Γ⇒ ∆, ∃xϕ(x) (∃-right)
where t is a term and a is a free variable not occurring in the lower
sequent, which is called the eigenvariable.
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The Rules (a)-(d) are called propositional rules and (d) and (h) quantifier
rules. ∀-right and ∃-left are called strong the other cases weak quantifier rules.
The formulas in the upper sequents that are used in the rule are called auxiliary
formulas (a.f.) the formulas in the lower sequent that are modified are called
principal formulas (p.f.) and formulas which are not used are called side formulas
(s.f.).
3. LJ is defined as LK where the sequents that are in use are restricted to those which
do not have more than one formula on the right side.
4. The system that is used in [41] is defined as follows.
(∧) ` Γ, A and ` Γ, B ⇒ ` Γ, A ∧B
(∨) ` Γ, Ai and i ∈ {1, 2} ⇒ ` Γ, A1 ∨ A2
(∀1) ` Γ, F (a) ⇒ ` Γ, ∀xF (x)
(∃1) ` Γ, F (t) ⇒ ` Γ, ∃xF (x)
(∀2) ` Γ, F (U) ⇒ ` Γ,∀XF (X)
(∃2) ` Γ, F (U) ⇒ ` Γ,∃XF (X)
(cut) ` Γ, A and ` Γ,¬A ⇒ ` Γ
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